ffmpeg - Debian Package Tracker

general

source: ffmpeg (main)
version: 7:7.1.2-1
maintainer: Debian Multimedia Maintainers (archive) (DMD)
uploaders: Reinhard Tartler [DMD] – Balint Reczey [DMD] – Sebastian Ramacher [DMD] – James Cowgill [DMD]
arch: all any
std-ver: 4.7.2
VCS: Git (Browse, QA)

versions [more versions can be listed by madison] [old versions available from snapshot.debian.org]

[pool directory]

o-o-stable: 7:4.3.7-0+deb11u1
o-o-sec: 7:4.3.9-0+deb11u1
o-o-p-u: 7:4.3.7-0+deb11u1
oldstable: 7:5.1.7-0+deb12u1
old-sec: 7:5.1.7-0+deb12u1
stable: 7:7.1.1-1
stable-sec: 7:7.1.2-0+deb13u1
stable-p-u: 7:7.1.2-0+deb13u1
testing: 7:7.1.2-1
unstable: 7:7.1.2-1
exp: 7:8.0-1

versioned links

7:4.3.7-0+deb11u1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
7:4.3.9-0+deb11u1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
7:5.1.7-0+deb12u1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
7:7.1.1-1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
7:7.1.2-0+deb13u1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
7:7.1.2-1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
7:8.0-1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]

binaries

ffmpeg (17 bugs: 0, 12, 5, 0)
ffmpeg-doc
libavcodec-dev (1 bugs: 0, 0, 1, 0)
libavcodec-extra
libavcodec-extra61
libavcodec61
libavdevice-dev
libavdevice61
libavfilter-dev
libavfilter-extra
libavfilter-extra10
libavfilter10
libavformat-dev (1 bugs: 0, 1, 0, 0)
libavformat-extra
libavformat-extra61
libavformat61
libavutil-dev
libavutil59
libpostproc-dev
libpostproc58
libswresample-dev
libswresample5
libswscale-dev
libswscale8

action needed

A new upstream version is available: 8.0 high

A new upstream version 8.0 is available, you should consider packaging it.

Created: 2025-08-24 Last update: 2025-10-20 12:00

4 security issues in sid high

There are 4 open security issues in sid.

4 important issues:

CVE-2025-9951: A heap-buffer-overflow write exists in jpeg2000dec FFmpeg which allows an attacker to potentially gain remote code execution or cause denial of service via the channel definition cdef atom of JPEG2000.
CVE-2025-22921: FFmpeg git-master,N-113007-g8d24a28d06 was discovered to contain a segmentation violation via the component /libavcodec/jpeg2000dec.c.
CVE-2025-25473: FFmpeg git master before commit c08d30 was discovered to contain a NULL pointer dereference via the component libavformat/mov.c.
CVE-2025-59734: It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2. When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0. This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false. A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer. Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb. GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata. This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.

Created: 2024-12-31 Last update: 2025-10-19 14:00

4 security issues in forky high

There are 4 open security issues in forky.

4 important issues:

CVE-2025-9951: A heap-buffer-overflow write exists in jpeg2000dec FFmpeg which allows an attacker to potentially gain remote code execution or cause denial of service via the channel definition cdef atom of JPEG2000.
CVE-2025-22921: FFmpeg git-master,N-113007-g8d24a28d06 was discovered to contain a segmentation violation via the component /libavcodec/jpeg2000dec.c.
CVE-2025-25473: FFmpeg git master before commit c08d30 was discovered to contain a NULL pointer dereference via the component libavformat/mov.c.
CVE-2025-59734: It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2. When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0. This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false. A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer. Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb. GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata. This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.

Created: 2025-08-09 Last update: 2025-10-19 14:00

10 security issues in bullseye high

There are 10 open security issues in bullseye.

4 important issues:

