There are 7 open security issues in trixie.
7 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2026-27168:
(needs triaging)
SAIL is a cross-platform library for loading and saving images with support for animation, metadata, and ICC profiles. All versions are vulnerable to Heap-based Buffer Overflow through the XWD parser's use of the bytes_per_line value. The value os read directly from the file as the read size in io->strict_read(), and is never compared to the actual size of the destination buffer. An attacker can provide an XWD file with an arbitrarily large bytes_per_line, causing a massive write operation beyond the buffer heap allocated for the image pixels. The issue did not have a fix at the time of publication.
- CVE-2026-40492:
(needs triaging)
SAIL is a cross-platform library for loading and saving images with support for animation, metadata, and ICC profiles. Prior to commit 36aa5c7ec8a2bb35f6fb867a1177a6f141156b02, the XWD codec resolves pixel format based on `pixmap_depth` but the byte-swap code uses `bits_per_pixel` independently. When `pixmap_depth=8` (BPP8_INDEXED, 1 byte/pixel buffer) but `bits_per_pixel=32`, the byte-swap loop accesses memory as `uint32_t*`, reading/writing 4x the allocated buffer size. This is a different vulnerability from the previously reported GHSA-3g38-x2pj-mv55 (CVE-2026-27168), which addressed `bytes_per_line` validation. Commit 36aa5c7ec8a2bb35f6fb867a1177a6f141156b02 contains a patch.
- CVE-2026-40493:
(needs triaging)
SAIL is a cross-platform library for loading and saving images with support for animation, metadata, and ICC profiles. Prior to commit c930284445ea3ff94451ccd7a57c999eca3bc979, the PSD codec computes bytes-per-pixel (`bpp`) from raw header fields `channels * depth`, but the pixel buffer is allocated based on the resolved pixel format. For LAB mode with `channels=3, depth=16`, `bpp = (3*16+7)/8 = 6`, but the format `BPP40_CIE_LAB` allocates only 5 bytes per pixel. Every pixel write overshoots, causing a deterministic heap buffer overflow on every row. Commit c930284445ea3ff94451ccd7a57c999eca3bc979 contains a patch.
- CVE-2026-40494:
(needs triaging)
SAIL is a cross-platform library for loading and saving images with support for animation, metadata, and ICC profiles. Prior to commit 45d48d1f2e8e0d73e80bc1fd5310cb57f4547302, the TGA codec's RLE decoder in `tga.c` has an asymmetric bounds check vulnerability. The run-packet path (line 297) correctly clamps the repeat count to the remaining buffer space, but the raw-packet path (line 305-311) has no equivalent bounds check. This allows writing up to 496 bytes of attacker-controlled data past the end of a heap buffer. Commit 45d48d1f2e8e0d73e80bc1fd5310cb57f4547302 patches the issue.
- CVE-2026-54626:
(needs triaging)
SAIL is a cross-platform library for loading and saving images with support for animation, metadata, and ICC profiles. In 0.9.10 and earlier, the TGA_INDEXED_RLE path selected by image_type == 9 allocates an image buffer using the one-byte-per-pixel SAIL_PIXEL_FORMAT_BPP8_INDEXED format returned by tga_private_sail_pixel_format() in src/sail-codecs/tga/helpers.c, while sail_codec_load_frame_v8_tga() in src/sail-codecs/tga/tga.c derives a two-to-four-byte pixel_size from an attacker-controlled header bpp value from 9 through 32. Loading a crafted color-mapped run-length-encoded TGA through sail_load_from_file() or sail_load_from_memory() therefore writes attacker-controlled bytes beyond the heap pixel buffer. The pixel-count clamp added for CVE-2026-40494 does not constrain the per-pixel write width, so this issue is an incomplete fix of that vulnerability and can cause heap corruption, a reliable crash, or potential code execution. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.0.
- CVE-2026-54627:
(needs triaging)
SAIL is a cross-platform library for loading and saving images with support for animation, metadata, and ICC profiles. In 0.9.10 and earlier, psd_private_sail_pixel_format() in src/sail-codecs/psd/helpers.c resolves a one-channel PSD in Bitmap color mode to SAIL_PIXEL_FORMAT_BPP1_INDEXED without requiring the file depth to be one, so the pixel buffer uses one-bit rows while sail_codec_load_frame_v8_psd() in src/sail-codecs/psd/psd.c accepts depth == 8 and writes one attacker-controlled byte per pixel. Loading a crafted PSD through sail_load_from_file() or sail_load_from_memory() therefore writes beyond each heap row, causing memory corruption, a reliable crash, or potential code execution. This mode/depth mismatch is distinct from GHSA-rcqx-gc76-r9mv and GHSA-wcj8-hxxf-pq2c. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.0.
- CVE-2026-54692:
(needs triaging)
SAIL is a cross-platform library for loading and saving images with support for animation, metadata, and ICC profiles. Prior to 1.0.0, sail_codec_load_frame_v8_xbm() in src/sail-codecs/xbm/xbm.c allocates the decoded pixel buffer using the X11 one-byte-per-literal layout, but an X10 static short file causes the flat decode loop to write two file-controlled bytes per literal. When ceil(width/8) produces an odd row stride, the X10 literal count includes a padding byte for every row, but the destination has no space for those bytes, so loading the XBM through sail_load_from_file, sail_load_from_memory, or sail_start_loading_* produces a forward heap overwrite that scales with image height. The X11 static char path is not affected. The overwrite can corrupt process state, cause reliable crashes, and potentially enable code execution in a susceptible consuming application. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.0.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/s/sail.png){kind=link}