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Linux container runtime

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general
  • source: docker.io (main)
  • version: 20.10.25+dfsg1-1
  • maintainer: Debian Go Packaging Team (DMD)
  • uploaders: Paul Tagliamonte [DMD] – Dmitry Smirnov [DMD] – Tianon Gravi [DMD] – Tim Potter [DMD] – Arnaud Rebillout [DMD]
  • arch: all
  • std-ver: 4.6.0
  • VCS: Git (Browse, QA)
versions [more versions can be listed by madison] [old versions available from snapshot.debian.org]
[pool directory]
  • o-o-stable: 18.09.1+dfsg1-7.1+deb10u3
  • o-o-sec: 18.09.1+dfsg1-7.1+deb10u3
  • oldstable: 20.10.5+dfsg1-1+deb11u2
  • stable: 20.10.24+dfsg1-1
  • testing: 20.10.25+dfsg1-1
  • unstable: 20.10.25+dfsg1-1
versioned links
  • 18.09.1+dfsg1-7.1+deb10u3: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
  • 20.10.5+dfsg1-1+deb11u2: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
  • 20.10.24+dfsg1-1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
  • 20.10.25+dfsg1-1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
binaries
  • docker-doc (1 bugs: 0, 0, 1, 0)
  • docker.io (27 bugs: 0, 21, 6, 0)
  • golang-github-docker-docker-dev (2 bugs: 0, 1, 1, 0)
action needed
A new upstream version is available: 24.0.6 high
A new upstream version 24.0.6 is available, you should consider packaging it.
Created: 2022-10-15 Last update: 2023-09-22 22:06
7 security issues in buster high

There are 7 open security issues in buster.

3 important issues:
  • CVE-2023-28840: Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
  • CVE-2023-28841: Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
  • CVE-2023-28842: Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.
4 issues postponed or untriaged:
  • CVE-2021-41089: (needs triaging) Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where attempting to copy files using `docker cp` into a specially-crafted container can result in Unix file permission changes for existing files in the host’s filesystem, widening access to others. This bug does not directly allow files to be read, modified, or executed without an additional cooperating process. This bug has been fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.9. Users should update to this version as soon as possible. Running containers do not need to be restarted.
  • CVE-2021-41091: (needs triaging) Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where the data directory (typically `/var/lib/docker`) contained subdirectories with insufficiently restricted permissions, allowing otherwise unprivileged Linux users to traverse directory contents and execute programs. When containers included executable programs with extended permission bits (such as `setuid`), unprivileged Linux users could discover and execute those programs. When the UID of an unprivileged Linux user on the host collided with the file owner or group inside a container, the unprivileged Linux user on the host could discover, read, and modify those files. This bug has been fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.9. Users should update to this version as soon as possible. Running containers should be stopped and restarted for the permissions to be fixed. For users unable to upgrade limit access to the host to trusted users. Limit access to host volumes to trusted containers.
  • CVE-2021-41092: (needs triaging) Docker CLI is the command line interface for the docker container runtime. A bug was found in the Docker CLI where running `docker login my-private-registry.example.com` with a misconfigured configuration file (typically `~/.docker/config.json`) listing a `credsStore` or `credHelpers` that could not be executed would result in any provided credentials being sent to `registry-1.docker.io` rather than the intended private registry. This bug has been fixed in Docker CLI 20.10.9. Users should update to this version as soon as possible. For users unable to update ensure that any configured credsStore or credHelpers entries in the configuration file reference an installed credential helper that is executable and on the PATH.
  • CVE-2022-36109: (needs triaging) Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where supplementary groups are not set up properly. If an attacker has direct access to a container and manipulates their supplementary group access, they may be able to use supplementary group access to bypass primary group restrictions in some cases, potentially gaining access to sensitive information or gaining the ability to execute code in that container. This bug is fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.18. Running containers should be stopped and restarted for the permissions to be fixed. For users unable to upgrade, this problem can be worked around by not using the `"USER $USERNAME"` Dockerfile instruction. Instead by calling `ENTRYPOINT ["su", "-", "user"]` the supplementary groups will be set up properly.
Created: 2023-02-27 Last update: 2023-08-31 09:44
lintian reports 1 error and 6 warnings high
Lintian reports 1 error and 6 warnings about this package. You should make the package lintian clean getting rid of them.
Created: 2023-07-18 Last update: 2023-07-18 01:07
Depends on packages which need a new maintainer normal
The packages that docker.io depends on which need a new maintainer are:
  • zfs-fuse (#834130)
    • Suggests: zfs-fuse
  • aufs-tools (#1033793)
    • Suggests: aufs-tools
Created: 2019-11-22 Last update: 2023-09-22 21:41
1 bug tagged patch in the BTS normal
The BTS contains patches fixing 1 bug, consider including or untagging them.
Created: 2023-09-13 Last update: 2023-09-22 21:31
Does not build reproducibly during testing normal
A package building reproducibly enables third parties to verify that the source matches the distributed binaries. It has been identified that this source package produced different results, failed to build or had other issues in a test environment. Please read about how to improve the situation!
Created: 2023-07-26 Last update: 2023-09-22 19:30
RFH: The maintainer is looking for help with this package. normal
The current maintainer is looking for someone who can help with the maintenance of this package. If you are interested in this package, please consider helping out. One way you can help is offer to be a co-maintainer or triage bugs in the BTS. Please see bug number #908868 for more information.
Created: 2018-09-15 Last update: 2018-09-15 13:53
4 low-priority security issues in bullseye low

There are 4 open security issues in bullseye.

