node-webfont - Debian Package Tracker

general

source: node-webfont (main)
version: 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-21
maintainer: Debian Javascript Maintainers (archive) (DMD)
uploaders: Julian Gilbey [DMD]
arch: all
std-ver: 4.7.4
VCS: Git (Browse, QA)

versions [more versions can be listed by madison] [old versions available from snapshot.debian.org]

[pool directory]

oldstable: 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-7
stable: 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-13
testing: 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-21
unstable: 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-21

versioned links

11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-7: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-13: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-21: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]

binaries

node-webfont

action needed

Problems while searching for a new upstream version high

uscan had problems while searching for a new upstream version:

Checksum supports only digits in versions, rc is not accepted

Created: 2026-09-03 Last update: 2026-09-09 12:01

8 security issues in trixie high

There are 8 open security issues in trixie.

8 important issues:

CVE-2023-26920: fast-xml-parser before 4.1.2 allows __proto__ for Prototype Pollution.
CVE-2026-25896: fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. From 4.1.3to before 5.3.5, a dot (.) in a DOCTYPE entity name is treated as a regex wildcard during entity replacement, allowing an attacker to shadow built-in XML entities (<, >, &, ", ') with arbitrary values. This bypasses entity encoding and leads to XSS when parsed output is rendered. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.3.5.
CVE-2026-26278: fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. In versions 4.1.3 through 5.3.5, the XML parser can be forced to do an unlimited amount of entity expansion. With a very small XML input, it’s possible to make the parser spend seconds or even minutes processing a single request, effectively freezing the application. Version 5.3.6 fixes the issue. As a workaround, avoid using DOCTYPE parsing by `processEntities: false` option.
CVE-2026-27942: fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. Prior to version 5.3.8, the application crashes with stack overflow when user use XML builder with `preserveOrder:true`. Version 5.3.8 fixes the issue. As a workaround, use XML builder with `preserveOrder:false` or check the input data before passing to builder.
CVE-2026-33036: fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Versions 4.0.0-beta.3 through 5.5.5 contain a bypass vulnerability where numeric character references (&#NNN;, &#xHH;) and standard XML entities completely evade the entity expansion limits (e.g., maxTotalExpansions, maxExpandedLength) added to fix CVE-2026-26278, enabling XML entity expansion Denial of Service. The root cause is that replaceEntitiesValue() in OrderedObjParser.js only enforces expansion counting on DOCTYPE-defined entities while the lastEntities loop handling numeric/standard entities performs no counting at all. An attacker supplying 1M numeric entity references like A can force ~147MB of memory allocation and heavy CPU usage, potentially crashing the process—even when developers have configured strict limits. This issue has been fixed in version 5.5.6.
CVE-2026-33349: fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. From version 4.0.0-beta.3 to before version 5.5.7, the DocTypeReader in fast-xml-parser uses JavaScript truthy checks to evaluate maxEntityCount and maxEntitySize configuration limits. When a developer explicitly sets either limit to 0 — intending to disallow all entities or restrict entity size to zero bytes — the falsy nature of 0 in JavaScript causes the guard conditions to short-circuit, completely bypassing the limits. An attacker who can supply XML input to such an application can trigger unbounded entity expansion, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. This issue has been patched in version 5.5.7.
CVE-2026-41650: fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Prior to version 5.7.0, XMLBuilder does not escape the "-->" sequence in comment content or the "]]>" sequence in CDATA sections when building XML from JavaScript objects. This allows XML injection when user-controlled data flows into comments or CDATA elements, leading to XSS, SOAP injection, or data manipulation. This issue has been patched in version 5.7.0.
CVE-2026-73569: fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. From 5.9.3 until 5.10.1, src/xmlparser/OrderedObjParser.js processes multiple DOCTYPE declarations within a single XML document and passes each declaration's entities through addInputEntities(). addInputEntities() resets maxTotalExpansions and maxExpandedLength every time it is called, allowing additional DOCTYPE declarations to repeatedly reset the configured entity-expansion limits during one parse operation. A crafted XML document can then cause excessive CPU use, event-loop blocking, memory exhaustion, and process termination. This issue is fixed in version 5.10.1.

Created: 2026-02-19 Last update: 2026-09-05 08:00

8 security issues in sid high

There are 8 open security issues in sid.

