docker.io - Debian Package Tracker

general

source: docker.io (main)
version: 27.5.1+dfsg4-2
maintainer: Debian Go Packaging Team (DMD)
uploaders: Reinhard Tartler [DMD] – Paul Tagliamonte [DMD] – Dmitry Smirnov [DMD] – Tianon Gravi [DMD] – Tim Potter [DMD] – Arnaud Rebillout [DMD]
arch: all
std-ver: 4.7.2
VCS: Git (Browse, QA)

versions [more versions can be listed by madison] [old versions available from snapshot.debian.org]

[pool directory]

o-o-stable: 20.10.5+dfsg1-1+deb11u2
o-o-sec: 20.10.5+dfsg1-1+deb11u4
oldstable: 20.10.24+dfsg1-1+deb12u1
stable: 26.1.5+dfsg1-9
testing: 27.5.1+dfsg4-1
unstable: 27.5.1+dfsg4-2
exp: 28.5.2+dfsg1-1

versioned links

20.10.5+dfsg1-1+deb11u2: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
20.10.5+dfsg1-1+deb11u4: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
20.10.24+dfsg1-1+deb12u1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
26.1.5+dfsg1-9: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
27.5.1+dfsg4-1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
27.5.1+dfsg4-2: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
28.5.2+dfsg1-1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]

binaries

docker-cli
docker-doc
docker.io (15 bugs: 0, 9, 6, 0)
golang-github-docker-docker-dev (1 bugs: 0, 1, 0, 0)

action needed

The VCS repository is not up to date, push the missing commits. high

vcswatch reports that the current version of the package is not in its VCS.
Either you need to push your commits and/or your tags, or the information about the package's VCS are out of date. A common cause of the latter issue when using the Git VCS is not specifying the correct branch when the packaging is not in the default one (remote HEAD branch), which is usually "master" but can be modified in salsa.debian.org in the project's general settings with the "Default Branch" field). Alternatively the Vcs-Git field in debian/control can contain a "-b <branch-name>" suffix to indicate what branch is used for the Debian packaging.

Created: 2026-01-18 Last update: 2026-03-01 13:31

1 security issue in sid high

There is 1 open security issue in sid.

1 important issue:

CVE-2025-54410: Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker Engine, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. A firewalld vulnerability affects Moby releases before 28.0.0. When firewalld reloads, Docker fails to re-create iptables rules that isolate bridge networks, allowing any container to access all ports on any other container across different bridge networks on the same host. This breaks network segmentation between containers that should be isolated, creating significant risk in multi-tenant environments. Only containers in --internal networks remain protected. Workarounds include reloading firewalld and either restarting the docker daemon, re-creating bridge networks, or using rootless mode. Maintainers anticipate a fix for this issue in version 25.0.13.

Created: 2025-07-31 Last update: 2026-02-27 18:30

1 security issue in forky high

There is 1 open security issue in forky.

1 important issue:

CVE-2025-54410: Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker Engine, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. A firewalld vulnerability affects Moby releases before 28.0.0. When firewalld reloads, Docker fails to re-create iptables rules that isolate bridge networks, allowing any container to access all ports on any other container across different bridge networks on the same host. This breaks network segmentation between containers that should be isolated, creating significant risk in multi-tenant environments. Only containers in --internal networks remain protected. Workarounds include reloading firewalld and either restarting the docker daemon, re-creating bridge networks, or using rootless mode. Maintainers anticipate a fix for this issue in version 25.0.13.

Created: 2025-08-09 Last update: 2026-02-27 18:30

10 security issues in bullseye high

There are 10 open security issues in bullseye.

1 important issue:

CVE-2025-54410: Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker Engine, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. A firewalld vulnerability affects Moby releases before 28.0.0. When firewalld reloads, Docker fails to re-create iptables rules that isolate bridge networks, allowing any container to access all ports on any other container across different bridge networks on the same host. This breaks network segmentation between containers that should be isolated, creating significant risk in multi-tenant environments. Only containers in --internal networks remain protected. Workarounds include reloading firewalld and either restarting the docker daemon, re-creating bridge networks, or using rootless mode. Maintainers anticipate a fix for this issue in version 25.0.13.

