jackson-dataformat-smile - Debian Package Tracker

general

source: jackson-dataformat-smile (main)
version: 2.7.8-6
maintainer: Debian Java Maintainers (archive) (DMD)
uploaders: Hilko Bengen [DMD]
arch: all
std-ver: 4.6.0
VCS: Git (Browse, QA)

versions [more versions can be listed by madison] [old versions available from snapshot.debian.org]

[pool directory]

o-o-stable: 2.7.8-3
o-o-sec: 2.7.8-3+deb11u1
oldstable: 2.7.8-5+deb12u1
old-sec: 2.7.8-5+deb12u1
old-p-u: 2.7.8-5+deb12u1
stable: 2.7.8-5+deb13u1
stable-sec: 2.7.8-5+deb13u1
testing: 2.7.8-6
unstable: 2.7.8-6

versioned links

2.7.8-3: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
2.7.8-3+deb11u1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
2.7.8-5+deb12u1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
2.7.8-5+deb13u1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
2.7.8-6: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]

binaries

libjackson2-dataformat-smile

action needed

Problems while searching for a new upstream version high

uscan had problems while searching for a new upstream version:

In debian/watch no matching files for watch source
  https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-dataformat-smile/releases

Created: 2025-11-27 Last update: 2026-10-06 09:30

1 security issue in trixie high

There is 1 open security issue in trixie.

1 important issue:

CVE-2026-68496: The Smile parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. SmileParser._handleLongFieldName() grows its internal name buffer through an unconstrained _growArrayTo() call and performs no length validation. An attacker who can have a Smile document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach SmileFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the Smile module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforce maxNameLength incrementally during name decoding; this gap is specific to the binary formats. maxNameLength and validateNameLength were introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0, so releases before 2.16.0 do not contain the constraint that is left unenforced. This issue is tracked together with the CBOR parser defect in the same vendor advisory, GHSA-3v8f-v6vx-fmrm, which covers both binary formats. The Smile parser defect (jackson-dataformats-binary issue #726) is CVE-2026-68496; the CBOR parser defect (issue #725) is assigned CVE-2026-68495.

Created: 2026-10-01 Last update: 2026-10-02 08:31

1 security issue in sid high

There is 1 open security issue in sid.

1 important issue:

CVE-2026-68496: The Smile parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. SmileParser._handleLongFieldName() grows its internal name buffer through an unconstrained _growArrayTo() call and performs no length validation. An attacker who can have a Smile document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach SmileFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the Smile module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforce maxNameLength incrementally during name decoding; this gap is specific to the binary formats. maxNameLength and validateNameLength were introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0, so releases before 2.16.0 do not contain the constraint that is left unenforced. This issue is tracked together with the CBOR parser defect in the same vendor advisory, GHSA-3v8f-v6vx-fmrm, which covers both binary formats. The Smile parser defect (jackson-dataformats-binary issue #726) is CVE-2026-68496; the CBOR parser defect (issue #725) is assigned CVE-2026-68495.

Created: 2026-10-01 Last update: 2026-10-02 08:31

1 security issue in forky high

There is 1 open security issue in forky.

1 important issue:

CVE-2026-68496: The Smile parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. SmileParser._handleLongFieldName() grows its internal name buffer through an unconstrained _growArrayTo() call and performs no length validation. An attacker who can have a Smile document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach SmileFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the Smile module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforce maxNameLength incrementally during name decoding; this gap is specific to the binary formats. maxNameLength and validateNameLength were introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0, so releases before 2.16.0 do not contain the constraint that is left unenforced. This issue is tracked together with the CBOR parser defect in the same vendor advisory, GHSA-3v8f-v6vx-fmrm, which covers both binary formats. The Smile parser defect (jackson-dataformats-binary issue #726) is CVE-2026-68496; the CBOR parser defect (issue #725) is assigned CVE-2026-68495.

Created: 2026-10-01 Last update: 2026-10-02 08:31

1 security issue in bookworm high

There is 1 open security issue in bookworm.

