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ansible-core

Configuration management, deployment, and task execution system

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general
  • source: ansible-core (main)
  • version: 2.22.0-1
  • maintainer: Debian Python Team (DMD)
  • uploaders: Lee Garrett (DMD)
  • arch: all
  • std-ver: 4.7.4
  • VCS: Git (Browse, QA)
versions [more versions can be listed by madison] [old versions available from snapshot.debian.org]
[pool directory]
  • oldstable: 2.14.18-0+deb12u2
  • stable: 2.19.4-0+deb13u1
  • testing: 2.22.0-1
  • unstable: 2.22.0-1
versioned links
  • 2.14.18-0+deb12u2: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
  • 2.19.4-0+deb13u1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
  • 2.22.0-1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
binaries
  • ansible-core (1 bugs: 0, 1, 0, 0)
action needed
Marked for autoremoval on 18 December due to debugpy: #1145330 high
Version 2.22.0-1 of ansible-core is marked for autoremoval from testing on Fri 18 Dec 2026. It depends (transitively) on debugpy, affected by #1145330. You should try to prevent the removal by fixing these RC bugs.
Created: 2026-10-23 Last update: 2026-11-19 02:32
Debci reports failed tests high
  • unstable: fail (log)
    The tests ran in 1:58:33
    Last run: 2026-10-03T00:23:59.000Z
    Previous status: unknown

  • testing: pass (log)
    The tests ran in 1:26:07
    Last run: 2026-11-18T04:05:11.000Z
    Previous status: unknown

  • stable: pass (log)
    The tests ran in 1:29:04
    Last run: 2026-07-15T21:09:28.000Z
    Previous status: unknown

Created: 2026-06-24 Last update: 2026-11-19 02:02
5 security issues in trixie high

There are 5 open security issues in trixie.

4 important issues:
  • CVE-2026-84503: A flaw was found in ansible-core's ansible.builtin.git module. The module invokes git (ls-remote, clone, fetch) with the repository URL as a positional argument and without a "--" separator, so a repository URL that begins with a dash is interpreted by git as a command-line option. A caller that passes an attacker-controlled repository URL to the module can trigger argument injection (for example --upload-pack/--exec), resulting in arbitrary command execution on the host running the module.
  • CVE-2026-89091: A flaw was found in ansible-core. When installing a collection with `ansible-galaxy collection install`, the archive extractor validates member paths using lexical path normalisation (os.path.abspath) instead of resolving symbolic links (os.path.realpath), and it performs no containment check on symlink-typed directory members before creating them. A crafted collection tarball can chain symlink directory entries so that a subsequent file member is written outside the intended destination directory. This allows an attacker who can get a victim to install a malicious collection to overwrite arbitrary files with the privileges of the user running ansible-galaxy, leading to code execution on the control node. This is a bypass of the fix for CVE-2020-10691.
  • CVE-2026-123036: A flaw was found in ansible-core. When a task marked `no_log: true` fails, the task result is censored before being emitted, but the `exception` field is retained because it is present in the PRESERVE allow-list in lib/ansible/_internal/_task.py, and the default stdout callback prints it through CallbackBase._handle_exception. As a result, sensitive values the operator explicitly asked to hide can be disclosed: module argument-validation errors echo the argument value, templating errors print an Origin source snippet (the failing line plus the two preceding lines of the variables file, exposing neighbouring secrets from an -e @secrets.yml file), and fail/assert messages are printed in full. Secret material supplied as extra variables or variables files can therefore leak to terminal output, CI logs, and the stdout logs of any automation wrapping ansible-playbook, even though every task touching the secrets is marked no_log: true. This is a regression introduced with the ansible-core 2.19 data-tagging/templating rework; the behaviour does not occur on 2.16, where the error text is correctly censored.
  • CVE-2026-123037: A flaw was found in the ansible-core user module. When generate_ssh_key is enabled, User.ssh_key_gen() guards the key files against symlinks but checks the ~/.ssh directory only with os.path.exists(). An unprivileged user on a managed node who replaces their ~/.ssh with a symlink to an existing root-writable directory causes the privileged module to write the generated key pair through the symlink and then chown both files to that user. Because such files can be dropped into directories processed by schedulers (e.g. /etc/cron.daily) or dynamic MOTD (/etc/update-motd.d), the user can escalate to root on the managed node. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2024-9902.
1 issue left for the package maintainer to handle:
  • CVE-2026-16493: (needs triaging) A flaw was found in ansible-core. The _extract_collection_from_git() function in ansible-core's concrete_artifact_manager.py constructs git clone commands without a '--' (end-of-options) separator before user-supplied URLs when installing collections from git sources. An attacker who provides a crafted collection source URI containing git argument injection payloads can achieve arbitrary command execution when a user runs 'ansible-galaxy collection install' with the malicious source. This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-11332, which hardened the role install path but missed the equivalent collection install code path.