9 issues postponed or untriaged:

CVE-2022-36109: (needs triaging) Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where supplementary groups are not set up properly. If an attacker has direct access to a container and manipulates their supplementary group access, they may be able to use supplementary group access to bypass primary group restrictions in some cases, potentially gaining access to sensitive information or gaining the ability to execute code in that container. This bug is fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.18. Running containers should be stopped and restarted for the permissions to be fixed. For users unable to upgrade, this problem can be worked around by not using the `"USER $USERNAME"` Dockerfile instruction. Instead by calling `ENTRYPOINT ["su", "-", "user"]` the supplementary groups will be set up properly.
CVE-2023-28840: (needs triaging) Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
CVE-2023-28841: (needs triaging) Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
CVE-2023-28842: (needs triaging) Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.
CVE-2024-24557: (needs triaging) Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. The classic builder cache system is prone to cache poisoning if the image is built FROM scratch. Also, changes to some instructions (most important being HEALTHCHECK and ONBUILD) would not cause a cache miss. An attacker with the knowledge of the Dockerfile someone is using could poison their cache by making them pull a specially crafted image that would be considered as a valid cache candidate for some build steps. 23.0+ users are only affected if they explicitly opted out of Buildkit (DOCKER_BUILDKIT=0 environment variable) or are using the /build API endpoint. All users on versions older than 23.0 could be impacted. Image build API endpoint (/build) and ImageBuild function from github.com/docker/docker/client is also affected as it the uses classic builder by default. Patches are included in 24.0.9 and 25.0.2 releases.
CVE-2024-29018: (needs triaging) Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. Moby's networking implementation allows for many networks, each with their own IP address range and gateway, to be defined. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the `--internal` flag is used to designate a network as _internal_. The `internal` attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network _internal_, and other API clients may specify the `internal` parameter as well. When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses. The host serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs. Containers on an internal network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly. In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking, `dockerd` directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery, and resolution of names from an upstream resolver. When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver. This request is made from the container's network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself. As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to an internal network will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved. Many systems run a local forwarding DNS resolver. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device. To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address, `dockerd` detects this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host namework namespace. The loopback resolver then forwards the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected. Because `dockerd` forwards DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, internal networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address. Moby releases 26.0.0, 25.0.4, and 23.0.11 are patched to prevent forwarding any DNS requests from internal networks. As a workaround, run containers intended to be solely attached to internal networks with a custom upstream address, which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container's network namespace.
CVE-2024-32473: (needs triaging) Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. In 26.0.0, IPv6 is not disabled on network interfaces, including those belonging to networks where `--ipv6=false`. An container with an `ipvlan` or `macvlan` interface will normally be configured to share an external network link with the host machine. Because of this direct access, (1) Containers may be able to communicate with other hosts on the local network over link-local IPv6 addresses, (2) if router advertisements are being broadcast over the local network, containers may get SLAAC-assigned addresses, and (3) the interface will be a member of IPv6 multicast groups. This means interfaces in IPv4-only networks present an unexpectedly and unnecessarily increased attack surface. The issue is patched in 26.0.2. To completely disable IPv6 in a container, use `--sysctl=net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=1` in the `docker create` or `docker run` command. Or, in the service configuration of a `compose` file.
CVE-2024-36621: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) moby v25.0.5 is affected by a Race Condition in builder/builder-next/adapters/snapshot/layer.go. The vulnerability could be used to trigger concurrent builds that call the EnsureLayer function resulting in resource leaks/exhaustion.
CVE-2024-36623: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) moby through v25.0.3 has a Race Condition vulnerability in the streamformatter package which can be used to trigger multiple concurrent write operations resulting in data corruption or application crashes.

Created: 2025-07-31 Last update: 2026-02-27 18:30

10 security issues in buster high

There are 10 open security issues in buster.

