node-minimatch - Debian Package Tracker

general

source: node-minimatch (main)
version: 9.0.3-6
maintainer: Debian Javascript Maintainers (archive) (DMD)
uploaders: Jérémy Lal [DMD]
arch: all
std-ver: 4.7.0
VCS: Git (Browse, QA)

versions [more versions can be listed by madison] [old versions available from snapshot.debian.org]

[pool directory]

o-o-stable: 3.0.4+~3.0.3-1+deb11u2
oldstable: 5.1.1+~5.1.2-1
stable: 9.0.3-6
testing: 9.0.3-6
unstable: 9.0.3-6

versioned links

3.0.4+~3.0.3-1+deb11u2: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
5.1.1+~5.1.2-1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
9.0.3-6: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]

binaries

node-minimatch

action needed

A new upstream version is available: 10.2.4 high

A new upstream version 10.2.4 is available, you should consider packaging it.

Created: 2025-11-26 Last update: 2026-03-14 04:47

3 security issues in trixie high

There are 3 open security issues in trixie.

2 important issues:

CVE-2026-27903: minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3 fix the issue.
CVE-2026-27904: minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4, nested `*()` extglobs produce regexps with nested unbounded quantifiers (e.g. `(?:(?:a|b)*)*`), which exhibit catastrophic backtracking in V8. With a 12-byte pattern `*(*(*(a|b)))` and an 18-byte non-matching input, `minimatch()` stalls for over 7 seconds. Adding a single nesting level or a few input characters pushes this to minutes. This is the most severe finding: it is triggered by the default `minimatch()` API with no special options, and the minimum viable pattern is only 12 bytes. The same issue affects `+()` extglobs equally. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4 fix the issue.

1 issue left for the package maintainer to handle:

CVE-2026-26996: (needs triaging) minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Versions 10.2.0 and below are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive * wildcards followed by a literal character that doesn't appear in the test string. Each * compiles to a separate [^/]*? regex group, and when the match fails, V8's regex engine backtracks exponentially across all possible splits. The time complexity is O(4^N) where N is the number of * characters. With N=15, a single minimatch() call takes ~2 seconds. With N=34, it hangs effectively forever. Any application that passes user-controlled strings to minimatch() as the pattern argument is vulnerable to DoS. This issue has been fixed in version 10.2.1.

You can find information about how to handle this issue in the security team's documentation.

Created: 2026-02-21 Last update: 2026-02-27 01:31

3 security issues in sid high

There are 3 open security issues in sid.

3 important issues:

CVE-2026-26996: minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Versions 10.2.0 and below are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive * wildcards followed by a literal character that doesn't appear in the test string. Each * compiles to a separate [^/]*? regex group, and when the match fails, V8's regex engine backtracks exponentially across all possible splits. The time complexity is O(4^N) where N is the number of * characters. With N=15, a single minimatch() call takes ~2 seconds. With N=34, it hangs effectively forever. Any application that passes user-controlled strings to minimatch() as the pattern argument is vulnerable to DoS. This issue has been fixed in version 10.2.1.
CVE-2026-27903: minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3 fix the issue.
CVE-2026-27904: minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4, nested `*()` extglobs produce regexps with nested unbounded quantifiers (e.g. `(?:(?:a|b)*)*`), which exhibit catastrophic backtracking in V8. With a 12-byte pattern `*(*(*(a|b)))` and an 18-byte non-matching input, `minimatch()` stalls for over 7 seconds. Adding a single nesting level or a few input characters pushes this to minutes. This is the most severe finding: it is triggered by the default `minimatch()` API with no special options, and the minimum viable pattern is only 12 bytes. The same issue affects `+()` extglobs equally. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4 fix the issue.

Created: 2026-02-21 Last update: 2026-02-27 01:31

3 security issues in forky high

There are 3 open security issues in forky.