8 important issues:

CVE-2023-26920: fast-xml-parser before 4.1.2 allows __proto__ for Prototype Pollution.
CVE-2026-25896: fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. From 4.1.3to before 5.3.5, a dot (.) in a DOCTYPE entity name is treated as a regex wildcard during entity replacement, allowing an attacker to shadow built-in XML entities (<, >, &, ", ') with arbitrary values. This bypasses entity encoding and leads to XSS when parsed output is rendered. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.3.5.
CVE-2026-26278: fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. In versions 4.1.3 through 5.3.5, the XML parser can be forced to do an unlimited amount of entity expansion. With a very small XML input, it’s possible to make the parser spend seconds or even minutes processing a single request, effectively freezing the application. Version 5.3.6 fixes the issue. As a workaround, avoid using DOCTYPE parsing by `processEntities: false` option.
CVE-2026-27942: fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. Prior to version 5.3.8, the application crashes with stack overflow when user use XML builder with `preserveOrder:true`. Version 5.3.8 fixes the issue. As a workaround, use XML builder with `preserveOrder:false` or check the input data before passing to builder.
CVE-2026-33036: fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Versions 4.0.0-beta.3 through 5.5.5 contain a bypass vulnerability where numeric character references (&#NNN;, &#xHH;) and standard XML entities completely evade the entity expansion limits (e.g., maxTotalExpansions, maxExpandedLength) added to fix CVE-2026-26278, enabling XML entity expansion Denial of Service. The root cause is that replaceEntitiesValue() in OrderedObjParser.js only enforces expansion counting on DOCTYPE-defined entities while the lastEntities loop handling numeric/standard entities performs no counting at all. An attacker supplying 1M numeric entity references like A can force ~147MB of memory allocation and heavy CPU usage, potentially crashing the process—even when developers have configured strict limits. This issue has been fixed in version 5.5.6.
CVE-2026-33349: fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. From version 4.0.0-beta.3 to before version 5.5.7, the DocTypeReader in fast-xml-parser uses JavaScript truthy checks to evaluate maxEntityCount and maxEntitySize configuration limits. When a developer explicitly sets either limit to 0 — intending to disallow all entities or restrict entity size to zero bytes — the falsy nature of 0 in JavaScript causes the guard conditions to short-circuit, completely bypassing the limits. An attacker who can supply XML input to such an application can trigger unbounded entity expansion, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. This issue has been patched in version 5.5.7.
CVE-2026-41650: fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Prior to version 5.7.0, XMLBuilder does not escape the "-->" sequence in comment content or the "]]>" sequence in CDATA sections when building XML from JavaScript objects. This allows XML injection when user-controlled data flows into comments or CDATA elements, leading to XSS, SOAP injection, or data manipulation. This issue has been patched in version 5.7.0.
CVE-2026-73569: fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. From 5.9.3 until 5.10.1, src/xmlparser/OrderedObjParser.js processes multiple DOCTYPE declarations within a single XML document and passes each declaration's entities through addInputEntities(). addInputEntities() resets maxTotalExpansions and maxExpandedLength every time it is called, allowing additional DOCTYPE declarations to repeatedly reset the configured entity-expansion limits during one parse operation. A crafted XML document can then cause excessive CPU use, event-loop blocking, memory exhaustion, and process termination. This issue is fixed in version 5.10.1.

Created: 2026-02-19 Last update: 2026-09-05 08:00

8 security issues in forky high

There are 8 open security issues in forky.

8 important issues:

