There are 6 open security issues in trixie.
4 important issues:
- CVE-2026-101910:
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. From 10.2.0 until 10.5.1, the Address6 isPrivate classifier in src/ipv6.ts does not recognize the NAT64 local-use range 64:ff9b:1::/48. Applications that combine isPrivate, isLoopback, and isLinkLocal for a trust-boundary decision can treat an internal IPv4 destination encoded through that range as external. Exploitation depends on a server network using an operator-selected NAT64 prefix within the local-use range. A successful bypass can cross the intended network trust boundary. This issue is fixed in version 10.5.1.
- CVE-2026-101911:
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Prior to 10.7.1, the Address6 constructor, Address6.isValid, and parse code in src/ipv6.ts accept unbounded strings and expand invalid characters through RE_BAD_CHARACTERS into large diagnostics. Material impact occurs only when an application accepts a very large attacker-controlled field and passes it to Address6 parsing without an earlier length bound. Common URL and header limits, and common body-parser defaults, generally constrain the effect; common defaults typically exclude 32 MiB fields. Megabyte-scale fields can cause a synchronous stall and high transient memory use, approximately 16 MiB can trigger an invalid string length exception, and process termination occurs at approximately 32 MiB. The affected entry points include Address6.isValid and construction paths that reach parse. This issue is fixed in version 10.7.1.
- CVE-2026-101912:
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Prior to 10.7.1, the isInSubnet and isHostInSubnet methods in src/common.ts compare masked binary strings without validating that both operands use the same IP family. A cross-family containment check whose leading address bits match makes the masked strings compare equal even though IPv4 and IPv6 do not share an address space. An allowlist or denylist decision can therefore classify an address outside the intended range as contained. This issue is fixed in version 10.7.1.
- CVE-2026-101913:
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Prior to 10.5.1, the Address6 isLinkLocal method in src/ipv6.ts recognizes only fe80::/64 instead of the complete fe80::/10 IPv6 link-local range. An attacker-controlled address elsewhere in fe80::/10 can therefore pass a trust-boundary check that relies on isLinkLocal. The same address is identified as link-local by getType and getScope, exposing the inconsistent classification. A successful bypass can reach an on-link host outside the intended trust boundary. This issue is fixed in version 10.5.1.
2 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2026-42338:
(needs triaging)
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Prior to 10.1.1, Address6.group() and Address6.link() do not HTML-escape attacker-controlled content before embedding it in the HTML strings they return, and AddressError.parseMessage (emitted by the Address6 constructor for invalid input) can contain unescaped attacker-controlled content in one branch. An application that (1) passes untrusted input to Address6 and (2) renders the output of these methods, or the thrown error's parseMessage, as HTML (e.g. via innerHTML) is vulnerable to cross-site scripting. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.1.1.
- CVE-2026-69192:
(needs triaging)
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Prior to 10.3.1, Address4 accepts an octet written with a leading zero and decodes it as decimal, while the WHATWG URL host parser, inet_aton, and getaddrinfo all decode a leading zero as octal. The library and the network stack therefore disagree about which host a string names. new Address4('012.0.0.1') reports correctForm() of 12.0.0.1 and isPrivate() of false, but fetch('http://012.0.0.1/') connects to 10.0.0.1. An application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks, for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF, will classify an internal target as external and allow the request. The defect is in the parse gate rather than in any one classifier, so every consumer of Address4 inherits it: isPrivate(), isLoopback(), isLinkLocal(), isCGNAT(), isInSubnet(), isHostInSubnet(), and correctForm() are all computed from the mis-decoded octets. This issue is fixed in version 10.3.1.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/n/node-ip-address.png){kind=link}