There are 4 open security issues in trixie.
4 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2026-19872:
(needs triaging)
HTML::FormHandler versions before 0.410000 for Perl allow cross-site scripting via a submitted value rendered unescaped in an error message. The wrappers and renderers that emit a form's errors interpolate the error string straight into HTML with no escaping. Two of the library's own messages, no_match and not_allowed, splice the submitted value into that string, and a failing type constraint puts the rejected value into the message it builds, which _apply_actions hands to add_error. A field declared with a check regexp, a check list or a type constraint reaches those messages, with no custom validator and no non-default configuration. Errors rendered through an application's own escaping template layer rather than the library's rendering roles are not affected. A request over the network that submits markup to such a field gets it back live inside the error span, running script in the victim's origin. Re-rendering a rejected value later gives the stored variant.
- CVE-2026-85484:
(needs triaging)
HTML::FormHandler versions before 0.410002 for Perl render option group labels and radio button labels into HTML without escaping. The Select, RadioGroup, CheckboxGroup and HorizCheckboxGroup widgets render a group label unescaped, Select into a label attribute and the other three into element content. RadioGroup also renders each radio button's own label unescaped. Any application whose option list is built from data rather than literals, using options_from, an options_fieldname method, or the DBIC model, allows attacker-influenced text in a label that can override the options or embed JavaScript in rendered pages.
- CVE-2026-85485:
(needs triaging)
HTML::FormHandler versions before 0.410002 for Perl render some error messages into HTML without escaping. The Table form layout and the Bootstrap 2 and 3 wrappers splice each error string straight into the surrounding markup. Version 0.410000, the fix for CVE-2026-19872, escaped the equivalent values in the other layouts and wrappers, and 0.410002 extended that to these three. Error messages that contain attacker-influenced content such as rejected field values could embed JavaScript in rendered pages.
- CVE-2026-85630:
(needs triaging)
HTML::FormHandler versions before 0.410002 for Perl render field attributes into HTML without escaping using the process_attrs method. Any application with fields or field labels where some attributes are built from data rather than literals allows attacker-influenced text in an attribute value that can override the field attributes or embed JavaScript in rendered pages. For example, the RadioGroup widget uses the process_attrs method via the render_option and wrap_radio methods.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
1 issue that should be fixed with the next stable update:
- CVE-2022-4993:
HTML::FormHandler versions before 0.410000 for Perl allow attacker selected method dispatch and resource exhaustion because _apply_actions and add_error use error message text built from request data as a Locale::Maketext bracket notation template. add_error hands its first argument to the language handle as the Locale::Maketext message key, and the default handle's lexicon sets `_AUTO`, so a string that is not a lexicon entry is compiled as a bracket notation template instead of being looked up. In a bracket group the first token names a method called on the language handle and the remaining tokens are its arguments. Three kinds of text the library did not author reach that position. _apply_actions installs a `$SIG{__WARN__}` handler that stores the warning text in `$error_message`, and a captured warning survives a successful action, so a field carrying a numeric transform turns `Argument "[sprintf,%50000000d,0]" isn't numeric` into the template; a warning quotes the submitted value verbatim, so the group is well formed and dispatches. `$error_message ||= $tobj->validate($new_value)` takes a type constraint's own failure message, which renders the rejected value through a partial dumper in bracket and comma form (Devel::PartialDump when Moose can load it, Type::Tiny's own dumper always), so a field with `apply => [ Str ]` given a parameter sent more than once, which arrives as an array, gets `Reference ["a","b"] did not pass type constraint "Str"` as its template, from a request that carries no bracket character of its own. A coercion or transform exception reaches it the same way. Beyond those, a validator whose message contains the field value puts that value in the template directly, and add_error replaces the message list with the contents of an arrayref first argument (`@message = @{$message[0]} if ref $message[0] eq 'ARRAY'`), so a value arriving as an array fills the argument slots from the same request as well. A malformed group such as `[0]` makes the compile croak, and HTML::FormHandler::I18N::maketext and add_error each re-raise that as a die, so process() throws. A well formed group naming sprintf reaches CORE::sprintf with an attacker chosen field width. Any caller that applies a type constraint or a transform to an untrusted field, or whose validator passes an untrusted field value to add_error, can be made to throw an unhandled exception out of process(), or to allocate an arbitrary amount of memory in one request, and an application whose language handle subclass defines side effecting public methods makes those callable with attacker chosen arguments. The dumped type constraint message is bounded to the exception, because both dumpers quote non-numeric elements so the method slot is never an attacker chosen name. The built-in messages pass fixed templates with the value in an argument slot, where it stays inert, and the built-in field types attach explicit message callbacks, so neither is affected.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/libh/libhtml-formhandler-perl.png){kind=link}