There are 14 open security issues in trixie.
14 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2024-55601:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. Starting in version 0.123.0 and prior to version 0.139.4, some HTML attributes in Markdown in the internal templates listed below not escaped in internal render hooks. Those whoa re impacted are Hugo users who do not trust their Markdown content files and are using one or more of these templates: `_default/_markup/render-link.html` from `v0.123.0`; `_default/_markup/render-image.html` from `v0.123.0`; `_default/_markup/render-table.html` from `v0.134.0`; and/or `shortcodes/youtube.html` from `v0.125.0`. This issue is patched in v0.139.4. As a workaround, one may replace an affected component with user defined templates or disable the internal templates.
- CVE-2026-10582:
(needs triaging)
Hugo's security.http.urls allowlist is the only control on outbound fetches made by resources.GetRemote, and it inspects the URL text alone. CheckAllowedHTTPURL in config/security/securityConfig.go applies the configured pattern list and then re-checks a canonicalised form of an integer, hex or octal IPv4 host, but it never resolves the hostname and never inspects the address the HTTP client actually connects to. The client constructed in resources/resource_factories/create/create.go installs no dial-time hook, so no check occurs at connection time either. A hostname that resolves to a loopback, private or cloud-metadata address therefore satisfies the policy, and the response body is embedded in the generated site. An attacker who can supply a URL through content, for example a front-matter field or a CMS field, can make the build fetch an internal endpoint and publish the response in the static output, so the build artifact itself carries the data out.
- CVE-2026-10618:
(needs triaging)
Hugo's default fenced-code-block renderer writes attribute values taken from the code-fence info string into the rendered HTML without escaping them. New in markup/internal/attributes/attributes.go converts every attribute value from a byte slice to a string as it is stored, deliberately dropping the escaping that used to happen there, and RenderAttributes in the same file escapes only values that are still byte slices, so its escaping branch is never reached and every value is written verbatim. The function's documentation states that it performs HTML escaping of string attributes, which it does not. A quote inside an attribute value in the info string therefore terminates the attribute and allows a further attribute, including an event handler, to be placed on the wrapper element, and the script runs for every visitor who loads the page. This path is reached under the default configuration, with code fences enabled and without goldmark's unsafe setting or any custom render hook. Attribute names beginning with on are filtered when the attributes are parsed, so injection is achieved through the value rather than the name.
- CVE-2026-35166:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. From 0.60.0 to before 0.159.2, links and image links in the default markdown to HTML renderer are not properly escaped. Hugo users who trust their Markdown content or have custom render hooks for links and images are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.159.2.
- CVE-2026-44301:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. From 0.43 to before 0.161.0, when building a Hugo site that uses Node-based asset pipelines (PostCSS, Babel, TailwindCSS), Hugo invoked the configured Node tools without restrictions on file system access. As a result, executing hugo against an untrusted site could allow code running through these tools to read or write files outside the project's working directory. Users who do not use PostCSS, Babel, or TailwindCSS, or who only build trusted sites, are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.161.0.
- CVE-2026-50133:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. Prior to 0.162.0, Hugo accepts content files in several markup formats. Files mapped to the text/html media type (typically .html files under /content, or pages produced by a content adapter that sets content.mediaType = "text/html") had their body emitted verbatim into the rendered page. A site that ingests HTML content from an untrusted source could therefore be served stored cross-site scripting. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.162.0.
- CVE-2026-50134:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. From 0.91.0 until 0.162.0, resources.GetRemote enforces security.http.urls on the URL it is called with, but it did not re-validate intermediate URLs on HTTP 3xx redirects. An allowed server (or an attacker controlling its DNS or response) could therefore redirect the request to a host that the policy was meant to forbid and Hugo would fetch from the redirected target. The same bypass also lifted any host-shape restriction the operator had put in place. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.162.0.
- CVE-2026-50135:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. From 0.123.0 to 0.161.1, a regression made RootMappingFs.statRoot use Stat (follows symlinks) instead of Lstat , so a direct resources.Get of a symlink pointing outside its mount returned the target's contents — letting a symlink planted in a local mount (e.g. a vendored themes/ theme) read arbitrary files accessible to the Hugo user. Go-module themes from GitHub (symlinks stripped) and directory walks were unaffected. Fixed in 0.162.0.
