runc - Debian Package Tracker

general

source: runc (main)
version: 1.3.3+ds1-2
maintainer: Debian Go Packaging Team (DMD)
uploaders: Reinhard Tartler [DMD] – Dmitry Smirnov [DMD] – Alexandre Viau [DMD]
arch: all any
std-ver: 4.7.2
VCS: Git (Browse, QA)

versions [more versions can be listed by madison] [old versions available from snapshot.debian.org]

[pool directory]

o-o-stable: 1.0.0~rc93+ds1-5+deb11u5
o-o-sec: 1.0.0~rc93+ds1-5+deb11u3
o-o-p-u: 1.0.0~rc93+ds1-5+deb11u5
oldstable: 1.1.5+ds1-1+deb12u1
old-sec: 1.1.5+ds1-1+deb12u1
stable: 1.1.15+ds1-2
testing: 1.3.3+ds1-2
unstable: 1.3.3+ds1-2

versioned links

1.0.0~rc93+ds1-5+deb11u3: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
1.0.0~rc93+ds1-5+deb11u5: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
1.1.5+ds1-1+deb12u1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
1.1.15+ds1-2: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
1.3.3+ds1-2: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]

binaries

golang-github-opencontainers-runc-dev
runc (2 bugs: 0, 2, 0, 0)

action needed

Debci reports failed tests high

unstable: pass (log)
The tests ran in 0:06:44
Last run: 2025-11-20T23:07:02.000Z
Previous status: unknown

testing: fail (log)
The tests ran in 0:04:47
Last run: 2025-11-20T13:25:44.000Z
Previous status: unknown

stable: pass (log)
The tests ran in 0:04:07
Last run: 2025-11-10T00:45:51.000Z
Previous status: unknown

Created: 2025-11-20 Last update: 2025-11-30 22:01

3 security issues in trixie high

There are 3 open security issues in trixie.

3 important issues:

CVE-2025-31133: runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions 1.2.7 and below, 1.3.0-rc.1 through 1.3.1, 1.4.0-rc.1 and 1.4.0-rc.2 files, runc would not perform sufficient verification that the source of the bind-mount (i.e., the container's /dev/null) was actually a real /dev/null inode when using the container's /dev/null to mask. This exposes two methods of attack: an arbitrary mount gadget, leading to host information disclosure, host denial of service, container escape, or a bypassing of maskedPaths. This issue is fixed in versions 1.2.8, 1.3.3 and 1.4.0-rc.3.
CVE-2025-52565: runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. Versions 1.0.0-rc3 through 1.2.7, 1.3.0-rc.1 through 1.3.2, and 1.4.0-rc.1 through 1.4.0-rc.2, due to insufficient checks when bind-mounting `/dev/pts/$n` to `/dev/console` inside the container, an attacker can trick runc into bind-mounting paths which would normally be made read-only or be masked onto a path that the attacker can write to. This attack is very similar in concept and application to CVE-2025-31133, except that it attacks a similar vulnerability in a different target (namely, the bind-mount of `/dev/pts/$n` to `/dev/console` as configured for all containers that allocate a console). This happens after `pivot_root(2)`, so this cannot be used to write to host files directly -- however, as with CVE-2025-31133, this can load to denial of service of the host or a container breakout by providing the attacker with a writable copy of `/proc/sysrq-trigger` or `/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern` (respectively). This issue is fixed in versions 1.2.8, 1.3.3 and 1.4.0-rc.3.
CVE-2025-52881: runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions 1.2.7, 1.3.2 and 1.4.0-rc.2, an attacker can trick runc into misdirecting writes to /proc to other procfs files through the use of a racing container with shared mounts (we have also verified this attack is possible to exploit using a standard Dockerfile with docker buildx build as that also permits triggering parallel execution of containers with custom shared mounts configured). This redirect could be through symbolic links in a tmpfs or theoretically other methods such as regular bind-mounts. While similar, the mitigation applied for the related CVE, CVE-2019-19921, was fairly limited and effectively only caused runc to verify that when LSM labels are written they are actually procfs files. This issue is fixed in versions 1.2.8, 1.3.3, and 1.4.0-rc.3.

