There are 3 open security issues in bookworm.
3 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2019-0231:
(needs triaging)
Handling of the close_notify SSL/TLS message does not lead to a connection closure, leading the server to retain the socket opened and to have the client potentially receive clear text messages afterward. Mitigation: 2.0.20 users should migrate to 2.0.21, 2.1.0 users should migrate to 2.1.1. This issue affects: Apache MINA.
- CVE-2021-41973:
(needs triaging)
In Apache MINA, a specifically crafted, malformed HTTP request may cause the HTTP Header decoder to loop indefinitely. The decoder assumed that the HTTP Header begins at the beginning of the buffer and loops if there is more data than expected. Please update MINA to 2.1.5 or greater.
- CVE-2024-52046:
(needs triaging)
The ObjectSerializationDecoder in Apache MINA uses Java’s native deserialization protocol to process incoming serialized data but lacks the necessary security checks and defenses. This vulnerability allows attackers to exploit the deserialization process by sending specially crafted malicious serialized data, potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE) attacks. This issue affects MINA core versions 2.0.X, 2.1.X and 2.2.X, and will be fixed by the releases 2.0.27, 2.1.10 and 2.2.4. It's also important to note that an application using MINA core library will only be affected if the IoBuffer#getObject() method is called, and this specific method is potentially called when adding a ProtocolCodecFilter instance using the ObjectSerializationCodecFactory class in the filter chain. If your application is specifically using those classes, you have to upgrade to the latest version of MINA core library. Upgrading will not be enough: you also need to explicitly allow the classes the decoder will accept in the ObjectSerializationDecoder instance, using one of the three new methods: /** * Accept class names where the supplied ClassNameMatcher matches for * deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected. * * @param classNameMatcher the matcher to use */ public void accept(ClassNameMatcher classNameMatcher) /** * Accept class names that match the supplied pattern for * deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected. * * @param pattern standard Java regexp */ public void accept(Pattern pattern) /** * Accept the wildcard specified classes for deserialization, * unless they are otherwise rejected. * * @param patterns Wildcard file name patterns as defined by * {@link org.apache.commons.io.FilenameUtils#wildcardMatch(String, String) FilenameUtils.wildcardMatch} */ public void accept(String... patterns) By default, the decoder will reject *all* classes that will be present in the incoming data. Note: The FtpServer, SSHd and Vysper sub-project are not affected by this issue.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/m/mina.png){kind=link}