There are 10 open security issues in trixie.
2 important issues:
- CVE-2026-10582:
Hugo's security.http.urls allowlist is the only control on outbound fetches made by resources.GetRemote, and it inspects the URL text alone. CheckAllowedHTTPURL in config/security/securityConfig.go applies the configured pattern list and then re-checks a canonicalised form of an integer, hex or octal IPv4 host, but it never resolves the hostname and never inspects the address the HTTP client actually connects to. The client constructed in resources/resource_factories/create/create.go installs no dial-time hook, so no check occurs at connection time either. A hostname that resolves to a loopback, private or cloud-metadata address therefore satisfies the policy, and the response body is embedded in the generated site. An attacker who can supply a URL through content, for example a front-matter field or a CMS field, can make the build fetch an internal endpoint and publish the response in the static output, so the build artifact itself carries the data out.
- CVE-2026-10618:
Hugo's default fenced-code-block renderer writes attribute values taken from the code-fence info string into the rendered HTML without escaping them. New in markup/internal/attributes/attributes.go converts every attribute value from a byte slice to a string as it is stored, deliberately dropping the escaping that used to happen there, and RenderAttributes in the same file escapes only values that are still byte slices, so its escaping branch is never reached and every value is written verbatim. The function's documentation states that it performs HTML escaping of string attributes, which it does not. A quote inside an attribute value in the info string therefore terminates the attribute and allows a further attribute, including an event handler, to be placed on the wrapper element, and the script runs for every visitor who loads the page. This path is reached under the default configuration, with code fences enabled and without goldmark's unsafe setting or any custom render hook. Attribute names beginning with on are filtered when the attributes are parsed, so injection is achieved through the value rather than the name.
8 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2024-55601:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. Starting in version 0.123.0 and prior to version 0.139.4, some HTML attributes in Markdown in the internal templates listed below not escaped in internal render hooks. Those whoa re impacted are Hugo users who do not trust their Markdown content files and are using one or more of these templates: `_default/_markup/render-link.html` from `v0.123.0`; `_default/_markup/render-image.html` from `v0.123.0`; `_default/_markup/render-table.html` from `v0.134.0`; and/or `shortcodes/youtube.html` from `v0.125.0`. This issue is patched in v0.139.4. As a workaround, one may replace an affected component with user defined templates or disable the internal templates.
- CVE-2026-35166:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. From 0.60.0 to before 0.159.2, links and image links in the default markdown to HTML renderer are not properly escaped. Hugo users who trust their Markdown content or have custom render hooks for links and images are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.159.2.
- CVE-2026-44301:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. From 0.43 to before 0.161.0, when building a Hugo site that uses Node-based asset pipelines (PostCSS, Babel, TailwindCSS), Hugo invoked the configured Node tools without restrictions on file system access. As a result, executing hugo against an untrusted site could allow code running through these tools to read or write files outside the project's working directory. Users who do not use PostCSS, Babel, or TailwindCSS, or who only build trusted sites, are not affected. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.161.0.
- CVE-2026-50133:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. Prior to 0.162.0, Hugo accepts content files in several markup formats. Files mapped to the text/html media type (typically .html files under /content, or pages produced by a content adapter that sets content.mediaType = "text/html") had their body emitted verbatim into the rendered page. A site that ingests HTML content from an untrusted source could therefore be served stored cross-site scripting. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.162.0.
- CVE-2026-50134:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. From 0.91.0 until 0.162.0, resources.GetRemote enforces security.http.urls on the URL it is called with, but it did not re-validate intermediate URLs on HTTP 3xx redirects. An allowed server (or an attacker controlling its DNS or response) could therefore redirect the request to a host that the policy was meant to forbid and Hugo would fetch from the redirected target. The same bypass also lifted any host-shape restriction the operator had put in place. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.162.0.
- CVE-2026-50135:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. From 0.123.0 to 0.161.1, a regression made RootMappingFs.statRoot use Stat (follows symlinks) instead of Lstat , so a direct resources.Get of a symlink pointing outside its mount returned the target's contents — letting a symlink planted in a local mount (e.g. a vendored themes/ theme) read arbitrary files accessible to the Hugo user. Go-module themes from GitHub (symlinks stripped) and directory walks were unaffected. Fixed in 0.162.0.
- CVE-2026-58402:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. From 0.60.0 until 0.163.3, Hugo's default code-block renderer wrote the Markdown code-fence language or info-string into the code class="language-…" data-lang="…" wrapper without HTML escaping. A fence info-string containing a quote and a script payload breaks out of the attribute and injects a live script element. This issue is fixed in 0.163.3.
- CVE-2026-58403:
(needs triaging)
Hugo is a static site generator. From v0.123.0 through v0.163.0, Hugo's virtual filesystem is designed so that files under a mount cannot reach outside the mount tree, but a regression caused RootMappingFs.statRoot to call Stat, which follows symlinks, instead of Lstat, so a direct os.ReadFile "somefile" where somefile was a symlink pointing outside the mount would return the target's contents. This effectively let a symlink planted inside a theme or local mount read arbitrary files reachable to the user running hugo. This issue is fixed in v0.163.1.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/h/hugo.png){kind=link}