CVE-2025-59731: When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, the specified raw length of run-length-encoded data is not checked when using it to calculate the output data. We read rle_raw_size from the input file at [0], we decompress and decode into the buffer td->rle_raw_data of size rle_raw_size at [1], and then at [2] we will access entries in this buffer up to (td->xsize - 1) * (td->ysize - 1) + rle_raw_size / 2, which may exceed rle_raw_size. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.
CVE-2025-59732: When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, there's an implicit assumption that the height and width are divisible by 8. If the height or width of the image is not divisible by 8, the copy loops at [0] and [1] will continue to write until the next multiple of 8. The buffer td->uncompressed_data is allocated in decode_block based on the precise height and width of the image, so the "rounded-up" multiple of 8 in the copy loop can exceed the buffer bounds, and the write block starting at [2] can corrupt following heap memory. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.
CVE-2025-59733: When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, there's an implicit assumption that all image channels have the same pixel type (and size), and that if there are four channels, the first four are "B", "G", "R" and "A". The channel parsing code can be found in decode_header. The buffer td->uncompressed_data is allocated in decode_block based on the xsize, ysize and computed current_channel_offset. The function dwa_uncompress then assumes at [5] that if there are 4 channels, these are "B", "G", "R" and "A", and in the calculations at [6] and [7] that all channels are of the same type, which matches the type of the main color channels. If we set the main color channels to a 4-byte type and add duplicate or unknown channels of the 2-byte EXR_HALF type, then the addition at [7] will increment the pointer by 4-bytes * xsize * nb_channels, which will exceed the allocated buffer. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.
CVE-2025-59734: It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2. When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0. This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false. A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer. Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb. GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata. This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.

6 issues postponed or untriaged:

CVE-2023-6603: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) A flaw was found in FFmpeg's HLS playlist parsing. This vulnerability allows a denial of service via a maliciously crafted HLS playlist that triggers a null pointer dereference during initialization.
CVE-2025-1594: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in FFmpeg up to 7.1. This affects the function ff_aac_search_for_tns of the file libavcodec/aacenc_tns.c of the component AAC Encoder. The manipulation leads to stack-based buffer overflow. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
CVE-2025-7700: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update)
CVE-2025-9951: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) A heap-buffer-overflow write exists in jpeg2000dec FFmpeg which allows an attacker to potentially gain remote code execution or cause denial of service via the channel definition cdef atom of JPEG2000.
CVE-2024-36615: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) FFmpeg n7.0 has a race condition vulnerability in the VP9 decoder. This could lead to a data race if video encoding parameters were being exported, as the side data would be attached in the decoder thread while being read in the output thread.
CVE-2025-10256: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update)

Created: 2025-10-10 Last update: 2025-10-19 14:00

lintian reports 6 errors and 9 warnings high

Lintian reports 6 errors and 9 warnings about this package. You should make the package lintian clean getting rid of them.

Created: 2025-09-21 Last update: 2025-09-21 12:01

2 bugs tagged patch in the BTS normal

The BTS contains patches fixing 2 bugs, consider including or untagging them.

Created: 2025-01-06 Last update: 2025-10-20 15:00

Depends on packages which need a new maintainer normal

The packages that ffmpeg depends on which need a new maintainer are:

libiec61883 (#826285)
- Depends: libiec61883-0
- Build-Depends: libiec61883-dev

Created: 2019-11-22 Last update: 2025-10-20 13:31

9 new commits since last upload, is it time to release? normal

vcswatch reports that this package seems to have new commits in its VCS but has not yet updated debian/changelog. You should consider updating the Debian changelog and uploading this new version into the archive.

Here are the relevant commit logs:

commit fb930cd2d7232a448cd376cd109bc12136ab16a9
Author: Sebastian Ramacher <sramacher@debian.org>
Date:   Sat Sep 27 10:26:37 2025 +0200

    Static libraries are installed from the standard flavor

commit b39034440c26d6511a68f9ce95d0b013b4f56d3f
Author: Sebastian Ramacher <sramacher@debian.org>
Date:   Sat Sep 27 00:02:03 2025 +0200

    Remove old TODOs

commit 21417233355b5c52272a2bb0202e6056176de167
Author: Sebastian Ramacher <sramacher@debian.org>
Date:   Fri Sep 26 23:36:15 2025 +0200

    Fix architecture list

commit 84373845747d4d642b45528bc748c1064996d051
Author: Sebastian Ramacher <sramacher@debian.org>
Date:   Fri Sep 26 23:21:52 2025 +0200

    Refactor

commit 039767ae40c743297cab386f024081f9e4ffffb3
Author: Sebastian Ramacher <sramacher@debian.org>
Date:   Fri Sep 26 23:20:36 2025 +0200

    Refactor

commit 23f7d29579e2f7de616a5aa5b3d94c8409fcfd3b
Author: Sebastian Ramacher <sramacher@debian.org>
Date:   Fri Sep 26 22:59:11 2025 +0200

