openssl - Debian Package Tracker

general

source: openssl (main)
version: 3.6.1-2
maintainer: Debian OpenSSL Team (archive) (DMD)
uploaders: Christoph Martin [DMD] – Kurt Roeckx [DMD] – Sebastian Andrzej Siewior [DMD]
arch: all any
std-ver: 4.7.2
VCS: Git (Browse, QA)

versions [more versions can be listed by madison] [old versions available from snapshot.debian.org]

[pool directory]

o-o-stable: 1.1.1w-0+deb11u1
o-o-sec: 1.1.1w-0+deb11u5
oldstable: 3.0.18-1~deb12u1
old-sec: 3.0.18-1~deb12u2
old-upd: 3.0.17-1~deb12u2
old-p-u: 3.0.19-1~deb12u1
stable: 3.5.5-1~deb13u1
stable-sec: 3.5.4-1~deb13u2
testing: 3.5.5-1
unstable: 3.6.1-2
exp: 4.0.0~alpha1-1

versioned links

1.1.1w-0+deb11u1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
1.1.1w-0+deb11u5: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
3.0.17-1~deb12u2: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
3.0.18-1~deb12u1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
3.0.18-1~deb12u2: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
3.0.19-1~deb12u1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
3.5.4-1~deb13u2: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
3.5.5-1~deb13u1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
3.5.5-1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
3.6.1-2: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
4.0.0~alpha1-1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]

binaries

libcrypto3-udeb
libssl-dev
libssl-doc (1 bugs: 0, 0, 1, 0)
libssl3-udeb
libssl3t64
openssl (46 bugs: 0, 28, 18, 0)
openssl-provider-fips (1 bugs: 0, 1, 0, 0)
openssl-provider-legacy

action needed

1 security issue in sid high

There is 1 open security issue in sid.

1 important issue:

CVE-2026-2673: Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword. Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server. If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported. As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction). OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included. The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group. The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'. No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary. OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue. OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.

Created: 2026-03-13 Last update: 2026-03-14 14:00

1 security issue in forky high

There is 1 open security issue in forky.

1 important issue:

CVE-2026-2673: Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword. Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server. If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported. As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction). OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included. The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group. The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'. No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary. OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue. OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.

Created: 2026-03-13 Last update: 2026-03-14 14:00

The VCS repository is not up to date, push the missing commits. high

vcswatch reports that the current version of the package is not in its VCS.
Either you need to push your commits and/or your tags, or the information about the package's VCS are out of date. A common cause of the latter issue when using the Git VCS is not specifying the correct branch when the packaging is not in the default one (remote HEAD branch), which is usually "master" but can be modified in salsa.debian.org in the project's general settings with the "Default Branch" field). Alternatively the Vcs-Git field in debian/control can contain a "-b <branch-name>" suffix to indicate what branch is used for the Debian packaging.

Created: 2026-03-14 Last update: 2026-03-14 13:02

5 security issues in buster high

There are 5 open security issues in buster.

1 important issue:

CVE-2024-5535: Issue summary: Calling the OpenSSL API function SSL_select_next_proto with an empty supported client protocols buffer may cause a crash or memory contents to be sent to the peer. Impact summary: A buffer overread can have a range of potential consequences such as unexpected application beahviour or a crash. In particular this issue could result in up to 255 bytes of arbitrary private data from memory being sent to the peer leading to a loss of confidentiality. However, only applications that directly call the SSL_select_next_proto function with a 0 length list of supported client protocols are affected by this issue. This would normally never be a valid scenario and is typically not under attacker control but may occur by accident in the case of a configuration or programming error in the calling application. The OpenSSL API function SSL_select_next_proto is typically used by TLS applications that support ALPN (Application Layer Protocol Negotiation) or NPN (Next Protocol Negotiation). NPN is older, was never standardised and is deprecated in favour of ALPN. We believe that ALPN is significantly more widely deployed than NPN. The SSL_select_next_proto function accepts a list of protocols from the server and a list of protocols from the client and returns the first protocol that appears in the server list that also appears in the client list. In the case of no overlap between the two lists it returns the first item in the client list. In either case it will signal whether an overlap between the two lists was found. In the case where SSL_select_next_proto is called with a zero length client list it fails to notice this condition and returns the memory immediately following the client list pointer (and reports that there was no overlap in the lists). This function is typically called from a server side application callback for ALPN or a client side application callback for NPN. In the case of ALPN the list of protocols supplied by the client is guaranteed by libssl to never be zero in length. The list of server protocols comes from the application and should never normally be expected to be of zero length. In this case if the SSL_select_next_proto function has been called as expected (with the list supplied by the client passed in the client/client_len parameters), then the application will not be vulnerable to this issue. If the application has accidentally been configured with a zero length server list, and has accidentally passed that zero length server list in the client/client_len parameters, and has additionally failed to correctly handle a "no overlap" response (which would normally result in a handshake failure in ALPN) then it will be vulnerable to this problem. In the case of NPN, the protocol permits the client to opportunistically select a protocol when there is no overlap. OpenSSL returns the first client protocol in the no overlap case in support of this. The list of client protocols comes from the application and should never normally be expected to be of zero length. However if the SSL_select_next_proto function is accidentally called with a client_len of 0 then an invalid memory pointer will be returned instead. If the application uses this output as the opportunistic protocol then the loss of confidentiality will occur. This issue has been assessed as Low severity because applications are most likely to be vulnerable if they are using NPN instead of ALPN - but NPN is not widely used. It also requires an application configuration or programming error. Finally, this issue would not typically be under attacker control making active exploitation unlikely. The FIPS modules in 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue. Due to the low severity of this issue we are not issuing new releases of OpenSSL at this time. The fix will be included in the next releases when they become available.