Created: 2025-11-05 Last update: 2025-11-23 06:30

4 security issues in bullseye high

There are 4 open security issues in bullseye.

3 important issues:

CVE-2025-31133: runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions 1.2.7 and below, 1.3.0-rc.1 through 1.3.1, 1.4.0-rc.1 and 1.4.0-rc.2 files, runc would not perform sufficient verification that the source of the bind-mount (i.e., the container's /dev/null) was actually a real /dev/null inode when using the container's /dev/null to mask. This exposes two methods of attack: an arbitrary mount gadget, leading to host information disclosure, host denial of service, container escape, or a bypassing of maskedPaths. This issue is fixed in versions 1.2.8, 1.3.3 and 1.4.0-rc.3.
CVE-2025-52565: runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. Versions 1.0.0-rc3 through 1.2.7, 1.3.0-rc.1 through 1.3.2, and 1.4.0-rc.1 through 1.4.0-rc.2, due to insufficient checks when bind-mounting `/dev/pts/$n` to `/dev/console` inside the container, an attacker can trick runc into bind-mounting paths which would normally be made read-only or be masked onto a path that the attacker can write to. This attack is very similar in concept and application to CVE-2025-31133, except that it attacks a similar vulnerability in a different target (namely, the bind-mount of `/dev/pts/$n` to `/dev/console` as configured for all containers that allocate a console). This happens after `pivot_root(2)`, so this cannot be used to write to host files directly -- however, as with CVE-2025-31133, this can load to denial of service of the host or a container breakout by providing the attacker with a writable copy of `/proc/sysrq-trigger` or `/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern` (respectively). This issue is fixed in versions 1.2.8, 1.3.3 and 1.4.0-rc.3.
CVE-2025-52881: runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions 1.2.7, 1.3.2 and 1.4.0-rc.2, an attacker can trick runc into misdirecting writes to /proc to other procfs files through the use of a racing container with shared mounts (we have also verified this attack is possible to exploit using a standard Dockerfile with docker buildx build as that also permits triggering parallel execution of containers with custom shared mounts configured). This redirect could be through symbolic links in a tmpfs or theoretically other methods such as regular bind-mounts. While similar, the mitigation applied for the related CVE, CVE-2019-19921, was fairly limited and effectively only caused runc to verify that when LSM labels are written they are actually procfs files. This issue is fixed in versions 1.2.8, 1.3.3, and 1.4.0-rc.3.

1 issue postponed or untriaged:

CVE-2024-45310: (postponed; to be fixed through a stable update) runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. runc 1.1.13 and earlier, as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier, can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host filesystem by sharing a volume between two containers and exploiting a race with `os.MkdirAll`. While this could be used to create empty files, existing files would not be truncated. An attacker must have the ability to start containers using some kind of custom volume configuration. Containers using user namespaces are still affected, but the scope of places an attacker can create inodes can be significantly reduced. Sufficiently strict LSM policies (SELinux/Apparmor) can also in principle block this attack -- we suspect the industry standard SELinux policy may restrict this attack's scope but the exact scope of protection hasn't been analysed. This is exploitable using runc directly as well as through Docker and Kubernetes. The issue is fixed in runc v1.1.14 and v1.2.0-rc3. Some workarounds are available. Using user namespaces restricts this attack fairly significantly such that the attacker can only create inodes in directories that the remapped root user/group has write access to. Unless the root user is remapped to an actual user on the host (such as with rootless containers that don't use `/etc/sub[ug]id`), this in practice means that an attacker would only be able to create inodes in world-writable directories. A strict enough SELinux or AppArmor policy could in principle also restrict the scope if a specific label is applied to the runc runtime, though neither the extent to which the standard existing policies block this attack nor what exact policies are needed to sufficiently restrict this attack have been thoroughly tested.

Created: 2025-11-05 Last update: 2025-11-23 06:30

4 security issues in bookworm high

There are 4 open security issues in bookworm.