    Remove ia64 handling

commit 3a228b1ed839d111254ad897b5ac3dba0e34e013
Author: Sebastian Ramacher <sramacher@debian.org>
Date:   Fri Sep 26 22:47:03 2025 +0200

    libjxl-dev is now available on alpha

commit 753bf22abd08fdd0dfeae4736733ee2a8ae3800d
Author: Sebastian Ramacher <sramacher@debian.org>
Date:   Mon Sep 15 08:52:08 2025 +0200

    Remove mips-specific handling

commit e853f6bd9426fbfefa18ec2bebef94c9b47754bd
Author: Sebastian Ramacher <sramacher@debian.org>
Date:   Sat Sep 13 23:08:09 2025 +0200

    Remove deprecated/removed codecs

Created: 2025-09-13 Last update: 2025-10-16 03:00

4 low-priority security issues in trixie low

There are 4 open security issues in trixie.

4 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:

CVE-2025-9951: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) A heap-buffer-overflow write exists in jpeg2000dec FFmpeg which allows an attacker to potentially gain remote code execution or cause denial of service via the channel definition cdef atom of JPEG2000.
CVE-2025-22921: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) FFmpeg git-master,N-113007-g8d24a28d06 was discovered to contain a segmentation violation via the component /libavcodec/jpeg2000dec.c.
CVE-2025-25473: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) FFmpeg git master before commit c08d30 was discovered to contain a NULL pointer dereference via the component libavformat/mov.c.
CVE-2025-59734: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2. When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0. This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false. A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer. Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb. GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata. This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.

You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.

Created: 2024-12-31 Last update: 2025-10-19 14:00

11 low-priority security issues in bookworm low

There are 11 open security issues in bookworm.

11 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:

CVE-2025-1594: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in FFmpeg up to 7.1. This affects the function ff_aac_search_for_tns of the file libavcodec/aacenc_tns.c of the component AAC Encoder. The manipulation leads to stack-based buffer overflow. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
CVE-2025-9951: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) A heap-buffer-overflow write exists in jpeg2000dec FFmpeg which allows an attacker to potentially gain remote code execution or cause denial of service via the channel definition cdef atom of JPEG2000.
CVE-2023-49528: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) Buffer Overflow vulnerability in FFmpeg version n6.1-3-g466799d4f5, allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code and cause a denial of service (DoS) via the af_dialoguenhance.c:261:5 in the de_stereo component.
CVE-2024-31578: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) FFmpeg version n6.1.1 was discovered to contain a heap use-after-free via the av_hwframe_ctx_init function.
CVE-2024-32228: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) FFmpeg 7.0 is vulnerable to Buffer Overflow. There is a SEGV at libavcodec/hevcdec.c:2947:22 in hevc_frame_end.
CVE-2024-35369: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) In FFmpeg version n6.1.1, specifically within the avcodec/speexdec.c module, a potential security vulnerability exists due to insufficient validation of certain parameters when parsing Speex codec extradata. This vulnerability could lead to integer overflow conditions, potentially resulting in undefined behavior or crashes during the decoding process.
CVE-2024-36615: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) FFmpeg n7.0 has a race condition vulnerability in the VP9 decoder. This could lead to a data race if video encoding parameters were being exported, as the side data would be attached in the decoder thread while being read in the output thread.
CVE-2024-36618: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) FFmpeg n6.1.1 has a vulnerability in the AVI demuxer of the libavformat library which allows for an integer overflow, potentially resulting in a denial-of-service (DoS) condition.
CVE-2025-10256: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update)
CVE-2025-22921: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) FFmpeg git-master,N-113007-g8d24a28d06 was discovered to contain a segmentation violation via the component /libavcodec/jpeg2000dec.c.
CVE-2025-59734: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) It is possible to cause an use-after-free write in SANM decoding with a carefully crafted animation using subversion <2. When a STOR chunk is present, a subsequent FOBJ chunk will be saved in ctx->stored_frame. Stored frames can later be referenced by FTCH chunks. For files using subversion < 2, the undecoded frame is stored, and decoded again when the FTCH chunks are parsed. However, in process_frame_obj if the frame has an invalid size, there’s an early return, with a value of 0. This causes the code in decode_frame to still store the raw frame buffer into ctx->stored_frame. Leaving ctx->has_dimensions set to false. A subsequent chunk with type FTCH would call process_ftch and decode that frame obj again, adding to the top/left values and calling process_frame_obj again. Given that we never set ctx->have_dimensions before, this time we set the dimensions, calling init_buffers, which can reallocate the buffer in ctx->stored_frame, freeing the previous one. However, the GetByteContext object gb still holds a reference to the old buffer. Finally, when the code tries to decode the frame, codecs that accept a GetByteContext as a parameter will trigger a use-after-free read when using gb. GetByteContext is only used for reading bytes, so at most one could read invalid data. There are no heap allocations between the free and when the object is accessed. However, upon returning to process_ftch, the code restores the original values for top/left in stored_frame, writing 4 bytes to the freed data at offset 6, potentially corrupting the allocator’s metadata. This issue can be triggered just by probing whether a file has the sanm format. We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond.

