node-qs - Debian Package Tracker

general

source: node-qs (main)
version: 6.14.1+ds+~6.14.0-1
maintainer: Debian Javascript Maintainers (archive) (DMD)
uploaders: David Paleino [DMD] – Jérémy Lal [DMD]
arch: all
std-ver: 4.7.3
VCS: Git (Browse, QA)

versions [more versions can be listed by madison] [old versions available from snapshot.debian.org]

[pool directory]

o-o-stable: 6.9.4+ds-1+deb11u1
oldstable: 6.11.0+ds+~6.9.7-3
stable: 6.13.0+ds+~6.9.16-1
testing: 6.14.1+ds+~6.14.0-1
unstable: 6.14.1+ds+~6.14.0-1

versioned links

6.9.4+ds-1+deb11u1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
6.11.0+ds+~6.9.7-3: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
6.13.0+ds+~6.9.16-1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
6.14.1+ds+~6.14.0-1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]

binaries

node-qs

action needed

A new upstream version is available: 6.15.0+~6.14.0 high

A new upstream version 6.15.0+~6.14.0 is available, you should consider packaging it.

Created: 2026-02-12 Last update: 2026-03-02 22:31

The VCS repository is not up to date, push the missing commits. high

vcswatch reports that the current version of the package is not in its VCS.
Either you need to push your commits and/or your tags, or the information about the package's VCS are out of date. A common cause of the latter issue when using the Git VCS is not specifying the correct branch when the packaging is not in the default one (remote HEAD branch), which is usually "master" but can be modified in salsa.debian.org in the project's general settings with the "Default Branch" field). Alternatively the Vcs-Git field in debian/control can contain a "-b <branch-name>" suffix to indicate what branch is used for the Debian packaging.

Created: 2025-12-30 Last update: 2026-02-26 15:30

1 security issue in sid high

There is 1 open security issue in sid.

1 important issue:

CVE-2026-2391: ### Summary The `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284). ### Details When the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `['a', 'b', 'c']`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation. **Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50): ```js if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) { return val.split(','); } if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) { throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.'); } return val; ``` The `split(',')` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p). ### PoC **Test 1 - Basic bypass:** ``` npm install qs ``` ```js const qs = require('qs'); const payload = 'a=' + ','.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5) const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true }; try { const result = qs.parse(payload, options); console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful) } catch (e) { console.log('Limit enforced:', e.message); // Not thrown } ``` **Configuration:** - `comma: true` - `arrayLimit: 5` - `throwOnLimitExceeded: true` Expected: Throws "Array limit exceeded" error. Actual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26. ### Impact Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.

Created: 2026-02-12 Last update: 2026-02-16 10:52

1 security issue in forky high

There is 1 open security issue in forky.

1 important issue:

CVE-2026-2391: ### Summary The `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284). ### Details When the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `['a', 'b', 'c']`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation. **Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50): ```js if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) { return val.split(','); } if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) { throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.'); } return val; ``` The `split(',')` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p). ### PoC **Test 1 - Basic bypass:** ``` npm install qs ``` ```js const qs = require('qs'); const payload = 'a=' + ','.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5) const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true }; try { const result = qs.parse(payload, options); console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful) } catch (e) { console.log('Limit enforced:', e.message); // Not thrown } ``` **Configuration:** - `comma: true` - `arrayLimit: 5` - `throwOnLimitExceeded: true` Expected: Throws "Array limit exceeded" error. Actual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26. ### Impact Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.

Created: 2026-02-12 Last update: 2026-02-16 10:52

lintian reports 1 warning normal

Lintian reports 1 warning about this package. You should make the package lintian clean getting rid of them.

Created: 2025-12-31 Last update: 2026-02-17 04:46

2 low-priority security issues in trixie low

There are 2 open security issues in trixie.

2 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:

CVE-2026-2391: (needs triaging) ### Summary The `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284). ### Details When the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `['a', 'b', 'c']`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation. **Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50): ```js if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) { return val.split(','); } if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) { throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.'); } return val; ``` The `split(',')` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p). ### PoC **Test 1 - Basic bypass:** ``` npm install qs ``` ```js const qs = require('qs'); const payload = 'a=' + ','.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5) const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true }; try { const result = qs.parse(payload, options); console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful) } catch (e) { console.log('Limit enforced:', e.message); // Not thrown } ``` **Configuration:** - `comma: true` - `arrayLimit: 5` - `throwOnLimitExceeded: true` Expected: Throws "Array limit exceeded" error. Actual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26. ### Impact Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.
CVE-2025-15284: (needs triaging) Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1. Summary The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across all array notations. Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=valueconsumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly. Details The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2). Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162): if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) { obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No arrayLimit check } Working code (lib/parse.js:175): else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit checked here obj = []; obj[index] = leaf; } The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays. PoC const qs = require('qs'); const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 }); console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 6 (should be max 5) Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's "DoS demonstration" claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000 parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000. Impact Consistency bug in arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.

