redis - Debian Package Tracker

general

source: redis (main)
version: 5:7.0.15-3
maintainer: Chris Lamb (DMD)
arch: all any
std-ver: 4.6.2
VCS: Git (Browse, QA)

versions [more versions can be listed by madison] [old versions available from snapshot.debian.org]

[pool directory]

o-o-stable: 5:5.0.14-1+deb10u2
o-o-sec: 5:5.0.14-1+deb10u5
oldstable: 5:6.0.16-1+deb11u2
old-sec: 5:6.0.16-1+deb11u5
old-bpo: 5:7.0.10-1~bpo11+1
stable: 5:7.0.15-1~deb12u3
stable-sec: 5:7.0.15-1~deb12u3
testing: 5:7.0.15-3
unstable: 5:7.0.15-3
exp: 5:7.2.5-3

versioned links

5:5.0.14-1+deb10u2: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
5:5.0.14-1+deb10u5: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
5:6.0.16-1+deb11u2: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
5:6.0.16-1+deb11u5: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
5:7.0.10-1~bpo11+1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
5:7.0.15-1~deb12u3: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
5:7.0.15-3: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
5:7.2.5-3: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]

binaries

redis
redis-sentinel
redis-server (5 bugs: 0, 5, 0, 0)
redis-tools

action needed

Problems while searching for a new upstream version high

uscan had problems while searching for a new upstream version:

In debian/watch no matching files for watch line
  https://github.com/redis/redis/tags (?:.*?/)?v?(7\.0\.\d+)(?i)(?:\.(?:tar\.xz|tar\.bz2|tar\.gz|tar\.zstd?|zip|tgz|tbz|txz))

Created: 2024-10-30 Last update: 2025-04-29 20:01

1 security issue in trixie high

There is 1 open security issue in trixie.

1 important issue:

CVE-2025-21605: Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. In versions starting at 2.6 and prior to 7.4.3, An unauthenticated client can cause unlimited growth of output buffers, until the server runs out of memory or is killed. By default, the Redis configuration does not limit the output buffer of normal clients (see client-output-buffer-limit). Therefore, the output buffer can grow unlimitedly over time. As a result, the service is exhausted and the memory is unavailable. When password authentication is enabled on the Redis server, but no password is provided, the client can still cause the output buffer to grow from "NOAUTH" responses until the system will run out of memory. This issue has been patched in version 7.4.3. An additional workaround to mitigate this problem without patching the redis-server executable is to block access to prevent unauthenticated users from connecting to Redis. This can be done in different ways. Either using network access control tools like firewalls, iptables, security groups, etc, or enabling TLS and requiring users to authenticate using client side certificates.

Created: 2025-04-24 Last update: 2025-04-24 10:32

1 security issue in sid high

There is 1 open security issue in sid.

1 important issue:

CVE-2025-21605: Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. In versions starting at 2.6 and prior to 7.4.3, An unauthenticated client can cause unlimited growth of output buffers, until the server runs out of memory or is killed. By default, the Redis configuration does not limit the output buffer of normal clients (see client-output-buffer-limit). Therefore, the output buffer can grow unlimitedly over time. As a result, the service is exhausted and the memory is unavailable. When password authentication is enabled on the Redis server, but no password is provided, the client can still cause the output buffer to grow from "NOAUTH" responses until the system will run out of memory. This issue has been patched in version 7.4.3. An additional workaround to mitigate this problem without patching the redis-server executable is to block access to prevent unauthenticated users from connecting to Redis. This can be done in different ways. Either using network access control tools like firewalls, iptables, security groups, etc, or enabling TLS and requiring users to authenticate using client side certificates.

Created: 2025-04-24 Last update: 2025-04-24 10:32

5 security issues in bullseye high

There are 5 open security issues in bullseye.

