Marked for autoremoval on 14 December: #1152685high
Version 0.64.1-2 of rust-russh is marked for autoremoval from testing on Mon 14 Dec 2026. It is affected by #1152685. The removal of rust-russh will also cause the removal of (transitive) reverse dependencies: dromedary, rust-dromedary, rust-hussh, rust-sftp. You should try to prevent the removal by fixing these RC bugs.
CVE-2026-116696:
russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. Prior to 0.65.0, russh::keys::agent::server::serve in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs accepts repeated SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM records while adding a key and appends every Constraint::Confirm record to the key's retained constraint vector without a count or memory limit. A process that can connect to the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent session, can repeatedly add constrained keys and cause renewable memory growth that persists for the process lifetime because keys without a lifetime constraint do not expire. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.
CVE-2026-116773:
russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. Prior to 0.65.0, the client Session::process_packet path in russh/src/client/encrypted.rs accepts repeated packets encoded with russh's private msg::EXT_INFO = 7 before authentication, while the standards-compliant EXT_INFO message number 82 does not reach the affected handler. The handle_ext_info function appends every parsed extension name to received_extensions without clearing, deduplicating, or bounding the vector. A malicious SSH server that deliberately sends private message number 7 can therefore retain an unbounded number of attacker-controlled extension names for the session lifetime, causing progressive client memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.
CVE-2026-116774:
russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.60.0 until 0.65.0, channel-open parsing accepts a peer-declared maximum_packet_size of zero and passes it into ChannelTx::poll_writable in russh/src/channels/io/tx.rs. The Channel::data, Channel::make_writer, and Channel::into_stream asynchronous write paths then calculate a writable size of zero and remain pending forever because window adjustments cannot satisfy a static zero packet maximum. An authenticated client can strand server writes, and a malicious server can strand client writes, allowing affected tasks, channels, and connections to accumulate without surfacing an error. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.
CVE-2026-116794:
russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.
CVE-2026-128087:
russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From version 0.55.0 until version 0.65.1, the initial key exchange invokes client::Handler::kex_done() with the raw shared secret before check_server_key() accepts the server host key or certificate. A malicious SSH server can therefore trigger application-defined secondary-channel initialization or early data handling even when the server identity is subsequently rejected. Ordinary clients that keep the callback's no-op default or independently defer callback-derived actions until trust is confirmed are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.1.
CVE-2026-128088:
russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. Prior to version 0.65.1, try_sign() captures an Arc<PrivateKey> before awaiting Agent::confirm() and does not revalidate the shared lock state or key presence after the await. This is a distinct residual defect in the remediation for CVE-2026-116794. A peer, including a remote SSH server using agent forwarding, can begin a confirmation-constrained signature request while the agent is unlocked and receive the signature after another connection locks the agent if the stale confirmation returns true. New post-lock requests are rejected and private key material is not disclosed, but the pending operation bypasses the current lock state. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.1.
The package has not entered testing even though the delay is over
normal
The package has not entered testing even though the 2-day delay is over.Check why.
Among the 3 debian patches
available in version 0.65.1-2 of the package,
we noticed the following issues:
3 patches
where the metadata indicates that the patch has not yet been forwarded
upstream. You should either forward the patch upstream or update the
metadata to document its real status.