1 important issue:

CVE-2026-68496: The Smile parser in FasterXML jackson-dataformats-binary never invokes StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength() when decoding JSON object property names, so the maxNameLength limit is not enforced for this format. SmileParser._handleLongFieldName() grows its internal name buffer through an unconstrained _growArrayTo() call and performs no length validation. An attacker who can have a Smile document parsed may therefore embed a single property name of unbounded length; the parser buffers the whole name in memory before returning it, whatever maxNameLength is configured to. Because StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength is also disabled by default, nothing else bounds the name under default settings, so the only limits are the attacker's upload capacity and available heap, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. No privileges beyond the ability to submit data to a parsing endpoint are required, and exploitation needs only that the bytes reach SmileFactory parsing, directly or through an ObjectMapper configured with the Smile module. jackson-core's own JSON parsers enforce maxNameLength incrementally during name decoding; this gap is specific to the binary formats. maxNameLength and validateNameLength were introduced in jackson-core 2.16.0, so releases before 2.16.0 do not contain the constraint that is left unenforced. This issue is tracked together with the CBOR parser defect in the same vendor advisory, GHSA-3v8f-v6vx-fmrm, which covers both binary formats. The Smile parser defect (jackson-dataformats-binary issue #726) is CVE-2026-68496; the CBOR parser defect (issue #725) is assigned CVE-2026-68495.

Created: 2026-10-01 Last update: 2026-10-02 08:31

lintian reports 1 warning normal

Lintian reports 1 warning about this package. You should make the package lintian clean getting rid of them.

Created: 2020-09-21 Last update: 2026-06-07 00:00

debian/patches: 2 patches to forward upstream low

Among the 2 debian patches available in version 2.7.8-6 of the package, we noticed the following issues:

2 patches where the metadata indicates that the patch has not yet been forwarded upstream. You should either forward the patch upstream or update the metadata to document its real status.

Created: 2023-02-26 Last update: 2026-06-06 23:00

Standards version of the package is outdated. wishlist

The package should be updated to follow the last version of Debian Policy (Standards-Version 4.7.4 instead of 4.6.0).

Created: 2022-05-11 Last update: 2026-06-06 18:00

news

[rss feed]

[2026-06-11] Accepted jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.8-5+deb13u1 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Markus Koschany)
[2026-06-11] Accepted jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.8-5+deb12u1 (source) into oldstable-proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Markus Koschany)
[2026-06-11] jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.8-6 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2026-06-10] Accepted jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.8-5+deb13u1 (source) into stable-security (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Markus Koschany)
[2026-06-10] Accepted jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.8-5+deb12u1 (source) into oldstable-security (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Markus Koschany)
[2026-06-08] Accepted jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.8-3+deb11u1 (source) into oldoldstable-security (Markus Koschany)
[2026-06-06] Accepted jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.8-6 (source) into unstable (Markus Koschany)
[2021-11-09] jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.8-5 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2021-11-04] Accepted jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.8-5 (source) into unstable (Markus Koschany)
[2021-11-02] Accepted jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.8-4 (source) into unstable (Markus Koschany)
[2018-02-01] jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.8-3 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2018-01-26] Accepted jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.8-3 (source) into unstable (Markus Koschany)
[2017-10-19] jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.8-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2017-10-13] Accepted jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.8-2 (source) into unstable (Markus Koschany)
[2016-12-31] jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.8-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2016-12-19] Accepted jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.8-1 (source all) into unstable (Emmanuel Bourg)
[2016-04-14] jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.3-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2016-04-08] Accepted jackson-dataformat-smile 2.7.3-1 (source all) into unstable (Emmanuel Bourg)
[2014-10-05] jackson-dataformat-smile 2.4.2-1 MIGRATED to testing (Britney)
[2014-09-24] Accepted jackson-dataformat-smile 2.4.2-1 (source all) into unstable (Timo Aaltonen)
[2013-12-06] jackson-dataformat-smile 2.2.2-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2013-09-03] Accepted jackson-dataformat-smile 2.2.2-1 (source all) (Wolodja Wentland) (signed by: Hilko Bengen)

bugs [bug history graph]

all: 2
RC: 0
I&N: 0
M&W: 2
F&P: 0
patch: 0

links

homepage
lintian (0, 1)
buildd: logs, reproducibility
popcon
browse source code
other distros
security tracker
debian patches

ubuntu

[Information about Ubuntu for Debian Developers]

version: 2.7.8-6