There are 3 open security issues in trixie.
2 important issues:
- CVE-2026-111755:
follow-redirects is a Node.js HTTP and HTTPS client wrapper that automatically follows redirects. From 1.16.0 until 1.16.1, escapeRegex leaves valid header-name metacharacters unescaped in sensitiveHeaders. When an application declares a sensitive header whose name contains ^ or | and follows a cross-origin or HTTPS-to-HTTP redirect, unescaped regular-expression metacharacters prevent the generated filter from matching the declared header name, and the credential header is forwarded to an attacker-controlled redirect target. This issue is fixed in version 1.16.1.
- CVE-2026-111756:
follow-redirects is a Node.js HTTP and HTTPS client wrapper that automatically follows redirects. From version 1.16.0 to before version 1.16.1, follow-redirects removes sensitive credential headers (Authorization, Proxy-Authorization, Cookie, and any caller-declared sensitiveHeaders) before following a redirect that crosses to a different host or downgrades to a less secure protocol. The removal routine iterates the caller's headers container with for...in and matches header names against a filter. This assumes the headers container is a plain object keyed by header names. Node's underlying http.request, which follow-redirects is a drop-in replacement for, also accepts headers as an alternating array of names and values. For an array, for...in yields the numeric indices "0", "1", "2" and so on, which never match a header-name filter, so nothing is removed. An application that sends array-form headers and follows an attacker-controlled cross-origin redirect therefore forwards its Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization headers verbatim to the attacker-controlled destination, with no error or warning. The sensitiveHeaders option added to fix CVE-2026-40895 / GHSA-r4q5-vmmm-2653 is equally ineffective, because it relies on the same helper. This is an unauthenticated confidentiality vulnerability: any remote server the victim application contacts can harvest the victim's credential headers by responding with a cross-origin redirect. This issue has been patched in version 1.16.1.
1 issue left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2026-40895:
(needs triaging)
follow-redirects is an open source, drop-in replacement for Node's `http` and `https` modules that automatically follows redirects. Prior to 1.16.0, when an HTTP request follows a cross-domain redirect (301/302/307/308), follow-redirects only strips authorization, proxy-authorization, and cookie headers (matched by regex at index.js). Any custom authentication header (e.g., X-API-Key, X-Auth-Token, Api-Key, Token) is forwarded verbatim to the redirect target. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.16.0.
You can find information about how to handle this issue in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/n/node-follow-redirects.png){kind=link}