You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.

Created: 2024-04-12 Last update: 2025-10-19 14:00

testing migrations

This package will soon be part of the auto-rubberband transition. You might want to ensure that your package is ready for it. You can probably find supplementary information in the debian-release archives or in the corresponding release.debian.org bug.
This package will soon be part of the auto-ffmpeg transition. You might want to ensure that your package is ready for it. You can probably find supplementary information in the debian-release archives or in the corresponding release.debian.org bug.
This package will soon be part of the auto-svt-av1 transition. You might want to ensure that your package is ready for it. You can probably find supplementary information in the debian-release archives or in the corresponding release.debian.org bug.

news

[rss feed]

[2025-09-26] Accepted ffmpeg 7:7.1.2-0+deb13u1 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Ramacher)
[2025-09-23] ffmpeg 7:7.1.2-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-09-21] Accepted ffmpeg 7:7.1.2-0+deb13u1 (source) into stable-security (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Ramacher)
[2025-09-20] Accepted ffmpeg 7:7.1.2-1 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Ramacher)
[2025-09-12] Accepted ffmpeg 7:8.0-1 (all amd64 source) into experimental (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Ramacher)
[2025-08-26] Accepted ffmpeg 7:5.1.7-0+deb12u1 (source) into oldstable-proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Ramacher)
[2025-08-25] Accepted ffmpeg 7:5.1.7-0+deb12u1 (source) into oldstable-security (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Ramacher)
[2025-07-14] Accepted ffmpeg 7:4.3.9-0+deb11u1 (source) into oldstable-security (Adrian Bunk)
[2025-03-11] ffmpeg 7:7.1.1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-03-08] Accepted ffmpeg 7:7.1.1-1 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Ramacher)
[2025-02-28] Accepted ffmpeg 7:4.3.8-0+deb11u3 (source) into oldstable-security (Thorsten Alteholz)
[2025-02-24] ffmpeg 7:7.1-4 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-02-21] Accepted ffmpeg 7:7.1-4 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Ramacher)
[2025-01-31] Accepted ffmpeg 7:4.3.8-0+deb11u2 (source) into oldstable-security (Thorsten Alteholz)
[2024-10-31] ffmpeg 7:7.1-3 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-10-27] Accepted ffmpeg 7:7.1-3 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Ramacher)
[2024-10-21] Accepted ffmpeg 7:4.3.8-0+deb11u1 (source) into oldstable-security (Emilio Pozuelo Monfort)
[2024-10-20] Accepted ffmpeg 7:7.1-2 (source) into experimental (Sebastian Ramacher)
[2024-10-20] Accepted ffmpeg 7:7.1-1 (source) into experimental (Sebastian Ramacher)
[2024-08-16] ffmpeg 7:7.0.2-3 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-08-14] Accepted ffmpeg 7:5.1.6-0+deb12u1 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Ramacher)
[2024-08-14] Accepted ffmpeg 7:5.1.6-0+deb12u1 (source) into stable-security (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Ramacher)
[2024-08-13] Accepted ffmpeg 7:7.0.2-3 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Ramacher)
[2024-08-13] ffmpeg 7:7.0.2-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-08-10] Accepted ffmpeg 7:7.0.2-2 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Ramacher)
[2024-08-10] ffmpeg 7:7.0.2-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-08-04] ffmpeg 7:7.0.1-5 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-08-03] Accepted ffmpeg 7:7.0.2-1 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Ramacher)
[2024-07-30] Accepted ffmpeg 7:7.0.1-5 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Ramacher)
[2024-07-28] Accepted ffmpeg 7:7.0.1-4 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Ramacher)

bugs [bug history graph]

all: 23 24
RC: 0
I&N: 16
M&W: 7 8
F&P: 0
patch: 2

links

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ubuntu

[Information about Ubuntu for Debian Developers]

version: 7:7.1.1-1ubuntu4
12 bugs
patches for 7:7.1.1-1ubuntu4