You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.

Created: 2025-12-30 Last update: 2026-02-16 10:52

2 low-priority security issues in bookworm low

There are 2 open security issues in bookworm.

2 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:

CVE-2026-2391: (needs triaging) ### Summary The `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284). ### Details When the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `['a', 'b', 'c']`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation. **Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50): ```js if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) { return val.split(','); } if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) { throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.'); } return val; ``` The `split(',')` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p). ### PoC **Test 1 - Basic bypass:** ``` npm install qs ``` ```js const qs = require('qs'); const payload = 'a=' + ','.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5) const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true }; try { const result = qs.parse(payload, options); console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful) } catch (e) { console.log('Limit enforced:', e.message); // Not thrown } ``` **Configuration:** - `comma: true` - `arrayLimit: 5` - `throwOnLimitExceeded: true` Expected: Throws "Array limit exceeded" error. Actual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26. ### Impact Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.
CVE-2025-15284: (needs triaging) Improper Input Validation vulnerability in qs (parse modules) allows HTTP DoS.This issue affects qs: < 6.14.1. Summary The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across all array notations. Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=valueconsumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly. Details The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2). Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162): if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) { obj = utils.combine([], leaf); // No arrayLimit check } Working code (lib/parse.js:175): else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) { // Limit checked here obj = []; obj[index] = leaf; } The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays. PoC const qs = require('qs'); const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 }); console.log(result.a.length); // Output: 6 (should be max 5) Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's "DoS demonstration" claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000 parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000. Impact Consistency bug in arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.

You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.

Created: 2025-12-30 Last update: 2026-02-16 10:52

news

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[2026-01-15] node-qs 6.14.1+ds+~6.14.0-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-12-30] Accepted node-qs 6.14.1+ds+~6.14.0-1 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2024-09-20] node-qs 6.13.0+ds+~6.9.16-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-09-14] Accepted node-qs 6.13.0+ds+~6.9.16-1 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2023-12-10] node-qs 6.11.0+ds+~6.9.7-4 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-12-10] node-qs 6.11.0+ds+~6.9.7-4 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-12-07] Accepted node-qs 6.11.0+ds+~6.9.7-4 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2023-01-30] Accepted node-qs 6.5.2-1+deb10u1 (source) into oldstable (Guilhem Moulin)
[2022-12-10] Accepted node-qs 6.9.4+ds-1+deb11u1 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2022-12-09] node-qs 6.11.0+ds+~6.9.7-3 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2022-12-09] node-qs 6.11.0+ds+~6.9.7-3 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2022-12-04] Accepted node-qs 6.11.0+ds+~6.9.7-3 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2022-11-24] node-qs 6.11.0+ds+~6.9.7-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2022-11-22] Accepted node-qs 6.11.0+ds+~6.9.7-2 (source) into unstable (Jelmer Vernooĳ) (signed by: Jelmer Vernooij)
[2022-07-13] node-qs 6.11.0+ds+~6.9.7-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2022-07-09] Accepted node-qs 6.11.0+ds+~6.9.7-1 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2022-01-15] node-qs 6.10.3+ds+~6.9.7-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2022-01-13] Accepted node-qs 6.10.3+ds+~6.9.7-1 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2021-12-11] node-qs 6.10.2+ds+~6.9.7-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2021-12-08] Accepted node-qs 6.10.2+ds+~6.9.7-1 (source) into unstable (Yadd) (signed by: Xavier Guimard)
[2021-09-30] node-qs 6.10.1+ds-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2021-09-27] Accepted node-qs 6.10.1+ds-1 (source) into unstable (Ayoyimika Ajibade) (signed by: Praveen Arimbrathodiyil)
[2020-11-19] node-qs 6.9.4+ds-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2020-11-16] Accepted node-qs 6.9.4+ds-1 (source) into unstable (Xavier Guimard)
[2019-12-07] node-qs 6.9.1+ds-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2019-12-05] Accepted node-qs 6.9.1+ds-1 (source) into unstable (Xavier Guimard)
[2019-10-23] node-qs 6.9.0+ds-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2019-10-20] Accepted node-qs 6.9.0+ds-1 (source) into unstable (Xavier Guimard)
[2018-10-09] Accepted node-qs 6.5.2-1~bpo9+1 (source all) into stretch-backports, stretch-backports (Pirate Praveen) (signed by: Praveen Arimbrathodiyil)
[2018-09-21] node-qs 6.5.2-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)

bugs [bug history graph]

all: 1
RC: 0
I&N: 1
M&W: 0
F&P: 0
patch: 0

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version: 6.14.1+ds+~6.14.0-1