3 important issues:

CVE-2026-26996: minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Versions 10.2.0 and below are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive * wildcards followed by a literal character that doesn't appear in the test string. Each * compiles to a separate [^/]*? regex group, and when the match fails, V8's regex engine backtracks exponentially across all possible splits. The time complexity is O(4^N) where N is the number of * characters. With N=15, a single minimatch() call takes ~2 seconds. With N=34, it hangs effectively forever. Any application that passes user-controlled strings to minimatch() as the pattern argument is vulnerable to DoS. This issue has been fixed in version 10.2.1.
CVE-2026-27903: minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3 fix the issue.
CVE-2026-27904: minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4, nested `*()` extglobs produce regexps with nested unbounded quantifiers (e.g. `(?:(?:a|b)*)*`), which exhibit catastrophic backtracking in V8. With a 12-byte pattern `*(*(*(a|b)))` and an 18-byte non-matching input, `minimatch()` stalls for over 7 seconds. Adding a single nesting level or a few input characters pushes this to minutes. This is the most severe finding: it is triggered by the default `minimatch()` API with no special options, and the minimum viable pattern is only 12 bytes. The same issue affects `+()` extglobs equally. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4 fix the issue.

Created: 2026-02-21 Last update: 2026-02-27 01:31

3 security issues in bullseye high

There are 3 open security issues in bullseye.

2 important issues:

CVE-2026-27903: minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3 fix the issue.
CVE-2026-27904: minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4, nested `*()` extglobs produce regexps with nested unbounded quantifiers (e.g. `(?:(?:a|b)*)*`), which exhibit catastrophic backtracking in V8. With a 12-byte pattern `*(*(*(a|b)))` and an 18-byte non-matching input, `minimatch()` stalls for over 7 seconds. Adding a single nesting level or a few input characters pushes this to minutes. This is the most severe finding: it is triggered by the default `minimatch()` API with no special options, and the minimum viable pattern is only 12 bytes. The same issue affects `+()` extglobs equally. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4 fix the issue.

1 issue postponed or untriaged:

CVE-2026-26996: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Versions 10.2.0 and below are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive * wildcards followed by a literal character that doesn't appear in the test string. Each * compiles to a separate [^/]*? regex group, and when the match fails, V8's regex engine backtracks exponentially across all possible splits. The time complexity is O(4^N) where N is the number of * characters. With N=15, a single minimatch() call takes ~2 seconds. With N=34, it hangs effectively forever. Any application that passes user-controlled strings to minimatch() as the pattern argument is vulnerable to DoS. This issue has been fixed in version 10.2.1.

Created: 2026-02-26 Last update: 2026-02-27 01:31

3 security issues in bookworm high

There are 3 open security issues in bookworm.

2 important issues:

CVE-2026-27903: minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3, `matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior. Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.3 fix the issue.
CVE-2026-27904: minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Prior to version 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4, nested `*()` extglobs produce regexps with nested unbounded quantifiers (e.g. `(?:(?:a|b)*)*`), which exhibit catastrophic backtracking in V8. With a 12-byte pattern `*(*(*(a|b)))` and an 18-byte non-matching input, `minimatch()` stalls for over 7 seconds. Adding a single nesting level or a few input characters pushes this to minutes. This is the most severe finding: it is triggered by the default `minimatch()` API with no special options, and the minimum viable pattern is only 12 bytes. The same issue affects `+()` extglobs equally. Versions 10.2.3, 9.0.7, 8.0.6, 7.4.8, 6.2.2, 5.1.8, 4.2.5, and 3.1.4 fix the issue.

1 issue left for the package maintainer to handle:

CVE-2026-26996: (needs triaging) minimatch is a minimal matching utility for converting glob expressions into JavaScript RegExp objects. Versions 10.2.0 and below are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when a glob pattern contains many consecutive * wildcards followed by a literal character that doesn't appear in the test string. Each * compiles to a separate [^/]*? regex group, and when the match fails, V8's regex engine backtracks exponentially across all possible splits. The time complexity is O(4^N) where N is the number of * characters. With N=15, a single minimatch() call takes ~2 seconds. With N=34, it hangs effectively forever. Any application that passes user-controlled strings to minimatch() as the pattern argument is vulnerable to DoS. This issue has been fixed in version 10.2.1.

You can find information about how to handle this issue in the security team's documentation.

Created: 2026-02-21 Last update: 2026-02-27 01:31

Does not build reproducibly during testing normal

A package building reproducibly enables third parties to verify that the source matches the distributed binaries. It has been identified that this source package produced different results, failed to build or had other issues in a test environment. Please read about how to improve the situation!

