There are 2 open security issues in trixie.
2 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2026-81665:
(needs triaging)
A heap-based buffer overflow was found in Corosync's Totem Process Group (totempg) message reassembly. When processing fragmented multicast messages, the buffer used to reassemble fragments lacks a runtime bounds check in release builds. A network-adjacent attacker able to send crafted multicast protocol messages to the cluster could cause a heap buffer overflow with attacker-controlled data. This can crash the Corosync daemon, causing a denial of service to the entire cluster, and may potentially allow further exploitation given sufficient heap-corruption control.
- CVE-2026-81666:
(needs triaging)
An integer overflow was found in Corosync's handling of membership commit token messages. The length-validation check for these messages can be bypassed on 32-bit systems due to an integer overflow in the calculation of the expected message length, allowing a crafted network packet to trigger an out-of-bounds memory access that crashes the Corosync daemon. This results in a denial of service for the affected cluster node. The overflow does not occur on 64-bit systems, where the length calculation is correctly performed in 64-bit arithmetic.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/c/corosync.png){kind=link}