CVE-2023-26920: fast-xml-parser before 4.1.2 allows __proto__ for Prototype Pollution.
CVE-2026-25896: fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. From 4.1.3to before 5.3.5, a dot (.) in a DOCTYPE entity name is treated as a regex wildcard during entity replacement, allowing an attacker to shadow built-in XML entities (<, >, &, ", ') with arbitrary values. This bypasses entity encoding and leads to XSS when parsed output is rendered. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.3.5.
CVE-2026-26278: fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. In versions 4.1.3 through 5.3.5, the XML parser can be forced to do an unlimited amount of entity expansion. With a very small XML input, it’s possible to make the parser spend seconds or even minutes processing a single request, effectively freezing the application. Version 5.3.6 fixes the issue. As a workaround, avoid using DOCTYPE parsing by `processEntities: false` option.
CVE-2026-27942: fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. Prior to version 5.3.8, the application crashes with stack overflow when user use XML builder with `preserveOrder:true`. Version 5.3.8 fixes the issue. As a workaround, use XML builder with `preserveOrder:false` or check the input data before passing to builder.
CVE-2026-33036: fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Versions 4.0.0-beta.3 through 5.5.5 contain a bypass vulnerability where numeric character references (&#NNN;, &#xHH;) and standard XML entities completely evade the entity expansion limits (e.g., maxTotalExpansions, maxExpandedLength) added to fix CVE-2026-26278, enabling XML entity expansion Denial of Service. The root cause is that replaceEntitiesValue() in OrderedObjParser.js only enforces expansion counting on DOCTYPE-defined entities while the lastEntities loop handling numeric/standard entities performs no counting at all. An attacker supplying 1M numeric entity references like A can force ~147MB of memory allocation and heavy CPU usage, potentially crashing the process—even when developers have configured strict limits. This issue has been fixed in version 5.5.6.
CVE-2026-33349: fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. From version 4.0.0-beta.3 to before version 5.5.7, the DocTypeReader in fast-xml-parser uses JavaScript truthy checks to evaluate maxEntityCount and maxEntitySize configuration limits. When a developer explicitly sets either limit to 0 — intending to disallow all entities or restrict entity size to zero bytes — the falsy nature of 0 in JavaScript causes the guard conditions to short-circuit, completely bypassing the limits. An attacker who can supply XML input to such an application can trigger unbounded entity expansion, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. This issue has been patched in version 5.5.7.
CVE-2026-41650: fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Prior to version 5.7.0, XMLBuilder does not escape the "-->" sequence in comment content or the "]]>" sequence in CDATA sections when building XML from JavaScript objects. This allows XML injection when user-controlled data flows into comments or CDATA elements, leading to XSS, SOAP injection, or data manipulation. This issue has been patched in version 5.7.0.
CVE-2026-73569: fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. From 5.9.3 until 5.10.1, src/xmlparser/OrderedObjParser.js processes multiple DOCTYPE declarations within a single XML document and passes each declaration's entities through addInputEntities(). addInputEntities() resets maxTotalExpansions and maxExpandedLength every time it is called, allowing additional DOCTYPE declarations to repeatedly reset the configured entity-expansion limits during one parse operation. A crafted XML document can then cause excessive CPU use, event-loop blocking, memory exhaustion, and process termination. This issue is fixed in version 5.10.1.

Created: 2026-02-19 Last update: 2026-09-05 08:00

8 security issues in bookworm high

There are 8 open security issues in bookworm.

8 important issues:

CVE-2023-26920: fast-xml-parser before 4.1.2 allows __proto__ for Prototype Pollution.
CVE-2026-25896: fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. From 4.1.3to before 5.3.5, a dot (.) in a DOCTYPE entity name is treated as a regex wildcard during entity replacement, allowing an attacker to shadow built-in XML entities (<, >, &, ", ') with arbitrary values. This bypasses entity encoding and leads to XSS when parsed output is rendered. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.3.5.
CVE-2026-26278: fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. In versions 4.1.3 through 5.3.5, the XML parser can be forced to do an unlimited amount of entity expansion. With a very small XML input, it’s possible to make the parser spend seconds or even minutes processing a single request, effectively freezing the application. Version 5.3.6 fixes the issue. As a workaround, avoid using DOCTYPE parsing by `processEntities: false` option.
CVE-2026-27942: fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. Prior to version 5.3.8, the application crashes with stack overflow when user use XML builder with `preserveOrder:true`. Version 5.3.8 fixes the issue. As a workaround, use XML builder with `preserveOrder:false` or check the input data before passing to builder.
CVE-2026-33036: fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Versions 4.0.0-beta.3 through 5.5.5 contain a bypass vulnerability where numeric character references (&#NNN;, &#xHH;) and standard XML entities completely evade the entity expansion limits (e.g., maxTotalExpansions, maxExpandedLength) added to fix CVE-2026-26278, enabling XML entity expansion Denial of Service. The root cause is that replaceEntitiesValue() in OrderedObjParser.js only enforces expansion counting on DOCTYPE-defined entities while the lastEntities loop handling numeric/standard entities performs no counting at all. An attacker supplying 1M numeric entity references like A can force ~147MB of memory allocation and heavy CPU usage, potentially crashing the process—even when developers have configured strict limits. This issue has been fixed in version 5.5.6.
CVE-2026-33349: fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. From version 4.0.0-beta.3 to before version 5.5.7, the DocTypeReader in fast-xml-parser uses JavaScript truthy checks to evaluate maxEntityCount and maxEntitySize configuration limits. When a developer explicitly sets either limit to 0 — intending to disallow all entities or restrict entity size to zero bytes — the falsy nature of 0 in JavaScript causes the guard conditions to short-circuit, completely bypassing the limits. An attacker who can supply XML input to such an application can trigger unbounded entity expansion, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. This issue has been patched in version 5.5.7.
CVE-2026-41650: fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Prior to version 5.7.0, XMLBuilder does not escape the "-->" sequence in comment content or the "]]>" sequence in CDATA sections when building XML from JavaScript objects. This allows XML injection when user-controlled data flows into comments or CDATA elements, leading to XSS, SOAP injection, or data manipulation. This issue has been patched in version 5.7.0.
CVE-2026-73569: fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. From 5.9.3 until 5.10.1, src/xmlparser/OrderedObjParser.js processes multiple DOCTYPE declarations within a single XML document and passes each declaration's entities through addInputEntities(). addInputEntities() resets maxTotalExpansions and maxExpandedLength every time it is called, allowing additional DOCTYPE declarations to repeatedly reset the configured entity-expansion limits during one parse operation. A crafted XML document can then cause excessive CPU use, event-loop blocking, memory exhaustion, and process termination. This issue is fixed in version 5.10.1.