Created: 2025-11-08 Last update: 2026-03-14 03:06

2 new commits since last upload, is it time to release? normal

vcswatch reports that this package seems to have new commits in its VCS but has not yet updated debian/changelog. You should consider updating the Debian changelog and uploading this new version into the archive.

Here are the relevant commit logs:

commit 256f2aae1a2bdfc168beb45339023f2a96d6b99d
Author: Yadd <yadd@debian.org>
Date:   Sun Oct 26 16:58:41 2025 +0100

    Drop "Rules-Requires-Root: no"

commit 8a1a52f5e9493ea414dd52cdee2eeb12b357c5ad
Author: Yadd <yadd@debian.org>
Date:   Sun Oct 26 16:58:41 2025 +0100

    Declare compliance with policy 4.7.2

Created: 2025-10-26 Last update: 2026-03-11 03:32

lintian reports 2 warnings normal

Lintian reports 2 warnings about this package. You should make the package lintian clean getting rid of them.

Created: 2023-09-25 Last update: 2025-05-21 22:31

Standards version of the package is outdated. wishlist

The package should be updated to follow the last version of Debian Policy (Standards-Version 4.7.3 instead of 4.7.0).

Created: 2025-02-21 Last update: 2025-12-23 20:00

news

[rss feed]

[2025-06-20] node-minimatch 9.0.3-6 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-05-21] Accepted node-minimatch 9.0.3-6 (source) into unstable (Jérémy Lal)
[2024-08-30] node-minimatch 9.0.3-5 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-08-28] Accepted node-minimatch 9.0.3-5 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Jérémy Lal)
[2023-10-17] node-minimatch 9.0.3-4 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-10-12] Accepted node-minimatch 9.0.3-4 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2023-09-26] Accepted node-minimatch 9.0.3-3 (source all) into unstable (Jérémy Lal)
[2023-09-25] Accepted node-minimatch 9.0.3-2 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2023-09-22] Accepted node-minimatch 9.0.3-1 (source) into experimental (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2023-01-15] Accepted node-minimatch 3.0.4-3+deb10u1 (source) into oldstable (Guilhem Moulin)
[2022-12-10] Accepted node-minimatch 3.0.4+~3.0.3-1+deb11u2 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2022-12-03] node-minimatch 5.1.1+~5.1.2-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2022-11-30] Accepted node-minimatch 5.1.1+~5.1.2-1 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2022-11-26] Accepted node-minimatch 3.0.4+~3.0.3-1+deb11u1 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2022-05-20] node-minimatch 5.1.0+~3.0.5-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2022-05-20] node-minimatch 5.1.0+~3.0.5-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2022-05-18] Accepted node-minimatch 5.1.0+~3.0.5-1 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2022-04-06] node-minimatch 5.0.0+~3.0.5-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2022-04-04] Accepted node-minimatch 5.0.0+~3.0.5-2 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2022-02-17] Accepted node-minimatch 5.0.0+~3.0.5-1 (source) into experimental (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2022-02-16] node-minimatch 3.1.1+~3.0.5-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2022-02-13] Accepted node-minimatch 3.1.1+~3.0.5-1 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2022-02-09] Accepted node-minimatch 3.0.5+~3.0.5-1 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2022-01-03] node-minimatch 3.0.4+~3.0.5-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2021-12-31] Accepted node-minimatch 3.0.4+~3.0.5-1 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2020-11-11] node-minimatch 3.0.4+~3.0.3-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2020-11-05] Accepted node-minimatch 3.0.4+~3.0.3-1 (source) into unstable (Xavier Guimard)
[2020-03-22] node-minimatch 3.0.4-4 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2020-03-19] Accepted node-minimatch 3.0.4-4 (source) into unstable (Xavier Guimard)
[2018-10-09] Accepted node-minimatch 3.0.4-3~bpo9+1 (source all) into stretch-backports, stretch-backports (Pirate Praveen) (signed by: Praveen Arimbrathodiyil)

bugs [bug history graph]

all: 2
RC: 0
I&N: 2
M&W: 0
F&P: 0
patch: 0

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version: 9.0.3-6