2 important issues:

CVE-2024-29018: Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. Moby's networking implementation allows for many networks, each with their own IP address range and gateway, to be defined. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the `--internal` flag is used to designate a network as _internal_. The `internal` attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network _internal_, and other API clients may specify the `internal` parameter as well. When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses. The host serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs. Containers on an internal network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly. In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking, `dockerd` directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery, and resolution of names from an upstream resolver. When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver. This request is made from the container's network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself. As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to an internal network will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved. Many systems run a local forwarding DNS resolver. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device. To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address, `dockerd` detects this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host namework namespace. The loopback resolver then forwards the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected. Because `dockerd` forwards DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, internal networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address. Moby releases 26.0.0, 25.0.4, and 23.0.11 are patched to prevent forwarding any DNS requests from internal networks. As a workaround, run containers intended to be solely attached to internal networks with a custom upstream address, which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container's network namespace.
CVE-2024-32473: Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. In 26.0.0, IPv6 is not disabled on network interfaces, including those belonging to networks where `--ipv6=false`. An container with an `ipvlan` or `macvlan` interface will normally be configured to share an external network link with the host machine. Because of this direct access, (1) Containers may be able to communicate with other hosts on the local network over link-local IPv6 addresses, (2) if router advertisements are being broadcast over the local network, containers may get SLAAC-assigned addresses, and (3) the interface will be a member of IPv6 multicast groups. This means interfaces in IPv4-only networks present an unexpectedly and unnecessarily increased attack surface. The issue is patched in 26.0.2. To completely disable IPv6 in a container, use `--sysctl=net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=1` in the `docker create` or `docker run` command. Or, in the service configuration of a `compose` file.

8 issues postponed or untriaged:

CVE-2021-41089: (needs triaging) Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where attempting to copy files using `docker cp` into a specially-crafted container can result in Unix file permission changes for existing files in the host’s filesystem, widening access to others. This bug does not directly allow files to be read, modified, or executed without an additional cooperating process. This bug has been fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.9. Users should update to this version as soon as possible. Running containers do not need to be restarted.
CVE-2021-41091: (needs triaging) Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where the data directory (typically `/var/lib/docker`) contained subdirectories with insufficiently restricted permissions, allowing otherwise unprivileged Linux users to traverse directory contents and execute programs. When containers included executable programs with extended permission bits (such as `setuid`), unprivileged Linux users could discover and execute those programs. When the UID of an unprivileged Linux user on the host collided with the file owner or group inside a container, the unprivileged Linux user on the host could discover, read, and modify those files. This bug has been fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.9. Users should update to this version as soon as possible. Running containers should be stopped and restarted for the permissions to be fixed. For users unable to upgrade limit access to the host to trusted users. Limit access to host volumes to trusted containers.
CVE-2021-41092: (needs triaging) Docker CLI is the command line interface for the docker container runtime. A bug was found in the Docker CLI where running `docker login my-private-registry.example.com` with a misconfigured configuration file (typically `~/.docker/config.json`) listing a `credsStore` or `credHelpers` that could not be executed would result in any provided credentials being sent to `registry-1.docker.io` rather than the intended private registry. This bug has been fixed in Docker CLI 20.10.9. Users should update to this version as soon as possible. For users unable to update ensure that any configured credsStore or credHelpers entries in the configuration file reference an installed credential helper that is executable and on the PATH.
CVE-2022-36109: (needs triaging) Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where supplementary groups are not set up properly. If an attacker has direct access to a container and manipulates their supplementary group access, they may be able to use supplementary group access to bypass primary group restrictions in some cases, potentially gaining access to sensitive information or gaining the ability to execute code in that container. This bug is fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.18. Running containers should be stopped and restarted for the permissions to be fixed. For users unable to upgrade, this problem can be worked around by not using the `"USER $USERNAME"` Dockerfile instruction. Instead by calling `ENTRYPOINT ["su", "-", "user"]` the supplementary groups will be set up properly.
CVE-2023-28840: (needs triaging) Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
CVE-2023-28841: (needs triaging) Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
CVE-2023-28842: (needs triaging) Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.
CVE-2024-24557: (needs triaging) Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. The classic builder cache system is prone to cache poisoning if the image is built FROM scratch. Also, changes to some instructions (most important being HEALTHCHECK and ONBUILD) would not cause a cache miss. An attacker with the knowledge of the Dockerfile someone is using could poison their cache by making them pull a specially crafted image that would be considered as a valid cache candidate for some build steps. 23.0+ users are only affected if they explicitly opted out of Buildkit (DOCKER_BUILDKIT=0 environment variable) or are using the /build API endpoint. All users on versions older than 23.0 could be impacted. Image build API endpoint (/build) and ImageBuild function from github.com/docker/docker/client is also affected as it the uses classic builder by default. Patches are included in 24.0.9 and 25.0.2 releases.