You can find information about how to handle this issue in the security team's documentation.

Created: 2026-07-21 Last update: 2026-11-13 23:30
4 security issues in sid high

There are 4 open security issues in sid.

4 important issues:
  • CVE-2026-16493: A flaw was found in ansible-core. The _extract_collection_from_git() function in ansible-core's concrete_artifact_manager.py constructs git clone commands without a '--' (end-of-options) separator before user-supplied URLs when installing collections from git sources. An attacker who provides a crafted collection source URI containing git argument injection payloads can achieve arbitrary command execution when a user runs 'ansible-galaxy collection install' with the malicious source. This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-11332, which hardened the role install path but missed the equivalent collection install code path.
  • CVE-2026-89091: A flaw was found in ansible-core. When installing a collection with `ansible-galaxy collection install`, the archive extractor validates member paths using lexical path normalisation (os.path.abspath) instead of resolving symbolic links (os.path.realpath), and it performs no containment check on symlink-typed directory members before creating them. A crafted collection tarball can chain symlink directory entries so that a subsequent file member is written outside the intended destination directory. This allows an attacker who can get a victim to install a malicious collection to overwrite arbitrary files with the privileges of the user running ansible-galaxy, leading to code execution on the control node. This is a bypass of the fix for CVE-2020-10691.
  • CVE-2026-123036: A flaw was found in ansible-core. When a task marked `no_log: true` fails, the task result is censored before being emitted, but the `exception` field is retained because it is present in the PRESERVE allow-list in lib/ansible/_internal/_task.py, and the default stdout callback prints it through CallbackBase._handle_exception. As a result, sensitive values the operator explicitly asked to hide can be disclosed: module argument-validation errors echo the argument value, templating errors print an Origin source snippet (the failing line plus the two preceding lines of the variables file, exposing neighbouring secrets from an -e @secrets.yml file), and fail/assert messages are printed in full. Secret material supplied as extra variables or variables files can therefore leak to terminal output, CI logs, and the stdout logs of any automation wrapping ansible-playbook, even though every task touching the secrets is marked no_log: true. This is a regression introduced with the ansible-core 2.19 data-tagging/templating rework; the behaviour does not occur on 2.16, where the error text is correctly censored.
  • CVE-2026-123037: A flaw was found in the ansible-core user module. When generate_ssh_key is enabled, User.ssh_key_gen() guards the key files against symlinks but checks the ~/.ssh directory only with os.path.exists(). An unprivileged user on a managed node who replaces their ~/.ssh with a symlink to an existing root-writable directory causes the privileged module to write the generated key pair through the symlink and then chown both files to that user. Because such files can be dropped into directories processed by schedulers (e.g. /etc/cron.daily) or dynamic MOTD (/etc/update-motd.d), the user can escalate to root on the managed node. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2024-9902.
Created: 2026-07-21 Last update: 2026-11-13 23:30
4 security issues in forky high

There are 4 open security issues in forky.

