There are 4 open security issues in bookworm.
4 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2024-37568:
(needs triaging)
lepture Authlib before 1.3.1 has algorithm confusion with asymmetric public keys. Unless an algorithm is specified in a jwt.decode call, HMAC verification is allowed with any asymmetric public key. (This is similar to CVE-2022-29217 and CVE-2024-33663.)
- CVE-2025-59420:
(needs triaging)
Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. Prior to version 1.6.4, Authlib’s JWS verification accepts tokens that declare unknown critical header parameters (crit), violating RFC 7515 “must‑understand” semantics. An attacker can craft a signed token with a critical header (for example, bork or cnf) that strict verifiers reject but Authlib accepts. In mixed‑language fleets, this enables split‑brain verification and can lead to policy bypass, replay, or privilege escalation. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.4.
- CVE-2025-61920:
(needs triaging)
Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. Prior to version 1.6.5, Authlib’s JOSE implementation accepts unbounded JWS/JWT header and signature segments. A remote attacker can craft a token whose base64url‑encoded header or signature spans hundreds of megabytes. During verification, Authlib decodes and parses the full input before it is rejected, driving CPU and memory consumption to hostile levels and enabling denial of service. Version 1.6.5 patches the issue. Some temporary workarounds are available. Enforce input size limits before handing tokens to Authlib and/or use application-level throttling to reduce amplification risk.
- CVE-2025-62706:
(needs triaging)
Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. Prior to version 1.6.5, Authlib’s JWE zip=DEF path performs unbounded DEFLATE decompression. A very small ciphertext can expand into tens or hundreds of megabytes on decrypt, allowing an attacker who can supply decryptable tokens to exhaust memory and CPU and cause denial of service. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.5. Workarounds for this issue involve rejecting or stripping zip=DEF for inbound JWEs at the application boundary, forking and add a bounded decompression guard via decompressobj().decompress(data, MAX_SIZE)) and returning an error when output exceeds a safe limit, or enforcing strict maximum token sizes and fail fast on oversized inputs; combine with rate limiting.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/p/python-authlib.png){kind=link}