There are 4 open security issues in trixie.
3 important issues:
- CVE-2026-55458:
Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to 2.11.5, the reverse proxy's finalizeResponse method in modules/caddyhttp/reverseproxy/reverseproxy.go handles an upstream 101 Switching Protocols response before running removeConnectionHeaders and the hopHeaders deletion loop used for ordinary responses. The early return invokes handleUpgradeResponse, which copies the upstream headers to the client and normalizes only WebSocket-specific header names. An attacker who controls or compromises a proxied WebSocket upstream can therefore cause hop-by-hop headers such as Alt-Svc, Keep-Alive, and Proxy-Authenticate, as well as headers named by Connection, to cross the proxy boundary. For HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 extended CONNECT, the upstream 101 response may be represented to the client as an ordinary successful response, increasing the chance that leaked headers are processed. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.5.
- CVE-2026-92284:
Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. In version 2.11.3 and earlier, in modules/caddyhttp/replacer.go, resolving http.request.body reads the complete request body with an unbounded io.Copy before request-body middleware limits apply, allowing memory exhaustion and process termination.
- CVE-2026-92700:
Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. In version 2.11.3 and earlier, in modules/caddyhttp/fileserver/staticfiles.go, fileHidden() uses case-sensitive filepath.Match checks, so case variants can bypass hide rules on case-insensitive filesystems or when mixed-case paths coexist and expose files intended to be hidden.
1 issue left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2026-77281:
(needs triaging)
Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. In version 2.11.3 and earlier, three configuration-dependent weaknesses affect the handler and placeholder layer. In modules/caddyhttp/rewrite/rewrite.go, Rewrite.Rewrite() can pass attacker-controlled replacement bytes through buildQueryString for a second placeholder expansion when a rewrite URI ends with a literal question mark, allowing injected environment or request-variable placeholders to disclose data and, when the file provider is registered, allowing injected file placeholders to disclose readable files. The issue is fixed in version 2.11.4.
You can find information about how to handle this issue in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/c/caddy.png){kind=link}