There are 6 open security issues in bookworm.
6 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2023-4785:
(needs triaging)
Lack of error handling in the TCP server in Google's gRPC starting version 1.23 on posix-compatible platforms (ex. Linux) allows an attacker to cause a denial of service by initiating a significant number of connections with the server. Note that gRPC C++ Python, and Ruby are affected, but gRPC Java, and Go are NOT affected.
- CVE-2024-7246:
(needs triaging)
It's possible for a gRPC client communicating with a HTTP/2 proxy to poison the HPACK table between the proxy and the backend such that other clients see failed requests. It's also possible to use this vulnerability to leak other clients HTTP header keys, but not values. This occurs because the error status for a misencoded header is not cleared between header reads, resulting in subsequent (incrementally indexed) added headers in the first request being poisoned until cleared from the HPACK table. Please update to a fixed version of gRPC as soon as possible. This bug has been fixed in 1.58.3, 1.59.5, 1.60.2, 1.61.3, 1.62.3, 1.63.2, 1.64.3, 1.65.4.
- CVE-2023-32732:
(needs triaging)
gRPC contains a vulnerability whereby a client can cause a termination of connection between a HTTP2 proxy and a gRPC server: a base64 encoding error for `-bin` suffixed headers will result in a disconnection by the gRPC server, but is typically allowed by HTTP2 proxies. We recommend upgrading beyond the commit in https://github.com/grpc/grpc/pull/32309 https://www.google.com/url
- CVE-2023-33953:
(needs triaging)
gRPC contains a vulnerability that allows hpack table accounting errors could lead to unwanted disconnects between clients and servers in exceptional cases/ Three vectors were found that allow the following DOS attacks: - Unbounded memory buffering in the HPACK parser - Unbounded CPU consumption in the HPACK parser The unbounded CPU consumption is down to a copy that occurred per-input-block in the parser, and because that could be unbounded due to the memory copy bug we end up with an O(n^2) parsing loop, with n selected by the client. The unbounded memory buffering bugs: - The header size limit check was behind the string reading code, so we needed to first buffer up to a 4 gigabyte string before rejecting it as longer than 8 or 16kb. - HPACK varints have an encoding quirk whereby an infinite number of 0’s can be added at the start of an integer. gRPC’s hpack parser needed to read all of them before concluding a parse. - gRPC’s metadata overflow check was performed per frame, so that the following sequence of frames could cause infinite buffering: HEADERS: containing a: 1 CONTINUATION: containing a: 2 CONTINUATION: containing a: 3 etc…
- CVE-2023-44487:
(needs triaging)
The HTTP/2 protocol allows a denial of service (server resource consumption) because request cancellation can reset many streams quickly, as exploited in the wild in August through October 2023.
- CVE-2024-11407:
(needs triaging)
There exists a denial of service through Data corruption in gRPC-C++ - gRPC-C++ servers with transmit zero copy enabled through the channel arg GRPC_ARG_TCP_TX_ZEROCOPY_ENABLED can experience data corruption issues. The data sent by the application may be corrupted before transmission over the network thus leading the receiver to receive an incorrect set of bytes causing RPC requests to fail. We recommend upgrading past commit e9046b2bbebc0cb7f5dc42008f807f6c7e98e791
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/g/grpc.png){kind=link}