There are 4 open security issues in bookworm.
4 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2024-1753:
(needs triaging)
A flaw was found in Buildah (and subsequently Podman Build) which allows containers to mount arbitrary locations on the host filesystem into build containers. A malicious Containerfile can use a dummy image with a symbolic link to the root filesystem as a mount source and cause the mount operation to mount the host root filesystem inside the RUN step. The commands inside the RUN step will then have read-write access to the host filesystem, allowing for full container escape at build time.
- CVE-2024-9407:
(needs triaging)
A vulnerability exists in the bind-propagation option of the Dockerfile RUN --mount instruction. The system does not properly validate the input passed to this option, allowing users to pass arbitrary parameters to the mount instruction. This issue can be exploited to mount sensitive directories from the host into a container during the build process and, in some cases, modify the contents of those mounted files. Even if SELinux is used, this vulnerability can bypass its protection by allowing the source directory to be relabeled to give the container access to host files.
- CVE-2024-9675:
(needs triaging)
A vulnerability was found in Buildah. Cache mounts do not properly validate that user-specified paths for the cache are within our cache directory, allowing a `RUN` instruction in a Container file to mount an arbitrary directory from the host (read/write) into the container as long as those files can be accessed by the user running Buildah.
- CVE-2024-9676:
(needs triaging)
A vulnerability was found in Podman, Buildah, and CRI-O. A symlink traversal vulnerability in the containers/storage library can cause Podman, Buildah, and CRI-O to hang and result in a denial of service via OOM kill when running a malicious image using an automatically assigned user namespace (`--userns=auto` in Podman and Buildah). The containers/storage library will read /etc/passwd inside the container, but does not properly validate if that file is a symlink, which can be used to cause the library to read an arbitrary file on the host.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/g/golang-github-containers-buildah.png){kind=link}