There are 3 open security issues in trixie.
3 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2026-82251:
(needs triaging)
gitoxide before 0.52.1 fails to validate submodule names from .gitmodules configuration, allowing path traversal when deriving submodule git directories. Attackers can craft malicious submodule names with traversal segments to redirect state() and open() functions to repositories outside .git/modules, causing repository confusion and inspection of attacker-controlled repositories.
- CVE-2026-82252:
(needs triaging)
gitoxide before 0.52.1 follows symlinks when reading the worktree .gitmodules file, allowing attackers to inject out-of-repository bytes into submodule metadata. Attackers can create a malicious repository with a symlinked .gitmodules pointing outside the repository tree, causing gitoxide to parse arbitrary external files as submodule configuration and expose attacker-controlled name, path, and url values.
- CVE-2026-82253:
(needs triaging)
gitoxide (Rust crates gix <= 0.72.0 and gix-validate <= 0.10.0) contains a path traversal vulnerability. The submodule name validation function in gix-validate only checks the first occurrence of '..' via name.find(b".."), allowing crafted names such as 'a..b/../../../.git/' to bypass the check; additionally this validation is never invoked in production code paths. Combined with a trust inheritance flaw in Submodule::open(), where the parent repository's git_dir_trust (Trust::Full) is cloned and the ownership verification is skipped, an attacker can craft a malicious .gitmodules file so that a victim tool built on gitoxide reads arbitrary git repository configuration (including embedded credentials) with full trust, bypassing safe-directory protections. Fixed in gix 0.82.0 and gix-validate 0.11.1.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/r/rust-gix.png){kind=link}