There are 2 open security issues in trixie.
2 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2026-21619:
(needs triaging)
Uncontrolled Resource Consumption, Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in hexpm hex_core (hex_api modules), hexpm hex (mix_hex_api modules), erlang rebar3 (r3_hex_api modules) allows Object Injection, Excessive Allocation. This vulnerability is associated with program files src/hex_api.erl, src/mix_hex_api.erl, apps/rebar/src/vendored/r3_hex_api.erl and program routines hex_core:request/4, mix_hex_api:request/4, r3_hex_api:request/4. This issue affects hex_core: from 0.1.0 before 0.12.1; hex: from 2.3.0 before 2.3.2; rebar3: from 3.9.1 before 3.27.0.
- CVE-2026-32148:
(needs triaging)
Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in hexpm hex (Hex.RemoteConverger module) allows dependency integrity bypass via unverified lockfile checksums. Hex stores checksums for dependencies in the mix.lock file to ensure reproducible and integrity-checked builds. However, Hex.RemoteConverger.verify_resolved/2 never executes checksum verification because the lock data returned by Hex.Utils.lock/1 uses string-based dependency names, while the verification logic compares against atom-based names. This type mismatch causes the verification code path to be silently skipped. Checksums are still validated when packages are initially downloaded from the registry, but mismatches between the lockfile and resolved dependencies are not detected. An attacker who can influence cached packages (e.g., via local cache poisoning or a compromised registry) can provide modified dependency contents that will be accepted without detection. The mix.lock file is silently rewritten with the checksum values from the registry, erasing evidence of tampering. This issue affects hex: from 0.16.0 before 2.4.2.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/e/erlang-hex.png){kind=link}