There are 3 open security issues in bookworm.
2 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2025-14524:
(needs triaging)
When an OAuth2 bearer token is used for an HTTP(S) transfer, and that transfer performs a cross-protocol redirect to a second URL that uses an IMAP, LDAP, POP3 or SMTP scheme, curl might wrongly pass on the bearer token to the new target host.
- CVE-2025-14819:
(needs triaging)
When doing TLS related transfers with reused easy or multi handles and altering the `CURLSSLOPT_NO_PARTIALCHAIN` option, libcurl could accidentally reuse a CA store cached in memory for which the partial chain option was reversed. Contrary to the user's wishes and expectations. This could make libcurl find and accept a trust chain that it otherwise would not.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
1 ignored issue:
- CVE-2025-10148:
curl's websocket code did not update the 32 bit mask pattern for each new outgoing frame as the specification says. Instead it used a fixed mask that persisted and was used throughout the entire connection. A predictable mask pattern allows for a malicious server to induce traffic between the two communicating parties that could be interpreted by an involved proxy (configured or transparent) as genuine, real, HTTP traffic with content and thereby poison its cache. That cached poisoned content could then be served to all users of that proxy.
1 issue that should be fixed with the next stable update:
- CVE-2025-9086:
1. A cookie is set using the `secure` keyword for `https://target` 2. curl is redirected to or otherwise made to speak with `http://target` (same hostname, but using clear text HTTP) using the same cookie set 3. The same cookie name is set - but with just a slash as path (`path=\"/\",`). Since this site is not secure, the cookie *should* just be ignored. 4. A bug in the path comparison logic makes curl read outside a heap buffer boundary The bug either causes a crash or it potentially makes the comparison come to the wrong conclusion and lets the clear-text site override the contents of the secure cookie, contrary to expectations and depending on the memory contents immediately following the single-byte allocation that holds the path. The presumed and correct behavior would be to plainly ignore the second set of the cookie since it was already set as secure on a secure host so overriding it on an insecure host should not be okay.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/c/curl.png){kind=link}