- CVE-2026-58402:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. From 0.60.0 until 0.163.3, Hugo's default code-block renderer wrote the Markdown code-fence language or info-string into the code class="language-…" data-lang="…" wrapper without HTML escaping. A fence info-string containing a quote and a script payload breaks out of the attribute and injects a live script element. This issue is fixed in 0.163.3.
- CVE-2026-58403:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. From v0.123.0 through v0.163.0, Hugo's virtual filesystem is designed so that files under a mount cannot reach outside the mount tree, but a regression caused RootMappingFs.statRoot to call Stat, which follows symlinks, instead of Lstat, so a direct os.ReadFile "somefile" where somefile was a symlink pointing outside the mount would return the target's contents. This effectively let a symlink planted inside a theme or local mount read arbitrary files reachable to the user running hugo. This issue is fixed in v0.163.1.
- CVE-2026-89258:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. In versions after v0.123.0 and before v0.165.0, symlinks in parent directories were not dropped during direct resource lookups, allowing path confinement to be bypassed. An attacker who can place — or who convinces a site author to place — a symlink inside a mounted directory (for example, in a locally vendored theme under themes/) can cause functions that perform direct lookups, such as resources.Get and os.ReadFile, to follow that symlink and read files outside the intended project boundaries, disclosing their contents in the built site. Themes mounted as Go modules fetched from GitHub have symlinks stripped on download and are not affected, and multi-directory walks (e.g. content/asset walking) are not affected. This issue is an incomplete-fix follow-up to GHSA-c3wq-j5vh-68rc and GHSA-fw87-fv5r-9fpw; it is fixed in v0.165.0.
- CVE-2026-100691:
(needs triaging)
Hugo versions 0.75.0 through 0.165.x contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability: the syntax highlighter does not escape the `lineAnchors` option before passing it to Chroma, which writes the value verbatim into the `id` and `href` attributes of the generated line-number markup. A crafted `lineAnchors` value supplied as a Markdown code fence attribute (or passed to the `highlight` template function) results in unescaped HTML in the rendered page, allowing arbitrary JavaScript to execute in the browsers of visitors to the generated site. This affects sites that build and publish Markdown from untrusted contributors; Hugo's security model otherwise considers content trusted input. Fixed in 0.166.0, where the `lineAnchors` value is HTML-escaped before being passed to Chroma.
- CVE-2026-100692:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. In versions after v0.123.0 and before v0.166.0, Hugo's symlink confinement checks stopped at the mount root itself, so a theme or module checked into themes/ (or a vendored module) could contain a symlink at a mount root (for example themes/mytheme/assets -> /some/dir/outside). Files behind such a symlink were readable during a site build through resources.Get, resources.Match and similar functions, and could be published to public/ via static mounts, bypassing the rule that theme and module mount sources must be local paths. Modules fetched via Go modules are not affected because Go module zips cannot contain symlinks, and this is not an escalation for the main project, which may already mount absolute paths by configuration. Fixed in v0.166.0, where symlinked mount roots and symlinked directories between the mount root and the module directory are treated as non-existent for all modules. As a workaround, inspect themes/ and vendored modules for symlinks at mount roots before building, or replace symlinks with explicit mounts.
- CVE-2026-100694:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. In versions from v0.56.0 through v0.165.x, content files mapped to the text/org media type are rendered without escaping raw HTML: Org export blocks and @@html:...@@ snippets pass HTML through unescaped, resulting in cross-site scripting (XSS) in the generated site. An attacker who can supply or influence a content file under /content or the output of a content adapter can inject scripts that execute in the browsers of visitors to the affected pages. Only pages whose source file or content-adapter output declares the text/org media type are affected, and sites that fully trust all content sources are not impacted. Version v0.166.0 fixes the issue by introducing a security.allowContent allowlist that denies text/org by default; sites that intentionally author Org Mode content can opt back in with [security] allowContent = ['.*'].
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/h/hugo.png){kind=link}