Created: 2024-03-22 Last update: 2024-05-24 19:07

Depends on packages which need a new maintainer normal

The packages that docker.io depends on which need a new maintainer are:

zfs-fuse (#834130)
- Suggests: zfs-fuse

Created: 2019-11-22 Last update: 2026-03-02 06:30

Fails to build during reproducibility testing normal

A package building reproducibly enables third parties to verify that the source matches the distributed binaries. It has been identified that this source package produced different results, failed to build or had other issues in a test environment. Please read about how to improve the situation!

Created: 2025-11-04 Last update: 2026-03-02 06:01

1 bug tagged patch in the BTS normal

The BTS contains patches fixing 1 bug, consider including or untagging them.

Created: 2025-01-06 Last update: 2026-03-02 06:00

1 open merge request in Salsa normal

There is 1 open merge request for this package on Salsa. You should consider reviewing and/or merging these merge requests.

Created: 2025-08-19 Last update: 2026-03-01 13:31

lintian reports 2 warnings normal

Lintian reports 2 warnings about this package. You should make the package lintian clean getting rid of them.

Created: 2026-03-01 Last update: 2026-03-01 00:00

RFH: The maintainer is looking for help with this package. normal

The current maintainer is looking for someone who can help with the maintenance of this package. If you are interested in this package, please consider helping out. One way you can help is offer to be a co-maintainer or triage bugs in the BTS. Please see bug number #908868 for more information.

Created: 2018-09-15 Last update: 2018-09-15 13:53

debian/patches: 18 patches to forward upstream low

Among the 29 debian patches available in version 27.5.1+dfsg4-2 of the package, we noticed the following issues:

18 patches where the metadata indicates that the patch has not yet been forwarded upstream. You should either forward the patch upstream or update the metadata to document its real status.

Created: 2023-02-26 Last update: 2026-02-27 19:33

6 low-priority security issues in bookworm low

There are 6 open security issues in bookworm.

6 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:

