CVE-2026-103022:
Urwid is a console user interface library for Python. Prior to 4.0.7, handle_short_request() in urwid/display/web.py performs unguarded character encoding on POST input and unguarded UTF-8 decoding on polling update socket output. A remote attacker who obtains a valid X-Urwid-ID session token can submit non-ASCII POST data that raises UnicodeEncodeError, while non-UTF-8 polling output raises UnicodeDecodeError, causing the CGI handler to return an error and terminate request processing. The POST exception path also leaves an opened file descriptor unclosed for the CGI process lifetime, so repeated requests can cause denial of service for the web display interface. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.7.
1 issue that should be fixed with the next stable update:
CVE-2026-9323:
The urwid web display backend (urwid/display/web.py) generates web session identifiers (urwid_id) in Screen.start() by concatenating two random.randrange(10**9) calls that use Python's Mersenne Twister PRNG, which is not cryptographically secure. Each call consumes approximately 30 bits of PRNG state, and the Mersenne Twister internal state is approximately 19,937 bits, so an attacker who observes approximately 334 session IDs (for example via the X-Urwid-ID HTTP response header) can fully reconstruct the internal state and predict all past and future session IDs (Path B). The same identifier is also used as the filename of a FIFO created in the world-listable /tmp directory (for example /tmp/urwid375487765176907690.in), so any local user on the host can list /tmp to enumerate active session tokens directly (Path A). With a valid session ID, an attacker can read the victim's terminal screen via the polling endpoint, inject keystrokes into the victim's session (yielding OS-level code execution with the session owner's privileges if the session runs a shell), and inject exit sequences or flood the FIFO to terminate or crash the session. A prior Bandit S311 warning on this usage was suppressed with # noqa: S311 rather than fixed
CVE-2026-103022:
Urwid is a console user interface library for Python. Prior to 4.0.7, handle_short_request() in urwid/display/web.py performs unguarded character encoding on POST input and unguarded UTF-8 decoding on polling update socket output. A remote attacker who obtains a valid X-Urwid-ID session token can submit non-ASCII POST data that raises UnicodeEncodeError, while non-UTF-8 polling output raises UnicodeDecodeError, causing the CGI handler to return an error and terminate request processing. The POST exception path also leaves an opened file descriptor unclosed for the CGI process lifetime, so repeated requests can cause denial of service for the web display interface. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.7.
CVE-2026-9323:
The urwid web display backend (urwid/display/web.py) generates web session identifiers (urwid_id) in Screen.start() by concatenating two random.randrange(10**9) calls that use Python's Mersenne Twister PRNG, which is not cryptographically secure. Each call consumes approximately 30 bits of PRNG state, and the Mersenne Twister internal state is approximately 19,937 bits, so an attacker who observes approximately 334 session IDs (for example via the X-Urwid-ID HTTP response header) can fully reconstruct the internal state and predict all past and future session IDs (Path B). The same identifier is also used as the filename of a FIFO created in the world-listable /tmp directory (for example /tmp/urwid375487765176907690.in), so any local user on the host can list /tmp to enumerate active session tokens directly (Path A). With a valid session ID, an attacker can read the victim's terminal screen via the polling endpoint, inject keystrokes into the victim's session (yielding OS-level code execution with the session owner's privileges if the session runs a shell), and inject exit sequences or flood the FIFO to terminate or crash the session. A prior Bandit S311 warning on this usage was suppressed with # noqa: S311 rather than fixed
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/u/urwid.png){kind=link}