There are 8 open security issues in trixie.
5 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2026-0864:
(needs triaging)
When using the "configparser" module to write configuration files containing multi-line text values with carriage return characters (\r) the resulting file could be injected with unexpected keys and values if the attacker controls the written value.
- CVE-2026-4360:
(needs triaging)
In the Tarfile.extract() function, the filter parameter is not passed properly when extracting hardlinks. An affected system that extracts content from untrusted tar files could end up writing files with an unexpected uid/gid despite the user passing filter='data' to the extract() function.
- CVE-2026-7210:
(needs triaging)
`xml.parsers.expat` and `xml.etree.ElementTree` use insufficient entropy for Expat hash-flooding protection, which allows a crafted XML document to trigger hash flooding.\r\n\r\nFully mitigating this vulnerability requires both updating libexpat to 2.8.0 or later and applying this patch.
- CVE-2026-11940:
(needs triaging)
tarfile.extractall() with the 'data' or 'tar' filter could be bypassed by a crafted archive where a hardlink references a symlink stored at a deeper name than the hardlink itself. The extraction fallback validated the symlink at it's archived location but recreated it at the hardlink's shallower path, letting a relative target the filter judged contained escape the destination directory. This allowed a malicious tar archive to create a symlink pointing outside the destination, enabling out-of-destination file reads or writes. This was an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-4330.
- CVE-2026-11972:
(needs triaging)
When using the "tarfile" module with a file opened in "streaming mode" (mode="r|") the tarfile module did not properly handle EOF, making archive parsing take exponentially longer.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
3 ignored issues:
- CVE-2025-12781:
When passing data to the b64decode(), standard_b64decode(), and urlsafe_b64decode() functions in the "base64" module the characters "+/" will always be accepted, regardless of the value of "altchars" parameter, typically used to establish an "alternative base64 alphabet" such as the URL safe alphabet. This behavior matches what is recommended in earlier base64 RFCs, but newer RFCs now recommend either dropping characters outside the specified base64 alphabet or raising an error. The old behavior has the possibility of causing data integrity issues. This behavior can only be insecure if your application uses an alternate base64 alphabet (without "+/"). If your application does not use the "altchars" parameter or the urlsafe_b64decode() function, then your application does not use an alternative base64 alphabet. The attached patches DOES NOT make the base64-decode behavior raise an error, as this would be a change in behavior and break existing programs. Instead, the patch deprecates the behavior which will be replaced with the newly recommended behavior in a future version of Python. Users are recommended to mitigate by verifying user-controlled inputs match the base64 alphabet they are expecting or verify that their application would not be affected if the b64decode() functions accepted "+" or "/" outside of altchars.
- CVE-2025-15366:
The imaplib module, when passed a user-controlled command, can have additional commands injected using newlines. Mitigation rejects commands containing control characters.
- CVE-2025-15367:
The poplib module, when passed a user-controlled command, can have additional commands injected using newlines. Mitigation rejects commands containing control characters.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/p/python3.13.png){kind=link}