There are 4 open security issues in trixie.
1 important issue:
- CVE-2026-116689:
follow-redirects is a Node.js HTTP and HTTPS client wrapper that automatically follows redirects. From 1.16.0 until 1.16.2, the documented sensitiveHeaders option is checked with value instanceof Array, so an array created in another JavaScript realm is replaced with an empty list even though Array.isArray recognizes it. When a request then follows an attacker-controlled cross-origin redirect, a custom credential header named in that discarded list can be forwarded to the redirect destination. This issue is fixed in version 1.16.2.
3 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2026-40895:
(needs triaging)
follow-redirects is an open source, drop-in replacement for Node's `http` and `https` modules that automatically follows redirects. Prior to 1.16.0, when an HTTP request follows a cross-domain redirect (301/302/307/308), follow-redirects only strips authorization, proxy-authorization, and cookie headers (matched by regex at index.js). Any custom authentication header (e.g., X-API-Key, X-Auth-Token, Api-Key, Token) is forwarded verbatim to the redirect target. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.16.0.
- CVE-2026-111755:
(needs triaging)
follow-redirects is a Node.js HTTP and HTTPS client wrapper that automatically follows redirects. From 1.16.0 until 1.16.1, escapeRegex leaves valid header-name metacharacters unescaped in sensitiveHeaders. When an application declares a sensitive header whose name contains ^ or | and follows a cross-origin or HTTPS-to-HTTP redirect, unescaped regular-expression metacharacters prevent the generated filter from matching the declared header name, and the credential header is forwarded to an attacker-controlled redirect target. This issue is fixed in version 1.16.1.
- CVE-2026-111756:
(needs triaging)
follow-redirects is a Node.js HTTP and HTTPS client wrapper that automatically follows redirects. From version 1.16.0 to before version 1.16.1, follow-redirects removes sensitive credential headers (Authorization, Proxy-Authorization, Cookie, and any caller-declared sensitiveHeaders) before following a redirect that crosses to a different host or downgrades to a less secure protocol. The removal routine iterates the caller's headers container with for...in and matches header names against a filter. This assumes the headers container is a plain object keyed by header names. Node's underlying http.request, which follow-redirects is a drop-in replacement for, also accepts headers as an alternating array of names and values. For an array, for...in yields the numeric indices "0", "1", "2" and so on, which never match a header-name filter, so nothing is removed. An application that sends array-form headers and follows an attacker-controlled cross-origin redirect therefore forwards its Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization headers verbatim to the attacker-controlled destination, with no error or warning. The sensitiveHeaders option added to fix CVE-2026-40895 / GHSA-r4q5-vmmm-2653 is equally ineffective, because it relies on the same helper. This is an unauthenticated confidentiality vulnerability: any remote server the victim application contacts can harvest the victim's credential headers by responding with a cross-origin redirect. This issue has been patched in version 1.16.1.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/n/node-follow-redirects.png){kind=link}