There are 3 open security issues in trixie.
1 important issue:
- CVE-2026-53499:
FORT Validator is a Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) relying-party validator that produces validated route-origin data. FORT Validator versions through 1.6.7 contain an origin-validation error in their RRDP processing: a delegated CA under the same Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) can reference a victim CA’s public RRDP notification and snapshot URLs, causing FORT’s URL-based download cache to report success after deleting the victim’s local snapshot. Following a routine victim publication, this can silently remove the victim’s VRPs and other signed objects from FORT’s output, potentially enabling route hijacking or loss of reachability. Version 1.6.8 contains a patch that rejects cross-origin RRDP snapshot and delta URLs; as a workaround, administrators can disable HTTP/RRDP with --http.enabled=false while keeping rsync enabled, although this can leave data unavailable or stale where rsync is not supported.
2 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2024-56169:
(postponed; to be fixed through a stable update)
A validation integrity issue was discovered in Fort through 1.6.4 before 2.0.0. RPKI Relying Parties (such as Fort) are supposed to maintain a backup cache of the remote RPKI data. This can be employed as a fallback in case a new fetch fails or yields incorrect files. However, the product currently uses its cache merely as a bandwidth saving tool (because fetching is performed through deltas). If a fetch fails midway or yields incorrect files, there is no viable fallback. This leads to incomplete route origin validation data.
- CVE-2024-56170:
(postponed; to be fixed through a stable update)
A validation integrity issue was discovered in Fort through 1.6.4 before 2.0.0. RPKI manifests are listings of relevant files that clients are supposed to verify. Assuming everything else is correct, the most recent version of a manifest should be prioritized over other versions, to prevent replays, accidental or otherwise. Manifests contain the manifestNumber and thisUpdate fields, which can be used to gauge the relevance of a given manifest, when compared to other manifests. The former is a serial-like sequential number, and the latter is the date on which the manifest was created. However, the product does not compare the up-to-dateness of the most recently fetched manifest against the cached manifest. As such, it's prone to a rollback to a previous version if it's served a valid outdated manifest. This leads to outdated route origin validation.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/f/fort-validator.png){kind=link}