4 important issues:
  • CVE-2026-16493: A flaw was found in ansible-core. The _extract_collection_from_git() function in ansible-core's concrete_artifact_manager.py constructs git clone commands without a '--' (end-of-options) separator before user-supplied URLs when installing collections from git sources. An attacker who provides a crafted collection source URI containing git argument injection payloads can achieve arbitrary command execution when a user runs 'ansible-galaxy collection install' with the malicious source. This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-11332, which hardened the role install path but missed the equivalent collection install code path.
  • CVE-2026-89091: A flaw was found in ansible-core. When installing a collection with `ansible-galaxy collection install`, the archive extractor validates member paths using lexical path normalisation (os.path.abspath) instead of resolving symbolic links (os.path.realpath), and it performs no containment check on symlink-typed directory members before creating them. A crafted collection tarball can chain symlink directory entries so that a subsequent file member is written outside the intended destination directory. This allows an attacker who can get a victim to install a malicious collection to overwrite arbitrary files with the privileges of the user running ansible-galaxy, leading to code execution on the control node. This is a bypass of the fix for CVE-2020-10691.
  • CVE-2026-123036: A flaw was found in ansible-core. When a task marked `no_log: true` fails, the task result is censored before being emitted, but the `exception` field is retained because it is present in the PRESERVE allow-list in lib/ansible/_internal/_task.py, and the default stdout callback prints it through CallbackBase._handle_exception. As a result, sensitive values the operator explicitly asked to hide can be disclosed: module argument-validation errors echo the argument value, templating errors print an Origin source snippet (the failing line plus the two preceding lines of the variables file, exposing neighbouring secrets from an -e @secrets.yml file), and fail/assert messages are printed in full. Secret material supplied as extra variables or variables files can therefore leak to terminal output, CI logs, and the stdout logs of any automation wrapping ansible-playbook, even though every task touching the secrets is marked no_log: true. This is a regression introduced with the ansible-core 2.19 data-tagging/templating rework; the behaviour does not occur on 2.16, where the error text is correctly censored.
  • CVE-2026-123037: A flaw was found in the ansible-core user module. When generate_ssh_key is enabled, User.ssh_key_gen() guards the key files against symlinks but checks the ~/.ssh directory only with os.path.exists(). An unprivileged user on a managed node who replaces their ~/.ssh with a symlink to an existing root-writable directory causes the privileged module to write the generated key pair through the symlink and then chown both files to that user. Because such files can be dropped into directories processed by schedulers (e.g. /etc/cron.daily) or dynamic MOTD (/etc/update-motd.d), the user can escalate to root on the managed node. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2024-9902.
Created: 2026-07-21 Last update: 2026-11-13 23:30
6 security issues in bookworm high

There are 6 open security issues in bookworm.

4 important issues:
  • CVE-2026-84503: A flaw was found in ansible-core's ansible.builtin.git module. The module invokes git (ls-remote, clone, fetch) with the repository URL as a positional argument and without a "--" separator, so a repository URL that begins with a dash is interpreted by git as a command-line option. A caller that passes an attacker-controlled repository URL to the module can trigger argument injection (for example --upload-pack/--exec), resulting in arbitrary command execution on the host running the module.
  • CVE-2026-89091: A flaw was found in ansible-core. When installing a collection with `ansible-galaxy collection install`, the archive extractor validates member paths using lexical path normalisation (os.path.abspath) instead of resolving symbolic links (os.path.realpath), and it performs no containment check on symlink-typed directory members before creating them. A crafted collection tarball can chain symlink directory entries so that a subsequent file member is written outside the intended destination directory. This allows an attacker who can get a victim to install a malicious collection to overwrite arbitrary files with the privileges of the user running ansible-galaxy, leading to code execution on the control node. This is a bypass of the fix for CVE-2020-10691.
  • CVE-2026-123036: A flaw was found in ansible-core. When a task marked `no_log: true` fails, the task result is censored before being emitted, but the `exception` field is retained because it is present in the PRESERVE allow-list in lib/ansible/_internal/_task.py, and the default stdout callback prints it through CallbackBase._handle_exception. As a result, sensitive values the operator explicitly asked to hide can be disclosed: module argument-validation errors echo the argument value, templating errors print an Origin source snippet (the failing line plus the two preceding lines of the variables file, exposing neighbouring secrets from an -e @secrets.yml file), and fail/assert messages are printed in full. Secret material supplied as extra variables or variables files can therefore leak to terminal output, CI logs, and the stdout logs of any automation wrapping ansible-playbook, even though every task touching the secrets is marked no_log: true. This is a regression introduced with the ansible-core 2.19 data-tagging/templating rework; the behaviour does not occur on 2.16, where the error text is correctly censored.
  • CVE-2026-123037: A flaw was found in the ansible-core user module. When generate_ssh_key is enabled, User.ssh_key_gen() guards the key files against symlinks but checks the ~/.ssh directory only with os.path.exists(). An unprivileged user on a managed node who replaces their ~/.ssh with a symlink to an existing root-writable directory causes the privileged module to write the generated key pair through the symlink and then chown both files to that user. Because such files can be dropped into directories processed by schedulers (e.g. /etc/cron.daily) or dynamic MOTD (/etc/update-motd.d), the user can escalate to root on the managed node. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2024-9902.
2 issues postponed or untriaged:
  • CVE-2026-11332: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) A flaw was found in ansible-core. The ansible-galaxy role install command processes dependency specifications from a role's meta/requirements.yml file. Due to improper neutralization of argument delimiters, a malicious role author can inject arbitrary git configuration flags through the src field. This allows arbitrary code execution on the machine of a user who installs the role via ansible-galaxy role install.
  • CVE-2026-16493: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) A flaw was found in ansible-core. The _extract_collection_from_git() function in ansible-core's concrete_artifact_manager.py constructs git clone commands without a '--' (end-of-options) separator before user-supplied URLs when installing collections from git sources. An attacker who provides a crafted collection source URI containing git argument injection payloads can achieve arbitrary command execution when a user runs 'ansible-galaxy collection install' with the malicious source. This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-11332, which hardened the role install path but missed the equivalent collection install code path.
Created: 2026-10-09 Last update: 2026-11-13 23:30
1 new commit since last upload, is it time to release? normal
vcswatch reports that this package seems to have new commits in its VCS but has not yet updated debian/changelog. You should consider updating the Debian changelog and uploading this new version into the archive.

