There are 7 open security issues in bookworm.
7 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2024-2193:
(postponed; to be fixed through a stable update)
A Speculative Race Condition (SRC) vulnerability that impacts modern CPU architectures supporting speculative execution (related to Spectre V1) has been disclosed. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to disclose arbitrary data from the CPU using race conditions to access the speculative executable code paths.
- CVE-2024-2201:
(postponed; to be fixed through a stable update)
- CVE-2023-28746:
(postponed; to be fixed through a stable update)
Information exposure through microarchitectural state after transient execution from some register files for some Intel(R) Atom(R) Processors may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable information disclosure via local access.
- CVE-2023-46841:
(postponed; to be fixed through a stable update)
Recent x86 CPUs offer functionality named Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). A sub-feature of this are Shadow Stacks (CET-SS). CET-SS is a hardware feature designed to protect against Return Oriented Programming attacks. When enabled, traditional stacks holding both data and return addresses are accompanied by so called "shadow stacks", holding little more than return addresses. Shadow stacks aren't writable by normal instructions, and upon function returns their contents are used to check for possible manipulation of a return address coming from the traditional stack. In particular certain memory accesses need intercepting by Xen. In various cases the necessary emulation involves kind of replaying of the instruction. Such replaying typically involves filling and then invoking of a stub. Such a replayed instruction may raise an exceptions, which is expected and dealt with accordingly. Unfortunately the interaction of both of the above wasn't right: Recovery involves removal of a call frame from the (traditional) stack. The counterpart of this operation for the shadow stack was missing.
- CVE-2023-46842:
(postponed; to be fixed through a stable update)
Unlike 32-bit PV guests, HVM guests may switch freely between 64-bit and other modes. This in particular means that they may set registers used to pass 32-bit-mode hypercall arguments to values outside of the range 32-bit code would be able to set them to. When processing of hypercalls takes a considerable amount of time, the hypervisor may choose to invoke a hypercall continuation. Doing so involves putting (perhaps updated) hypercall arguments in respective registers. For guests not running in 64-bit mode this further involves a certain amount of translation of the values. Unfortunately internal sanity checking of these translated values assumes high halves of registers to always be clear when invoking a hypercall. When this is found not to be the case, it triggers a consistency check in the hypervisor and causes a crash.
- CVE-2024-31142:
(postponed; to be fixed through a stable update)
Because of a logical error in XSA-407 (Branch Type Confusion), the mitigation is not applied properly when it is intended to be used. XSA-434 (Speculative Return Stack Overflow) uses the same infrastructure, so is equally impacted. For more details, see: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-407.html https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-434.html
- CVE-2024-31143:
(postponed; to be fixed through a stable update)
An optional feature of PCI MSI called "Multiple Message" allows a device to use multiple consecutive interrupt vectors. Unlike for MSI-X, the setting up of these consecutive vectors needs to happen all in one go. In this handling an error path could be taken in different situations, with or without a particular lock held. This error path wrongly releases the lock even when it is not currently held.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.