1 important issue:

CVE-2025-21605: Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. In versions starting at 2.6 and prior to 7.4.3, An unauthenticated client can cause unlimited growth of output buffers, until the server runs out of memory or is killed. By default, the Redis configuration does not limit the output buffer of normal clients (see client-output-buffer-limit). Therefore, the output buffer can grow unlimitedly over time. As a result, the service is exhausted and the memory is unavailable. When password authentication is enabled on the Redis server, but no password is provided, the client can still cause the output buffer to grow from "NOAUTH" responses until the system will run out of memory. This issue has been patched in version 7.4.3. An additional workaround to mitigate this problem without patching the redis-server executable is to block access to prevent unauthenticated users from connecting to Redis. This can be done in different ways. Either using network access control tools like firewalls, iptables, security groups, etc, or enabling TLS and requiring users to authenticate using client side certificates.

4 ignored issues:

CVE-2021-31294: Redis before 6cbea7d allows a replica to cause an assertion failure in a primary server by sending a non-administrative command (specifically, a SET command). NOTE: this was fixed for Redis 6.2.x and 7.x in 2021. Versions before 6.2 were not intended to have safety guarantees related to this.
CVE-2022-24735: Redis is an in-memory database that persists on disk. By exploiting weaknesses in the Lua script execution environment, an attacker with access to Redis prior to version 7.0.0 or 6.2.7 can inject Lua code that will execute with the (potentially higher) privileges of another Redis user. The Lua script execution environment in Redis provides some measures that prevent a script from creating side effects that persist and can affect the execution of the same, or different script, at a later time. Several weaknesses of these measures have been publicly known for a long time, but they had no security impact as the Redis security model did not endorse the concept of users or privileges. With the introduction of ACLs in Redis 6.0, these weaknesses can be exploited by a less privileged users to inject Lua code that will execute at a later time, when a privileged user executes a Lua script. The problem is fixed in Redis versions 7.0.0 and 6.2.7. An additional workaround to mitigate this problem without patching the redis-server executable, if Lua scripting is not being used, is to block access to `SCRIPT LOAD` and `EVAL` commands using ACL rules.
CVE-2022-24736: Redis is an in-memory database that persists on disk. Prior to versions 6.2.7 and 7.0.0, an attacker attempting to load a specially crafted Lua script can cause NULL pointer dereference which will result with a crash of the redis-server process. The problem is fixed in Redis versions 7.0.0 and 6.2.7. An additional workaround to mitigate this problem without patching the redis-server executable, if Lua scripting is not being used, is to block access to `SCRIPT LOAD` and `EVAL` commands using ACL rules.
CVE-2024-31449: Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. An authenticated user may use a specially crafted Lua script to trigger a stack buffer overflow in the bit library, which may potentially lead to remote code execution. The problem exists in all versions of Redis with Lua scripting. This problem has been fixed in Redis versions 6.2.16, 7.2.6, and 7.4.1. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Created: 2025-04-24 Last update: 2025-04-24 10:32

1 security issue in bookworm high

There is 1 open security issue in bookworm.

1 important issue:

CVE-2025-21605: Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. In versions starting at 2.6 and prior to 7.4.3, An unauthenticated client can cause unlimited growth of output buffers, until the server runs out of memory or is killed. By default, the Redis configuration does not limit the output buffer of normal clients (see client-output-buffer-limit). Therefore, the output buffer can grow unlimitedly over time. As a result, the service is exhausted and the memory is unavailable. When password authentication is enabled on the Redis server, but no password is provided, the client can still cause the output buffer to grow from "NOAUTH" responses until the system will run out of memory. This issue has been patched in version 7.4.3. An additional workaround to mitigate this problem without patching the redis-server executable is to block access to prevent unauthenticated users from connecting to Redis. This can be done in different ways. Either using network access control tools like firewalls, iptables, security groups, etc, or enabling TLS and requiring users to authenticate using client side certificates.

Created: 2025-04-24 Last update: 2025-04-24 10:32

lintian reports 1 error and 1 warning high

Lintian reports 1 error and 1 warning about this package. You should make the package lintian clean getting rid of them.