CVE-2024-24557: (needs triaging) Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. The classic builder cache system is prone to cache poisoning if the image is built FROM scratch. Also, changes to some instructions (most important being HEALTHCHECK and ONBUILD) would not cause a cache miss. An attacker with the knowledge of the Dockerfile someone is using could poison their cache by making them pull a specially crafted image that would be considered as a valid cache candidate for some build steps. 23.0+ users are only affected if they explicitly opted out of Buildkit (DOCKER_BUILDKIT=0 environment variable) or are using the /build API endpoint. All users on versions older than 23.0 could be impacted. Image build API endpoint (/build) and ImageBuild function from github.com/docker/docker/client is also affected as it the uses classic builder by default. Patches are included in 24.0.9 and 25.0.2 releases.
CVE-2024-29018: (needs triaging) Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. Moby's networking implementation allows for many networks, each with their own IP address range and gateway, to be defined. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the `--internal` flag is used to designate a network as _internal_. The `internal` attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network _internal_, and other API clients may specify the `internal` parameter as well. When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses. The host serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs. Containers on an internal network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly. In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking, `dockerd` directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery, and resolution of names from an upstream resolver. When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver. This request is made from the container's network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself. As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to an internal network will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved. Many systems run a local forwarding DNS resolver. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device. To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address, `dockerd` detects this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host namework namespace. The loopback resolver then forwards the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected. Because `dockerd` forwards DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, internal networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address. Moby releases 26.0.0, 25.0.4, and 23.0.11 are patched to prevent forwarding any DNS requests from internal networks. As a workaround, run containers intended to be solely attached to internal networks with a custom upstream address, which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container's network namespace.
CVE-2024-32473: (needs triaging) Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. In 26.0.0, IPv6 is not disabled on network interfaces, including those belonging to networks where `--ipv6=false`. An container with an `ipvlan` or `macvlan` interface will normally be configured to share an external network link with the host machine. Because of this direct access, (1) Containers may be able to communicate with other hosts on the local network over link-local IPv6 addresses, (2) if router advertisements are being broadcast over the local network, containers may get SLAAC-assigned addresses, and (3) the interface will be a member of IPv6 multicast groups. This means interfaces in IPv4-only networks present an unexpectedly and unnecessarily increased attack surface. The issue is patched in 26.0.2. To completely disable IPv6 in a container, use `--sysctl=net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=1` in the `docker create` or `docker run` command. Or, in the service configuration of a `compose` file.
CVE-2024-36621: (needs triaging) moby v25.0.5 is affected by a Race Condition in builder/builder-next/adapters/snapshot/layer.go. The vulnerability could be used to trigger concurrent builds that call the EnsureLayer function resulting in resource leaks/exhaustion.
CVE-2024-36623: (needs triaging) moby through v25.0.3 has a Race Condition vulnerability in the streamformatter package which can be used to trigger multiple concurrent write operations resulting in data corruption or application crashes.
CVE-2025-54410: (needs triaging) Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker Engine, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. A firewalld vulnerability affects Moby releases before 28.0.0. When firewalld reloads, Docker fails to re-create iptables rules that isolate bridge networks, allowing any container to access all ports on any other container across different bridge networks on the same host. This breaks network segmentation between containers that should be isolated, creating significant risk in multi-tenant environments. Only containers in --internal networks remain protected. Workarounds include reloading firewalld and either restarting the docker daemon, re-creating bridge networks, or using rootless mode. Maintainers anticipate a fix for this issue in version 25.0.13.

You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.

Created: 2024-02-03 Last update: 2026-02-27 18:30

Standards version of the package is outdated. wishlist

The package should be updated to follow the last version of Debian Policy (Standards-Version 4.7.3 instead of 4.7.2).

Created: 2025-12-23 Last update: 2026-02-27 19:16

No known security issue in trixie wishlist

There is 1 open security issue in trixie.

1 ignored issue:

CVE-2025-54410: Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker Engine, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. A firewalld vulnerability affects Moby releases before 28.0.0. When firewalld reloads, Docker fails to re-create iptables rules that isolate bridge networks, allowing any container to access all ports on any other container across different bridge networks on the same host. This breaks network segmentation between containers that should be isolated, creating significant risk in multi-tenant environments. Only containers in --internal networks remain protected. Workarounds include reloading firewalld and either restarting the docker daemon, re-creating bridge networks, or using rootless mode. Maintainers anticipate a fix for this issue in version 25.0.13.

Created: 2025-07-31 Last update: 2026-02-27 18:30

testing migrations

excuses:
- Migration status for docker.io (27.5.1+dfsg4-1 to 27.5.1+dfsg4-2): Waiting for test results or another package, or too young (no action required now - check later)
- Issues preventing migration:
- ∙ ∙ Too young, only 3 of 5 days old
- Additional info (not blocking):
- ∙ ∙ Updating docker.io will fix bugs in testing: #1129110
- ∙ ∙ Piuparts tested OK - https://piuparts.debian.org/sid/source/d/docker.io.html
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for docker.io/27.5.1+dfsg4-2: amd64: Pass, arm64: No tests, superficial or marked flaky ♻ (reference ♻), i386: No tests, superficial or marked flaky ♻ (reference ♻), ppc64el: No tests, superficial or marked flaky ♻, riscv64: No tests, superficial or marked flaky ♻, s390x: No tests, superficial or marked flaky ♻
- ∙ ∙ Reproducibility regression on amd64: docker-doc, golang-github-docker-docker-dev
- ∙ ∙ Reproducibility regression on arm64: docker-doc, golang-github-docker-docker-dev
- ∙ ∙ Reproducibility regression on armhf: docker-doc, golang-github-docker-docker-dev
- ∙ ∙ Reproducibility regression on i386: docker-doc, golang-github-docker-docker-dev
- ∙ ∙ Reproducibility regression on ppc64el: docker-doc, golang-github-docker-docker-dev
- Not considered

