There are 3 open security issues in trixie.
1 important issue:
- CVE-2026-107315:
pgjdbc, the PostgreSQL JDBC Driver, versions 42.7.4 through 42.7.13 pads a value that is shorter than its declared length with bytes left in its send buffer instead of zeros, and the server stores those bytes as part of the value. The bytes are messages the driver sent earlier on the same connection: SQL text and parameter values of recent statements, which on a pooled connection can come from other requests. Each padded value can carry up to 8192 bytes of this traffic, or 16320 bytes on a connection with GSS encryption. The padding happens when an application declares a length larger than the data it supplies, through PreparedStatement.setObject with a ByteStreamWriter, CopyIn.writeToCopy, PGCopyOutputStream.write, LargeObject.write, or Blob.setBytes. The driver accepts these calls without an error. An attacker who can make the application store such a value and read it back can collect earlier traffic. Applications whose declared lengths always match their data are not affected. Versions 42.7.3 and earlier pad with zeros.
2 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2026-42198:
(needs triaging)
pgjdbc is an open source postgresql JDBC Driver. From version 42.2.0 to before version 42.7.11, pgjdbc is vulnerable to a client-side denial of service during SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication. A malicious server can instruct the driver to perform SCRAM authentication with a very large iteration count. With a large enough value, the client spends an unbounded amount of CPU time inside PBKDF2 before authentication can fail. A single attempt ties up a CPU core. Repeated or concurrent attempts exhaust client CPU and can wedge connection pools. In affected versions, loginTimeout did not fully mitigate this problem. When loginTimeout expired, the caller could stop waiting, but the worker thread performing the connection attempt could continue running and burning CPU inside the SCRAM PBKDF2 computation. This issue has been patched in version 42.7.11.
- CVE-2026-54291:
(needs triaging)
pgjdbc is an open source postgresql JDBC Driver. In releases 42.7.4 through 42.7.11, channelBinding=require connections can be silently downgraded from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS with channel binding to plain SCRAM-SHA-256 without it, losing the man-in-the-middle protection the setting is meant to guarantee. An attacker who can intercept the TLS connection can trigger the downgrade with a certificate whose signature algorithm has no tls-server-end-point channel-binding hash, because the bundled com.ongres.scram:scram-client returns an empty byte array instead of failing and pgJDBC ScramAuthenticator checks only that the server advertised a PLUS mechanism, without rejecting the empty binding or checking that the negotiated mechanism uses channel binding. This issue is fixed in version 42.7.12.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/libp/libpgjava.png){kind=link}