Here are the relevant commit logs:
commit a4d532956989b5b333089df48601c4ec9e80b4eb
Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
Date:   Tue Nov 10 09:38:24 2026 +0000

    d/tests/control: convert to deb822(5) syntax
    
    autopkgtest 6.1's `NEWS` file says:
    
    ```
      * Comments in debian/tests/control now follow deb822(5): only lines
        starting with '#' in the first column are ignored. Inline comments and
        indented comment lines are no longer stripped. Move such comments to
        separate lines starting with '#'.
    ```
    
    Conform to the new rules.
Created: 2026-11-10 Last update: 2026-11-16 03:30
news
[rss feed]
  • [2026-11-14] ansible-core 2.22.0-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2026-11-07] Accepted ansible-core 2.22.0-1 (source) into unstable (Lee Garrett)
  • [2026-10-08] ansible-core 2.22.0~beta2-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2026-10-02] Accepted ansible-core 2.22.0~beta2-1 (source) into unstable (Lee Garrett)
  • [2026-09-26] ansible-core 2.22.0~beta1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2026-09-20] Accepted ansible-core 2.22.0~beta1-1 (source) into unstable (Lee Garrett)
  • [2026-09-05] Accepted ansible-core 2.19.11-0+deb13u1 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Lee Garrett)
  • [2026-07-25] ansible-core 2.21.2-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2026-07-19] Accepted ansible-core 2.21.2-1 (source) into unstable (Lee Garrett)
  • [2026-07-04] ansible-core 2.21.1~rc1-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2026-06-29] Accepted ansible-core 2.21.1~rc1-2 (source) into unstable (Alexandre Detiste)
  • [2026-06-24] ansible-core 2.21.1~rc1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2026-06-18] Accepted ansible-core 2.21.1~rc1-1 (source) into unstable (Lee Garrett)
  • [2026-05-22] Accepted ansible-core 2.21.0-1 (source) into unstable (Lee Garrett)
  • [2026-03-18] ansible-core 2.20.3-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2026-03-13] Accepted ansible-core 2.20.3-1 (source) into unstable (Lee Garrett)
  • [2026-01-24] ansible-core 2.20.1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2025-12-19] Accepted ansible-core 2.20.1-1 (source) into unstable (Lee Garrett)
  • [2025-11-11] ansible-core 2.19.4-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2025-11-08] Accepted ansible-core 2.19.4-0+deb13u1 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Lee Garrett)
  • [2025-11-05] Accepted ansible-core 2.19.4-1 (source) into unstable (Lee Garrett)
  • [2025-10-28] ansible-core 2.19.3-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2025-10-22] Accepted ansible-core 2.19.3-2 (source) into unstable (Colin Watson)
  • [2025-10-19] Accepted ansible-core 2.19.1-0+deb13u1 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Lee Garrett)
  • [2025-10-12] ansible-core 2.19.3-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2025-10-07] Accepted ansible-core 2.19.3-1 (source) into unstable (Lee Garrett)
  • [2025-09-16] ansible-core 2.19.2-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2025-09-10] Accepted ansible-core 2.19.2-1 (source) into unstable (Lee Garrett)
  • [2025-09-02] ansible-core 2.19.1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2025-08-26] Accepted ansible-core 2.19.1-1 (source) into unstable (Lee Garrett)
  • 1
  • 2
bugs [bug history graph]
  • all: 4
  • RC: 0
  • I&N: 4
  • M&W: 0
  • F&P: 0
  • patch: 0
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  • version: 2.22.0~beta2-1
  • 5 bugs

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