4 issues postponed or untriaged:

CVE-2023-5678: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) Issue summary: Generating excessively long X9.42 DH keys or checking excessively long X9.42 DH keys or parameters may be very slow. Impact summary: Applications that use the functions DH_generate_key() to generate an X9.42 DH key may experience long delays. Likewise, applications that use DH_check_pub_key(), DH_check_pub_key_ex() or EVP_PKEY_public_check() to check an X9.42 DH key or X9.42 DH parameters may experience long delays. Where the key or parameters that are being checked have been obtained from an untrusted source this may lead to a Denial of Service. While DH_check() performs all the necessary checks (as of CVE-2023-3817), DH_check_pub_key() doesn't make any of these checks, and is therefore vulnerable for excessively large P and Q parameters. Likewise, while DH_generate_key() performs a check for an excessively large P, it doesn't check for an excessively large Q. An application that calls DH_generate_key() or DH_check_pub_key() and supplies a key or parameters obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of Service attack. DH_generate_key() and DH_check_pub_key() are also called by a number of other OpenSSL functions. An application calling any of those other functions may similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are DH_check_pub_key_ex(), EVP_PKEY_public_check(), and EVP_PKEY_generate(). Also vulnerable are the OpenSSL pkey command line application when using the "-pubcheck" option, as well as the OpenSSL genpkey command line application. The OpenSSL SSL/TLS implementation is not affected by this issue. The OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1 FIPS providers are not affected by this issue.
CVE-2024-0727: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) Issue summary: Processing a maliciously formatted PKCS12 file may lead OpenSSL to crash leading to a potential Denial of Service attack Impact summary: Applications loading files in the PKCS12 format from untrusted sources might terminate abruptly. A file in PKCS12 format can contain certificates and keys and may come from an untrusted source. The PKCS12 specification allows certain fields to be NULL, but OpenSSL does not correctly check for this case. This can lead to a NULL pointer dereference that results in OpenSSL crashing. If an application processes PKCS12 files from an untrusted source using the OpenSSL APIs then that application will be vulnerable to this issue. OpenSSL APIs that are vulnerable to this are: PKCS12_parse(), PKCS12_unpack_p7data(), PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(), PKCS12_unpack_authsafes() and PKCS12_newpass(). We have also fixed a similar issue in SMIME_write_PKCS7(). However since this function is related to writing data we do not consider it security significant. The FIPS modules in 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue.
CVE-2024-2511: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) Issue summary: Some non-default TLS server configurations can cause unbounded memory growth when processing TLSv1.3 sessions Impact summary: An attacker may exploit certain server configurations to trigger unbounded memory growth that would lead to a Denial of Service This problem can occur in TLSv1.3 if the non-default SSL_OP_NO_TICKET option is being used (but not if early_data support is also configured and the default anti-replay protection is in use). In this case, under certain conditions, the session cache can get into an incorrect state and it will fail to flush properly as it fills. The session cache will continue to grow in an unbounded manner. A malicious client could deliberately create the scenario for this failure to force a Denial of Service. It may also happen by accident in normal operation. This issue only affects TLS servers supporting TLSv1.3. It does not affect TLS clients. The FIPS modules in 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue. OpenSSL 1.0.2 is also not affected by this issue.
CVE-2024-4741: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update)

Created: 2024-06-27 Last update: 2024-06-29 19:18

1 bug tagged patch in the BTS normal

The BTS contains patches fixing 1 bug, consider including or untagging them.

Created: 2025-01-06 Last update: 2026-03-16 05:00

lintian reports 18 warnings normal

Lintian reports 18 warnings about this package. You should make the package lintian clean getting rid of them.

