There are 5 open security issues in bookworm.
4 important issues:
- CVE-2026-41672:
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13 and xmldom version 0.6.0 and prior, the package allows attacker-controlled comment content to be serialized into XML without validating or neutralizing comment-breaking sequences. As a result, an attacker can terminate the comment early and inject arbitrary XML nodes into the serialized output. This issue has been patched in versions @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13.
- CVE-2026-41673:
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13 and xmldom version 0.6.0 and prior, seven recursive traversals in lib/dom.js operate without a depth limit. A sufficiently deeply nested DOM tree causes a RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded, crashing the application. This issue has been patched in versions @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13.
- CVE-2026-41674:
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13 and xmldom version 0.6.0 and prior, the package serializes DocumentType node fields (internalSubset, publicId, systemId) verbatim without any escaping or validation. When these fields are set programmatically to attacker-controlled strings, XMLSerializer.serializeToString can produce output where the DOCTYPE declaration is terminated early and arbitrary markup appears outside it. This issue has been patched in versions @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13.
- CVE-2026-41675:
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13 and xmldom version 0.6.0 and prior, the package allows attacker-controlled processing instruction data to be serialized into XML without validating or neutralizing the PI-closing sequence ?>. As a result, an attacker can terminate the processing instruction early and inject arbitrary XML nodes into the serialized output. This issue has been patched in versions @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13.
1 issue left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2026-34601:
(needs triaging)
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In xmldom versions 0.6.0 and prior and @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.8.12 and 0.9.9, xmldom/xmldom allows attacker-controlled strings containing the CDATA terminator ]]> to be inserted into a CDATASection node. During serialization, XMLSerializer emitted the CDATA content verbatim without rejecting or safely splitting the terminator. As a result, data intended to remain text-only became active XML markup in the serialized output, enabling XML structure injection and downstream business-logic manipulation. This issue has been patched in xmldom version 0.6.0 and @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.12 and 0.9.9.
You can find information about how to handle this issue in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/n/node-xmldom.png){kind=link}