Created: 2026-02-19 Last update: 2026-09-05 08:00

Fails to build during reproducibility testing normal

A package building reproducibly enables third parties to verify that the source matches the distributed binaries. It has been identified that this source package produced different results, failed to build or had other issues in a test environment. Please read about how to improve the situation!

Created: 2026-09-06 Last update: 2026-09-09 06:01

lintian reports 23 warnings normal

Lintian reports 23 warnings about this package. You should make the package lintian clean getting rid of them.

Created: 2026-04-12 Last update: 2026-08-31 22:31

debian/patches: 1 patch to forward upstream low

Among the 19 debian patches available in version 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-21 of the package, we noticed the following issues:

1 patch where the metadata indicates that the patch has not yet been forwarded upstream. You should either forward the patch upstream or update the metadata to document its real status.

Created: 2025-10-04 Last update: 2026-08-31 19:33

news

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[2026-09-05] node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-21 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2026-08-31] Accepted node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-21 (source) into unstable (Xavier Guimard)
[2026-08-08] node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-20 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2026-08-03] Accepted node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-20 (source) into unstable (Jérémy Lal)
[2026-04-17] node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-19 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2026-04-11] Accepted node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-19 (source) into unstable (Xavier Guimard)
[2026-01-31] node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-18 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2026-01-26] Accepted node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-18 (source) into unstable (Jérémy Lal)
[2025-12-20] node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-16 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-12-15] Accepted node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-16 (source) into unstable (Jérémy Lal)
[2025-12-06] node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-15 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-12-06] node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-15 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-12-01] Accepted node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-15 (source) into unstable (Jérémy Lal)
[2025-10-09] node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-14 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-10-04] Accepted node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-14 (source) into unstable (Jérémy Lal)
[2025-04-27] node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-13 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-04-16] Accepted node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-13 (source) into unstable (Julian Gilbey)
[2025-03-16] node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-12 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-03-11] Accepted node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-12 (source) into unstable (Julian Gilbey)
[2025-02-14] Accepted node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-11 (source) into unstable (Jérémy Lal)
[2024-11-06] node-webfont REMOVED from testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-12-02] node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-10 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-11-29] Accepted node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-10 (source) into unstable (Julian Gilbey)
[2023-11-27] node-webfont REMOVED from testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-08-19] node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-9 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-08-16] Accepted node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-9 (source) into unstable (Julian Gilbey)
[2023-08-16] node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-8 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-08-14] Accepted node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-8 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2023-03-01] node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-7 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-02-19] Accepted node-webfont 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-7 (source) into unstable (Julian Gilbey)

bugs [bug history graph]

all: 0

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version: 11.4.0+dfsg2+~cs35.7.26-19