There are 2 open security issues in trixie.
2 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2025-61765:
(needs triaging)
python-socketio is a Python implementation of the Socket.IO realtime client and server. A remote code execution vulnerability in python-socketio versions prior to 5.14.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary Python code through malicious pickle deserialization in multi-server deployments on which the attacker previously gained access to the message queue that the servers use for internal communications. When Socket.IO servers are configured to use a message queue backend such as Redis for inter-server communication, messages sent between the servers are encoded using the `pickle` Python module. When a server receives one of these messages through the message queue, it assumes it is trusted and immediately deserializes it. The vulnerability stems from deserialization of messages using Python's `pickle.loads()` function. Having previously obtained access to the message queue, the attacker can send a python-socketio server a crafted pickle payload that executes arbitrary code during deserialization via Python's `__reduce__` method. This vulnerability only affects deployments with a compromised message queue. The attack can lead to the attacker executing random code in the context of, and with the privileges of a Socket.IO server process. Single-server systems that do not use a message queue, and multi-server systems with a secure message queue are not vulnerable. In addition to making sure standard security practices are followed in the deployment of the message queue, users of the python-socketio package can upgrade to version 5.14.0 or newer, which remove the `pickle` module and use the much safer JSON encoding for inter-server messaging.
- CVE-2026-48804:
(needs triaging)
python-socketio is a Python implementation of the Socket.IO realtime client and server. The python-socketio server stores binary `EVENT` and `ACK` messages in memory while it waits to receive their binary attachments. Once all the attachments are received, these messages are then processed. Prior to version 5.16.4, an attacker can submit a binary message and intentionally omit sending one or more of its attachments to cause the message along with the partial list of received attachments to stay in memory for a long time. Version 5.16.4 takes the following measures to address this issue: Binary packets are only accepted from authenticated clients and, when a client disconnects, the server checks if there is a partial binary message being held for the client and deletes it.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/p/python-socketio.png){kind=link}