There are 8 open security issues in trixie.
8 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2026-0799:
(needs triaging)
In BPF instructions that load/store a value from/to a scratch memory register the register index is an unsigned 32-bit integer and must not exceed 15, but libpcap BPF interpreter does not validate the value. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause the interpreter to try reading and writing the OS process memory in the 16GiB starting at the current stack frame on 64-bit architectures and in the entire address space on 32-bit architectures.
- CVE-2026-6244:
(needs triaging)
libpcap BPF interpreter for the 'div #k' and 'mod #k' ALU instructions does not check whether the immediate value is zero. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause a division by zero.
- CVE-2026-6554:
(needs triaging)
libpcap BPF interpreter treats the offset in the 'ja L' BPF instruction as a signed integer to implement looping via backward jumps, but it does not limit the number of loop iterations. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause the interpreter to loop infinitely.
- CVE-2025-11961:
(needs triaging)
pcap_ether_aton() is an auxiliary function in libpcap, it takes a string argument and returns a fixed-size allocated buffer. The string argument must be a well-formed MAC-48 address in one of the supported formats, but this requirement has been poorly documented. If an application calls the function with an argument that deviates from the expected format, the function can read data beyond the end of the provided string and write data beyond the end of the allocated buffer.
- CVE-2026-18238:
(needs triaging)
The rpcap client code that processes a RPCAP_MSG_PACKET message received from the server incorrectly validates its headers. A malicious server can send a crafted message and cause the client to treat up to 20 bytes of the client process memory beyond the end of the buffer as if it was a part of the captured packet.
- CVE-2026-18313:
(needs triaging)
rpcapd can allocate up to 65536 bytes per each RPCAP_MSG_UPDATEFILTER_REQ or RPCAP_MSG_STARTCAP_REQ message received from the client, but it never frees the memory, so it leaks memory even under normal use. A malicious client can cause the server to leak memory substantially faster.
- CVE-2026-31911:
(needs triaging)
libpcap BPF interpreter calls abort() if it encounters a BPF instruction that has an invalid opcode. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can terminate the OS process.
- CVE-2026-31912:
(needs triaging)
libpcap BPF interpreter detects neither reaching the end of the filter program buffer due to lack of a return instruction nor executing a jump instruction with an offset that translates to a pointer outside of the buffer. In particular uncommon use cases a crafted filter program can cause the interpreter to try reading the OS process memory in the 32GiB around the buffer on 64-bit architectures and in the entire address space on 32-bit architectures.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/libp/libpcap.png){kind=link}