Created: 2024-10-10 Last update: 2025-01-21 22:32

debian/patches: 8 patches to forward upstream low

Among the 10 debian patches available in version 5:7.0.15-3 of the package, we noticed the following issues:

8 patches where the metadata indicates that the patch has not yet been forwarded upstream. You should either forward the patch upstream or update the metadata to document its real status.

Created: 2023-02-26 Last update: 2025-01-21 18:30

Standards version of the package is outdated. wishlist

The package should be updated to follow the last version of Debian Policy (Standards-Version 4.7.2 instead of 4.6.2).

Created: 2024-04-07 Last update: 2025-02-27 13:25

news

[rss feed]

[2025-02-01] Accepted redis 5:7.0.15-1~deb12u3 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Adrian Bunk)
[2025-01-30] Accepted redis 5:7.0.15-1~deb12u3 (source) into stable-security (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Adrian Bunk)
[2025-01-26] redis 5:7.0.15-3 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-01-21] Accepted redis 5:7.2.5-3 (source) into experimental (Chris Lamb)
[2025-01-21] Accepted redis 5:7.0.15-3 (source) into unstable (Chris Lamb)
[2025-01-20] Accepted redis 5:6.0.16-1+deb11u5 (source) into oldstable-security (Adrian Bunk)
[2024-12-06] Accepted redis 5:7.0.15-1~deb12u2 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Adrian Bunk)
[2024-11-28] Accepted redis 5:6.0.16-1+deb11u4 (source) into oldstable-security (Adrian Bunk)
[2024-10-13] redis 5:7.0.15-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-10-09] Accepted redis 5:7.2.5-2 (source) into experimental (Chris Lamb)
[2024-10-09] Accepted redis 5:7.0.15-2 (source) into unstable (Chris Lamb)
[2024-09-10] Accepted redis 5:6.0.16-1+deb11u3 (source) into oldstable-security (Chris Lamb)
[2024-06-04] Accepted redis 5:7.2.5-1 (source) into experimental (Chris Lamb)
[2024-01-31] Accepted redis 5:7.0.15-1~deb12u1 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Chris Lamb)
[2024-01-29] Accepted redis 5:7.0.15-1~deb12u1 (source) into stable-security (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Chris Lamb)
[2024-01-14] redis 5:7.0.15-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-01-09] Accepted redis 5:7.2.4-1 (source) into experimental (Chris Lamb)
[2024-01-09] Accepted redis 5:7.0.15-1 (source) into unstable (Chris Lamb)
[2023-12-02] Accepted redis 5:7.0.11-1+deb12u1 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Chris Lamb)
[2023-11-04] Accepted redis 5:7.2.3-1 (source) into experimental (Chris Lamb)
[2023-11-03] redis 5:7.0.14-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-10-31] Accepted redis 5:7.2.2-2 (source) into experimental (Chris Lamb)
[2023-10-31] Accepted redis 5:7.0.14-2 (source) into unstable (Chris Lamb)
[2023-10-23] Accepted redis 5:5.0.14-1+deb10u5 (source amd64 all) into oldoldstable (Chris Lamb)
[2023-10-22] redis 5:7.0.14-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-10-19] Accepted redis 5:7.2.2-1 (source) into experimental (Chris Lamb)
[2023-10-19] Accepted redis 5:7.0.14-1 (source) into unstable (Chris Lamb)
[2023-10-19] redis 5:7.0.13-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-10-17] Accepted redis 5:7.2.1-2 (source) into experimental (Chris Lamb)
[2023-10-17] Accepted redis 5:7.0.13-2 (source) into unstable (Chris Lamb)

bugs [bug history graph]

all: 7
RC: 2
I&N: 5
M&W: 0
F&P: 0
patch: 0

links

homepage
lintian (1, 1)
buildd: logs, exp, checks, reproducibility, cross
popcon
browse source code
edit tags
other distros
security tracker
screenshots
debian patches
debci

ubuntu

[Information about Ubuntu for Debian Developers]

version: 5:7.0.15-3
22 bugs