There are 2 open security issues in trixie.
1 important issue:
- CVE-2026-130065:
msgpack-c through 7.0.2 contains a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in msgpack_vrefbuffer_migrate() in src/vrefbuffer.c that checks capacity against the source array's end pointer. When migrating between vrefbuffers of unequal size, the realloc is skipped and memcpy() writes iovec entries past the destination array, corrupting adjacent heap memory or crashing the application.
1 issue left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2026-72854:
(needs triaging)
msgpack_unpacker_expand_buffer in src/unpack.c, reached through the public msgpack_unpacker_reserve_buffer API, computes its new buffer size using an unchecked size_t addition of the requested size and the amount already used. The doubling loop guards its own multiplication against overflow, but the addition in the loop condition is unguarded, so a request near SIZE_MAX wraps: the loop condition is already satisfied, the allocation is performed at the small pre-wrap size, and the function returns true. The caller is told the requested capacity was reserved when it was not, so a subsequent write of the requested length overflows the heap buffer. The library's own example/lib_buffer_unpack.c demonstrates the reserve-then-write pattern, and its defensive assert comparing capacity against the request is compiled out under NDEBUG. msgpack-c's own decode entry points do not derive the reservation size from untrusted input, so reaching this requires an integration that passes an attacker-influenced length to the reservation API, such as a length-prefixed streaming transport.
You can find information about how to handle this issue in the security team's documentation.