Debian Package Tracker

general

source: openssl (main)
version: 1.1.1b-2
maintainer: Debian OpenSSL Team (archive) [DMD]
uploaders: Christoph Martin [DMD] – Kurt Roeckx [DMD] – Sebastian Andrzej Siewior [DMD]
arch: all any
std-ver: 4.2.1
VCS: Git (Browse, QA)

versions [more versions can be listed by madison] [old versions available from snapshot.debian.org]

[pool directory]

oldstable: 1.0.1t-1+deb8u8
old-sec: 1.0.1t-1+deb8u11
stable: 1.1.0j-1~deb9u1
stable-sec: 1.1.0j-1~deb9u1
testing: 1.1.1b-2
unstable: 1.1.1b-2

versioned links

1.0.1t-1+deb8u8: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
1.0.1t-1+deb8u11: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
1.1.0j-1~deb9u1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
1.1.1a-1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
1.1.1b-2: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]

binaries

libcrypto1.1-udeb
libssl-dev
libssl-doc
libssl1.1
libssl1.1-udeb
openssl

action needed

The VCS repository is not up to date, push the missing commits. high

vcswatch reports that the current version of the package is not in its VCS.
Either you need to push your commits, or the information about the package's VCS are out of date. A common cause of the latter issue when using the Git VCS is not specifying the correct branch when the packaging is not in the default one (remote HEAD branch), which is usually "master" but can be modified in salsa.debian.org in the project's general settings with the "Default Branch" field). Alternatively the Vcs-Git field in debian/control can contain a "-b <branch-name>" suffix to indicate what branch is used for the Debian packaging.

Created: 2019-04-17 Last update: 2019-05-26 06:05

1 security issue in sid high

There is 1 open security issue in sid.

1 important issue:

CVE-2019-1543: ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are ignored. It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a reused nonce. Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable. OpenSSL versions 1.1.1 and 1.1.0 are affected by this issue. Due to the limited scope of affected deployments this has been assessed as low severity and therefore we are not creating new releases at this time. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1c-dev (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1b). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0k-dev (Affected 1.1.0-1.1.0j).

Please fix it.

Created: 2019-03-06 Last update: 2019-04-20 18:41

1 bug tagged patch in the BTS normal

The BTS contains patches fixing 1 bug, consider including or untagging them.

Created: 2019-04-01 Last update: 2019-05-26 21:06

RFH: The maintainer is looking for help with this package. normal

The current maintainer is looking for someone who can help with the maintenance of this package. If you are interested in this package, please consider helping out. One way you can help is offer to be a co-maintainer or triage bugs in the BTS. Please see bug number #332498 for more information.

Created: 2017-12-02 Last update: 2017-12-02 00:26

1 ignored security issue in buster low

There is 1 open security issue in buster.

1 issue skipped by the security teams:

CVE-2019-1543: ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are ignored. It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a reused nonce. Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable. OpenSSL versions 1.1.1 and 1.1.0 are affected by this issue. Due to the limited scope of affected deployments this has been assessed as low severity and therefore we are not creating new releases at this time. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1c-dev (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1b). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0k-dev (Affected 1.1.0-1.1.0j).

Please fix it.

Created: 2019-03-06 Last update: 2019-04-20 18:41

1 ignored security issue in stretch low

There is 1 open security issue in stretch.

1 issue skipped by the security teams:

CVE-2019-1543: ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are ignored. It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a reused nonce. Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable. OpenSSL versions 1.1.1 and 1.1.0 are affected by this issue. Due to the limited scope of affected deployments this has been assessed as low severity and therefore we are not creating new releases at this time. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1c-dev (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1b). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0k-dev (Affected 1.1.0-1.1.0j).

Please fix it.

Created: 2019-03-06 Last update: 2019-04-20 18:41

2 ignored security issues in jessie low

There are 2 open security issues in jessie.