3 important issues:

CVE-2025-31133: runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions 1.2.7 and below, 1.3.0-rc.1 through 1.3.1, 1.4.0-rc.1 and 1.4.0-rc.2 files, runc would not perform sufficient verification that the source of the bind-mount (i.e., the container's /dev/null) was actually a real /dev/null inode when using the container's /dev/null to mask. This exposes two methods of attack: an arbitrary mount gadget, leading to host information disclosure, host denial of service, container escape, or a bypassing of maskedPaths. This issue is fixed in versions 1.2.8, 1.3.3 and 1.4.0-rc.3.
CVE-2025-52565: runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. Versions 1.0.0-rc3 through 1.2.7, 1.3.0-rc.1 through 1.3.2, and 1.4.0-rc.1 through 1.4.0-rc.2, due to insufficient checks when bind-mounting `/dev/pts/$n` to `/dev/console` inside the container, an attacker can trick runc into bind-mounting paths which would normally be made read-only or be masked onto a path that the attacker can write to. This attack is very similar in concept and application to CVE-2025-31133, except that it attacks a similar vulnerability in a different target (namely, the bind-mount of `/dev/pts/$n` to `/dev/console` as configured for all containers that allocate a console). This happens after `pivot_root(2)`, so this cannot be used to write to host files directly -- however, as with CVE-2025-31133, this can load to denial of service of the host or a container breakout by providing the attacker with a writable copy of `/proc/sysrq-trigger` or `/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern` (respectively). This issue is fixed in versions 1.2.8, 1.3.3 and 1.4.0-rc.3.
CVE-2025-52881: runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions 1.2.7, 1.3.2 and 1.4.0-rc.2, an attacker can trick runc into misdirecting writes to /proc to other procfs files through the use of a racing container with shared mounts (we have also verified this attack is possible to exploit using a standard Dockerfile with docker buildx build as that also permits triggering parallel execution of containers with custom shared mounts configured). This redirect could be through symbolic links in a tmpfs or theoretically other methods such as regular bind-mounts. While similar, the mitigation applied for the related CVE, CVE-2019-19921, was fairly limited and effectively only caused runc to verify that when LSM labels are written they are actually procfs files. This issue is fixed in versions 1.2.8, 1.3.3, and 1.4.0-rc.3.

1 issue left for the package maintainer to handle:

CVE-2024-45310: (needs triaging) runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. runc 1.1.13 and earlier, as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier, can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host filesystem by sharing a volume between two containers and exploiting a race with `os.MkdirAll`. While this could be used to create empty files, existing files would not be truncated. An attacker must have the ability to start containers using some kind of custom volume configuration. Containers using user namespaces are still affected, but the scope of places an attacker can create inodes can be significantly reduced. Sufficiently strict LSM policies (SELinux/Apparmor) can also in principle block this attack -- we suspect the industry standard SELinux policy may restrict this attack's scope but the exact scope of protection hasn't been analysed. This is exploitable using runc directly as well as through Docker and Kubernetes. The issue is fixed in runc v1.1.14 and v1.2.0-rc3. Some workarounds are available. Using user namespaces restricts this attack fairly significantly such that the attacker can only create inodes in directories that the remapped root user/group has write access to. Unless the root user is remapped to an actual user on the host (such as with rootless containers that don't use `/etc/sub[ug]id`), this in practice means that an attacker would only be able to create inodes in world-writable directories. A strict enough SELinux or AppArmor policy could in principle also restrict the scope if a specific label is applied to the runc runtime, though neither the extent to which the standard existing policies block this attack nor what exact policies are needed to sufficiently restrict this attack have been thoroughly tested.

You can find information about how to handle this issue in the security team's documentation.

Created: 2024-09-03 Last update: 2025-11-23 06:30

3 new commits since last upload, is it time to release? normal

vcswatch reports that this package seems to have new commits in its VCS but has not yet updated debian/changelog. You should consider updating the Debian changelog and uploading this new version into the archive.