Created: 2026-03-13 Last update: 2026-03-13 08:31

RFH: The maintainer is looking for help with this package. normal

The current maintainer is looking for someone who can help with the maintenance of this package. If you are interested in this package, please consider helping out. One way you can help is offer to be a co-maintainer or triage bugs in the BTS. Please see bug number #332498 for more information.

Created: 2017-12-02 Last update: 2017-12-02 00:26

1 low-priority security issue in trixie low

There is 1 open security issue in trixie.

1 issue left for the package maintainer to handle:

CVE-2026-2673: (needs triaging) Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword. Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server. If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported. As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction). OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included. The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group. The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'. No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary. OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue. OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.

You can find information about how to handle this issue in the security team's documentation.

Created: 2026-03-13 Last update: 2026-03-14 14:00

debian/patches: 3 patches to forward upstream low

Among the 3 debian patches available in version 3.6.1-2 of the package, we noticed the following issues:

3 patches where the metadata indicates that the patch has not yet been forwarded upstream. You should either forward the patch upstream or update the metadata to document its real status.

Created: 2023-02-26 Last update: 2026-03-13 08:33

Standards version of the package is outdated. wishlist

The package should be updated to follow the last version of Debian Policy (Standards-Version 4.7.3 instead of 4.7.2).

Created: 2025-12-23 Last update: 2026-03-13 07:02

testing migrations

This package will soon be part of the auto-openssl transition. You might want to ensure that your package is ready for it. You can probably find supplementary information in the debian-release archives or in the corresponding release.debian.org bug.
excuses:
- Migration status for openssl (3.5.5-1 to 3.6.1-2): BLOCKED: Rejected/violates migration policy/introduces a regression
- Issues preventing migration:
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for borgbackup2/2.0.0b20-2: amd64: Test triggered (failure will be ignored), arm64: Pass, i386: Pass, ppc64el: Pass, riscv64: Pass, s390x: Pass
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for cl-plus-ssl/20220328.git8b91648-7: amd64: Failed (not a regression) ♻ (reference ♻), arm64: Failed (not a regression) ♻ (reference ♻), i386: Failed (not a regression) ♻ (reference ♻), ppc64el: Failed (not a regression) ♻ (reference ♻), riscv64: Failed (not a regression) ♻ (reference ♻), s390x: Reference test triggered, but real test failed already ♻
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for cyrus-imapd/3.12.1-3: amd64: Pass, arm64: Test triggered (failure will be ignored), i386: Failed (not a regression) ♻ (reference ♻), ppc64el: Pass, riscv64: Pass, s390x: Pass
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for debusine/0.14.5: amd64: Pass, arm64: Pass, i386: Pass, ppc64el: Pass, riscv64: Test triggered (failure will be ignored), s390x: Pass
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for ecflow/5.15.2-2: ppc64el: Pass ♻, s390x: Pass ♻
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for glaze/7.1.0-1: ppc64el: Pass ♻ (reference ♻), s390x: Pass ♻ (reference ♻)
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for glusterfs/11.2-2: ppc64el: No tests, superficial or marked flaky ♻, s390x: No tests, superficial or marked flaky ♻
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for gnutls28/3.8.12-2: ppc64el: Pass ♻, s390x: Pass ♻
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for golang-github-mendersoftware-openssl/1.1.0-4: amd64: Pass, arm64: Pass, i386: Pass, ppc64el: Reference test triggered, but real test failed already ♻, riscv64: Pass, s390x: Pass
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for isc-kea/3.0.2-2: s390x: Pass ♻
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for libapache2-mod-auth-openidc/2.4.19.1-2: ppc64el: Pass ♻ (reference ♻), s390x: Pass ♻ (reference ♻)
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for libzonemaster-ldns-perl/5.0.1+ds-1: s390x: Pass ♻
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for linux/6.19.6-1: s390x: No tests, superficial or marked flaky ♻
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for nix/2.32.5+dfsg-1: ppc64el: Pass ♻, s390x: Pass ♻
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for nodejs/22.22.0+dfsg+~cs22.19.13-2: amd64: Regression ♻ (reference ♻), arm64: Regression ♻ (reference ♻), i386: Regression ♻ (reference ♻), ppc64el: Regression ♻ (reference ♻), riscv64: Test triggered (failure will be ignored), s390x: Regression ♻ (reference ♻)
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for nova/2:32.1.0-7: amd64: Pass, arm64: Pass, i386: No tests, superficial or marked flaky ♻, ppc64el: Regression ♻ (reference ♻), riscv64: No tests, superficial or marked flaky ♻, s390x: No tests, superficial or marked flaky ♻
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for openssl/3.6.1-2: amd64: Pass, arm64: Pass, i386: Pass, ppc64el: Pass, riscv64: Pass, s390x: Pass
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for ovn/26.03.0~git20260216.b543a88-3: ppc64el: No tests, superficial or marked flaky ♻, s390x: No tests, superficial or marked flaky ♻
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for oxigraph/0.5.5+ds-2: amd64: Pass, arm64: Pass, i386: Pass, ppc64el: Pass, riscv64: Test triggered (failure will be ignored), s390x: Pass
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for pyopenssl/25.3.0-1: ppc64el: Reference test triggered, but real test failed already ♻, s390x: Reference test triggered, but real test failed already ♻
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for python3.13/3.13.12-1: amd64: Pass, arm64: Pass, i386: Pass, ppc64el: Pass, riscv64: Test triggered (failure will be ignored), s390x: Pass
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for python3.14/3.14.3-1: amd64: Pass, arm64: Pass, i386: Pass, ppc64el: Pass, riscv64: Test triggered (failure will be ignored), s390x: Pass
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for qatengine/2.0.0-8: amd64: Regression ♻ (reference ♻)
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for ros-ros-comm/1.17.4+ds-3: amd64: Pass, arm64: Pass, i386: Pass, ppc64el: Pass, riscv64: Test triggered (failure will be ignored), s390x: Pass
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for tarsnap/1.0.41-3: amd64: Pass, arm64: Test triggered, i386: Pass, ppc64el: Test triggered, riscv64: Pass, s390x: Test triggered
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for tlswrapper/0~20251001-1: ppc64el: Pass ♻, s390x: Pass ♻ (reference ♻)
- ∙ ∙ Too young, only 3 of 5 days old
- Additional info (not blocking):
- ∙ ∙ Piuparts tested OK - https://piuparts.debian.org/sid/source/o/openssl.html
- ∙ ∙ Reproduced on amd64
- ∙ ∙ Reproduced on arm64
- ∙ ∙ Reproduced on armhf
- ∙ ∙ Reproduced on i386
- ∙ ∙ Reproducibility check waiting for results on ppc64el
- Not considered