2 issues skipped by the security teams:

CVE-2019-1543: ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are ignored. It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a reused nonce. Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable. OpenSSL versions 1.1.1 and 1.1.0 are affected by this issue. Due to the limited scope of affected deployments this has been assessed as low severity and therefore we are not creating new releases at this time. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1c-dev (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1b). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0k-dev (Affected 1.1.0-1.1.0j).
CVE-2018-0734: The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing algorithm to recover the private key. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1a (Affected 1.1.1). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0j (Affected 1.1.0-1.1.0i). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2q (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2p).

Please fix them.

Created: 2018-10-29 Last update: 2019-04-20 18:41

Build log checks report 2 warnings low

Build log checks report 2 warnings

Created: 2017-10-26 Last update: 2018-08-22 07:28

Standards version of the package is outdated. wishlist

The package should be updated to follow the last version of Debian Policy (Standards-Version 4.3.0 instead of 4.2.1).

Created: 2018-12-23 Last update: 2019-04-17 06:08

news

[rss feed]

[2019-04-21] openssl 1.1.1b-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2019-04-16] Accepted openssl 1.1.1b-2 (source) into unstable (Kurt Roeckx)
[2019-03-13] openssl 1.1.1b-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2019-03-01] Accepted openssl 1.0.1t-1+deb8u11 (source all amd64) into oldstable (Markus Koschany)
[2019-02-26] Accepted openssl 1.1.1b-1 (source) into unstable (Kurt Roeckx)
[2018-12-03] Accepted openssl 1.1.0j-1~deb9u1 (source) into proposed-updates->stable-new, proposed-updates (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2018-11-30] Accepted openssl 1.1.0j-1~deb9u1 (source) into stable->embargoed, stable (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2018-11-25] openssl 1.1.1a-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2018-11-22] Accepted openssl 1.1.1a-1 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2018-11-21] Accepted openssl 1.0.1t-1+deb8u10 (source all amd64) into oldstable (Thorsten Alteholz)
[2018-10-31] openssl 1.1.1-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2018-10-29] Accepted openssl 1.1.1-2 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2018-10-28] openssl 1.1.1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2018-09-12] Accepted openssl 1.1.1-1 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2018-08-21] Accepted openssl 1.1.1~~pre9-1 (source) into unstable (Kurt Roeckx)
[2018-07-28] Accepted openssl 1.0.1t-1+deb8u9 (source all amd64) into oldstable (Markus Koschany)
[2018-07-04] Accepted openssl 1.1.1~~pre8-1 (source) into experimental (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2018-05-30] Accepted openssl 1.1.1~~pre7-1 (source) into experimental (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2018-05-25] openssl 1.1.0h-4 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2018-05-23] Accepted openssl 1.1.0h-4 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2018-05-23] openssl 1.1.0h-3 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2018-05-18] Accepted openssl 1.1.0h-3 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2018-05-01] Accepted openssl 1.1.1~~pre6-2 (source) into experimental (Kurt Roeckx)
[2018-05-01] Accepted openssl 1.1.1~~pre6-1 (source) into experimental (Kurt Roeckx)
[2018-04-03] Accepted openssl 1.1.1~~pre4-1 (source) into experimental (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2018-03-30] Accepted openssl 1.0.1t-1+deb8u8 (source all) into oldstable-proposed-updates->oldstable-new, oldstable-proposed-updates (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2018-03-30] Accepted openssl 1.1.0f-3+deb9u2 (source) into proposed-updates->stable-new, proposed-updates (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2018-03-30] Accepted openssl 1.0.1t-1+deb7u4 (source all amd64) into oldoldstable (Antoine Beaupré)
[2018-03-30] Accepted openssl 1.0.1t-1+deb7u4 (source all amd64) into oldoldstable (Antoine Beaupré)
[2018-03-30] openssl 1.1.0h-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)

bugs [bug history graph]

all: 60
RC: 0
I&N: 34
M&W: 26
F&P: 0
patch: 1

links

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ubuntu

[Information about Ubuntu for Debian Developers]

version: 1.1.1b-2ubuntu1
113 bugs (5 patches)
patches for 1.1.1b-2ubuntu1