There are 3 open security issues in trixie.
1 important issue:
- CVE-2026-91986:
gitoxide gix-transport before 0.59.2 fails to filter control characters in git-daemon connect requests, allowing attackers to inject NUL/CR/LF bytes via crafted git URLs. Attackers can inject extra NUL-delimited protocol fields to spoof virtual hosts or inject newlines into daemon requests and logs.
2 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2026-82247:
(needs triaging)
gitoxide's gix-url crate (<= 0.32.0, fixed in 0.37.1) uses a hand-rolled URL parser that does not treat '?' or '#' as terminating the authority component, contrary to RFC 3986. As a consequence, gix-transport's HTTP redirect identity guard (can_reuse_identity) compares the wrong host and fails open. An attacker controlling a redirect response can craft a Location header of the form <attacker-authority>?@<original-authority> so that gitoxide sends the caller's HTTP Basic Authorization credentials to an unintended host. gix-transport is affected in versions <= 0.49.0 (fixed in 0.58.1).
- CVE-2026-82255:
(needs triaging)
gitoxide versions from 0.25.4 contain an HTTP credential leak vulnerability in the curl-based transport backend where credentials are sent to attacker-controlled servers after HTTP redirects. The vulnerability occurs because credential validation checks the original URL instead of the effective URL after redirect, allowing attackers to steal authentication tokens through cross-domain redirects or HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrades.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/r/rust-gix-transport.png){kind=link}