4 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
  • CVE-2022-36109: (needs triaging) Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where supplementary groups are not set up properly. If an attacker has direct access to a container and manipulates their supplementary group access, they may be able to use supplementary group access to bypass primary group restrictions in some cases, potentially gaining access to sensitive information or gaining the ability to execute code in that container. This bug is fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.18. Running containers should be stopped and restarted for the permissions to be fixed. For users unable to upgrade, this problem can be worked around by not using the `"USER $USERNAME"` Dockerfile instruction. Instead by calling `ENTRYPOINT ["su", "-", "user"]` the supplementary groups will be set up properly.
  • CVE-2023-28840: (needs triaging) Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
  • CVE-2023-28841: (needs triaging) Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
  • CVE-2023-28842: (needs triaging) Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec.

You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.

Created: 2022-09-12 Last update: 2023-08-31 09:44
debian/patches: 13 patches to forward upstream low

Among the 26 debian patches available in version 20.10.25+dfsg1-1 of the package, we noticed the following issues:

  • 13 patches where the metadata indicates that the patch has not yet been forwarded upstream. You should either forward the patch upstream or update the metadata to document its real status.
Created: 2023-02-26 Last update: 2023-07-17 22:00
Standards version of the package is outdated. wishlist
The package should be updated to follow the last version of Debian Policy (Standards-Version 4.6.2 instead of 4.6.0).
Created: 2022-05-11 Last update: 2023-07-17 18:15
news
[rss feed]
  • [2023-07-23] docker.io 20.10.25+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2023-07-17] Accepted docker.io 20.10.25+dfsg1-1 (source) into unstable (Shengjing Zhu)
  • [2023-04-26] docker.io 20.10.24+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2023-04-05] Accepted docker.io 20.10.24+dfsg1-1 (source) into unstable (Shengjing Zhu)
  • [2023-01-24] docker.io 20.10.23+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2023-01-24] docker.io 20.10.23+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2023-01-20] Accepted docker.io 20.10.23+dfsg1-1 (source) into unstable (Shengjing Zhu)
  • [2023-01-17] docker.io 20.10.22+dfsg1-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2023-01-14] Accepted docker.io 20.10.22+dfsg1-2 (source) into unstable (Shengjing Zhu)
  • [2023-01-01] Accepted docker.io 20.10.22+dfsg1-1 (source) into unstable (Shengjing Zhu)
  • [2022-11-28] docker.io 20.10.21+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2022-11-25] Accepted docker.io 20.10.21+dfsg1-1 (source) into unstable (Felix Geyer)
  • [2022-10-18] docker.io 20.10.19+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2022-10-18] docker.io 20.10.19+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2022-10-15] Accepted docker.io 20.10.19+dfsg1-1 (source) into unstable (Felix Geyer)
  • [2022-08-17] docker.io 20.10.17+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2022-08-15] Accepted docker.io 20.10.17+dfsg1-1 (source) into unstable (Reinhard Tartler)
  • [2022-07-01] Accepted docker.io 20.10.5+dfsg1-1+deb11u2 (source) into proposed-updates->stable-new, proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Felix Geyer)
  • [2022-04-10] docker.io 20.10.14+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2022-03-30] Accepted docker.io 20.10.14+dfsg1-1 (source) into unstable (Arnaud Rebillout)
  • [2021-12-12] Accepted docker.io 20.10.5+dfsg1-1+deb11u1 (source) into proposed-updates->stable-new, proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Shengjing Zhu)
  • [2021-12-09] docker.io 20.10.11+dfsg1-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2021-12-04] Accepted docker.io 20.10.11+dfsg1-2 (source) into unstable (Shengjing Zhu)
  • [2021-11-22] Accepted docker.io 20.10.11+dfsg1-1 (source) into unstable (Arnaud Rebillout)
  • [2021-11-04] Accepted docker.io 20.10.10+dfsg1-1 (source) into unstable (Arnaud Rebillout)
  • [2021-10-28] docker.io 20.10.8+dfsg1-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2021-10-22] Accepted docker.io 20.10.8+dfsg1-2 (source) into unstable (Anthony Fok)
  • [2021-09-25] docker.io 20.10.8+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • [2021-09-22] Accepted docker.io 20.10.8+dfsg1-1 (source) into unstable (Arnaud Rebillout)
  • [2021-03-30] docker.io 20.10.5+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
  • 1
  • 2
bugs [bug history graph]
  • all: 34 35
  • RC: 0
  • I&N: 23 24
  • M&W: 11
  • F&P: 0
  • patch: 1
links
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ubuntu Ubuntu logo [Information about Ubuntu for Debian Developers]
  • version: 20.10.24+dfsg1-1ubuntu2
  • 75 bugs (1 patch)
  • patches for 20.10.24+dfsg1-1ubuntu2

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