Here are the relevant commit logs:

commit 937efd87a20dea89c728e468fccacdcf3dcfb5eb
Author: Reinhard Tartler <siretart@tauware.de>
Date:   Sun Nov 16 11:28:18 2025 -0500

    debian/changelog: update

commit 0f19b30db99b97564550e3d090756281774293a2
Author: Reinhard Tartler <siretart@tauware.de>
Date:   Sun Nov 16 11:34:57 2025 -0500

    debian/control: Drop redundant Rules-Requires-Root

commit 43b2890359442aa33de8c859a7dba197a4b50998
Author: Reinhard Tartler <siretart@tauware.de>
Date:   Sun Nov 16 11:19:12 2025 -0500

    debian/watch: add Dversion-Mangle auto stanza

Created: 2025-11-16 Last update: 2025-11-24 10:32

debian/patches: 3 patches to forward upstream low

Among the 8 debian patches available in version 1.3.3+ds1-2 of the package, we noticed the following issues:

3 patches where the metadata indicates that the patch has not yet been forwarded upstream. You should either forward the patch upstream or update the metadata to document its real status.

Created: 2023-02-26 Last update: 2025-11-18 08:31

news

[rss feed]

[2025-11-23] runc 1.3.3+ds1-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-11-17] Accepted runc 1.3.3+ds1-2 (source) into unstable (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-11-16] Accepted runc 1.3.3+ds1-1 (source) into experimental (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-11-04] runc 1.3.2+ds1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-11-02] Accepted runc 1.3.2+ds1-1 (source) into unstable (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-09-25] runc 1.3.0+ds1-4 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-09-20] Accepted runc 1.3.0+ds1-4 (source) into unstable (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-09-18] Accepted runc 1.3.0+ds1-3 (source) into unstable (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-09-15] Accepted runc 1.3.0+ds1-2 (source) into experimental (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-09-14] Accepted runc 1.3.0+ds1-1 (source) into experimental (Reinhard Tartler)
[2025-02-15] runc 1.1.15+ds1-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-02-08] Accepted runc 1.1.15+ds1-2 (source) into unstable (Gianfranco Costamagna)
[2024-11-07] runc 1.1.15+ds1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-11-04] Accepted runc 1.1.15+ds1-1 (source) into unstable (Jochen Sprickerhof)
[2024-10-20] runc 1.1.12+ds1-5.1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-10-18] Accepted runc 1.1.12+ds1-5.1 (source) into unstable (Gianfranco Costamagna)
[2024-08-20] runc 1.1.12+ds1-5 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-08-20] runc 1.1.12+ds1-5 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-08-17] Accepted runc 1.1.12+ds1-5 (source) into unstable (Reinhard Tartler)
[2024-08-11] Accepted runc 1.0.0~rc93+ds1-5+deb11u5 (source all amd64) into oldstable-proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Daniel Leidert)
[2024-08-08] Accepted runc 1.1.12+ds1-4 (source) into experimental (Reinhard Tartler)
[2024-08-08] Accepted runc 1.1.12+ds1-3 (source) into experimental (Reinhard Tartler)
[2024-06-29] Accepted runc 1.0.0~rc93+ds1-5+deb11u4 (source all amd64) into oldstable-proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Daniel Leidert)
[2024-03-15] runc 1.1.12+ds1-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-02-27] Accepted runc 1.1.12+ds1-2 (source) into unstable (Shengjing Zhu)
[2024-02-19] Accepted runc 1.0.0~rc6+dfsg1-3+deb10u3 (source all amd64) into oldoldstable (Daniel Leidert)
[2024-02-08] runc 1.1.12+ds1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-02-04] Accepted runc 1.0.0~rc93+ds1-5+deb11u3 (source) into oldstable-proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Shengjing Zhu)
[2024-02-04] Accepted runc 1.1.5+ds1-1+deb12u1 (source) into proposed-updates (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Shengjing Zhu)
[2024-02-04] Accepted runc 1.0.0~rc93+ds1-5+deb11u3 (source) into oldstable-security (Debian FTP Masters) (signed by: Shengjing Zhu)

bugs [bug history graph]

all: 2
RC: 0
I&N: 2
M&W: 0
F&P: 0
patch: 0

links

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ubuntu

[Information about Ubuntu for Debian Developers]

version: 1.1.15+ds1-2ubuntu1
3 bugs
patches for 1.1.15+ds1-2ubuntu1