news

[rss feed]

[2026-02-27] Accepted docker.io 27.5.1+dfsg4-2 (source) into unstable (Reinhard Tartler)
[2026-01-18] Accepted docker.io 28.5.2+dfsg1-1 (source) into experimental (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-11-13] docker.io 27.5.1+dfsg4-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-11-06] Accepted docker.io 27.5.1+dfsg4-1 (source) into unstable (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-11-04] docker.io 27.5.1+dfsg3-6 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-11-04] docker.io 27.5.1+dfsg3-6 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-10-30] Accepted docker.io 27.5.1+dfsg3-6 (source) into unstable (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-10-29] Accepted docker.io 27.5.1+dfsg3-5 (source) into unstable (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-10-26] Accepted docker.io 27.5.1+dfsg3-4 (source) into unstable (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-10-25] Accepted docker.io 27.5.1+dfsg3-3 (source) into unstable (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-10-25] Accepted docker.io 27.5.1+dfsg3-2 (source) into unstable (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-10-24] Accepted docker.io 27.5.1+dfsg3-1 (source) into experimental (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-10-24] docker.io 26.1.5+dfsg1-10 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-10-18] Accepted docker.io 27.5.1+dfsg2-1 (source) into experimental (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-10-16] Accepted docker.io 27.5.1+dfsg1-2 (source) into experimental (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-10-14] Accepted docker.io 27.5.1+dfsg1-1 (source) into experimental (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-09-25] Accepted docker.io 26.1.5+dfsg1-10 (source) into unstable (Tianon Gravi)
[2025-03-08] docker.io 26.1.5+dfsg1-9 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-02-21] Accepted docker.io 26.1.5+dfsg1-9 (source) into unstable (Tianon Gravi)
[2025-02-21] Accepted docker.io 26.1.5+dfsg1-8 (source) into unstable (Tianon Gravi)
[2025-02-16] Accepted docker.io 26.1.5+dfsg1-7 (source) into unstable (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-02-16] Accepted docker.io 20.10.5+dfsg1-1+deb11u4 (source) into oldstable-security (Andrej Shadura) (signed by: Andrew Shadura)
[2025-02-10] Accepted docker.io 26.1.5+dfsg1-6 (source) into experimental (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-02-02] Accepted docker.io 26.1.5+dfsg1-5 (source) into experimental (Reinhard Tartler)
[2024-11-06] docker.io 26.1.5+dfsg1-4 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-10-31] Accepted docker.io 26.1.5+dfsg1-4 (source) into unstable (Reinhard Tartler)
[2024-10-30] Accepted docker.io 26.1.5+dfsg1-3 (source) into experimental (Reinhard Tartler)
[2024-10-20] Accepted docker.io 20.10.24+dfsg1-1+deb12u1 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Bastien ROUCARIÈS)
[2024-10-13] Accepted docker.io 20.10.5+dfsg1-1+deb11u3 (source) into oldstable-security (Bastien Roucariès) (signed by: Bastien ROUCARIÈS)
[2024-09-08] docker.io 26.1.5+dfsg1-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)

bugs [bug history graph]

all: 18 21
RC: 0
I&N: 9 11
M&W: 9 10
F&P: 0
patch: 1

links

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ubuntu

[Information about Ubuntu for Debian Developers]

version: 27.5.1+dfsg4-1ubuntu1
88 bugs (1 patch)
patches for 27.5.1+dfsg4-1ubuntu1