news

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[2026-03-13] Accepted openssl 4.0.0~alpha1-1 (source amd64 all) into experimental (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2026-03-12] Accepted openssl 3.6.1-2 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2026-02-28] Accepted openssl 3.0.19-1~deb12u1 (source) into oldstable-proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2026-02-27] Accepted openssl 3.5.5-1~deb13u1 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2026-02-23] Accepted openssl 1.1.1w-0+deb11u5 (source) into oldoldstable-security (Andreas Henriksson)
[2026-02-02] openssl 3.5.5-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2026-01-29] Accepted openssl 3.0.18-1~deb12u2 (source) into oldstable-proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2026-01-29] Accepted openssl 3.5.4-1~deb13u2 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2026-01-27] Accepted openssl 3.6.1-1 (source) into experimental (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2026-01-27] Accepted openssl 3.5.5-1 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2026-01-27] Accepted openssl 3.0.18-1~deb12u2 (source) into oldstable-security (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2026-01-27] Accepted openssl 3.5.4-1~deb13u2 (source) into stable-security (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2025-12-26] Accepted openssl 3.6.0-2 (source) into experimental (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2025-12-06] Accepted openssl 3.0.18-1~deb12u1 (source) into oldstable-proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2025-11-02] Accepted openssl 3.5.4-1~deb13u1 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2025-10-19] Accepted openssl 3.0.17-1~deb12u3 (source) into oldstable-proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2025-10-13] Accepted openssl 3.5.1-1+deb13u1 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2025-10-04] openssl 3.5.4-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-10-03] Accepted openssl 3.6.0-1 (source) into experimental (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2025-10-03] Accepted openssl 1.1.1w-0+deb11u4 (source) into oldoldstable-security (Emilio Pozuelo Monfort)
[2025-10-01] Accepted openssl 3.5.1-1+deb13u1 (source) into stable-security (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2025-10-01] Accepted openssl 3.0.17-1~deb12u3 (source) into oldstable-security (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2025-09-30] Accepted openssl 3.5.4-1 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2025-09-21] openssl 3.5.3-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-09-21] openssl 3.5.3-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-09-18] Accepted openssl 3.6.0~~beta1-1 (source) into experimental (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2025-09-17] Accepted openssl 3.5.3-1 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2025-09-06] Accepted openssl 3.6.0~~alpha1-1 (source) into experimental (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)
[2025-08-25] openssl 3.5.2-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-08-10] Accepted openssl 3.5.2-1 (source) into unstable (Sebastian Andrzej Siewior)

bugs [bug history graph]

all: 52
RC: 0
I&N: 32
M&W: 20
F&P: 0
patch: 1

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ubuntu

[Information about Ubuntu for Debian Developers]

version: 3.5.5-1ubuntu1
28 bugs
patches for 3.5.5-1ubuntu1