Version of asterisk is marked for autoremoval from testing on Mon 13 Nov 2017. It depends (transitively) on pjproject, affected by 877364. You should try to prevent the removal by fixing these RC bugs.
CVE-2011-3389: The SSL protocol, as used in certain configurations in Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Opera, and other products, encrypts data by using CBC mode with chained initialization vectors, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to obtain plaintext HTTP headers via a blockwise chosen-boundary attack (BCBA) on an HTTPS session, in conjunction with JavaScript code that uses (1) the HTML5 WebSocket API, (2) the Java URLConnection API, or (3) the Silverlight WebClient API, aka a "BEAST" attack.
CVE-2016-9938: An issue was discovered in Asterisk Open Source 11.x before 11.25.1, 13.x before 13.13.1, and 14.x before 14.2.1 and Certified Asterisk 11.x before 11.6-cert16 and 13.x before 13.8-cert4. The chan_sip channel driver has a liberal definition for whitespace when attempting to strip the content between a SIP header name and a colon character. Rather than following RFC 3261 and stripping only spaces and horizontal tabs, Asterisk treats any non-printable ASCII character as if it were whitespace. This means that headers such as Contact\x01: will be seen as a valid Contact header. This mostly does not pose a problem until Asterisk is placed in tandem with an authenticating SIP proxy. In such a case, a crafty combination of valid and invalid To headers can cause a proxy to allow an INVITE request into Asterisk without authentication since it believes the request is an in-dialog request. However, because of the bug described above, the request will look like an out-of-dialog request to Asterisk. Asterisk will then process the request as a new call. The result is that Asterisk can process calls from unvetted sources without any authentication. If you do not use a proxy for authentication, then this issue does not affect you. If your proxy is dialog-aware (meaning that the proxy keeps track of what dialogs are currently valid), then this issue does not affect you. If you use chan_pjsip instead of chan_sip, then this issue does not affect you.
CVE-2016-2232: Asterisk Open Source 1.8.x, 11.x before 11.21.1, 12.x, and 13.x before 13.7.1 and Certified Asterisk 1.8.28, 11.6 before 11.6-cert12, and 13.1 before 13.1-cert3 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (uninitialized pointer dereference and crash) via a zero length error correcting redundancy packet for a UDPTL FAX packet that is lost.
CVE-2017-14603: In Asterisk 11.x before 11.25.3, 13.x before 13.17.2, and 14.x before 14.6.2 and Certified Asterisk 11.x before 11.6-cert18 and 13.x before 13.13-cert6, insufficient RTCP packet validation could allow reading stale buffer contents and when combined with the "nat" and "symmetric_rtp" options allow redirecting where Asterisk sends the next RTCP report.
CVE-2017-14099: In res/res_rtp_asterisk.c in Asterisk 11.x before 11.25.2, 13.x before 13.17.1, and 14.x before 14.6.1 and Certified Asterisk 11.x before 11.6-cert17 and 13.x before 13.13-cert5, unauthorized data disclosure (media takeover in the RTP stack) is possible with careful timing by an attacker. The "strictrtp" option in rtp.conf enables a feature of the RTP stack that learns the source address of media for a session and drops any packets that do not originate from the expected address. This option is enabled by default in Asterisk 11 and above. The "nat" and "rtp_symmetric" options (for chan_sip and chan_pjsip, respectively) enable symmetric RTP support in the RTP stack. This uses the source address of incoming media as the target address of any sent media. This option is not enabled by default, but is commonly enabled to handle devices behind NAT. A change was made to the strict RTP support in the RTP stack to better tolerate late media when a reinvite occurs. When combined with the symmetric RTP support, this introduced an avenue where media could be hijacked. Instead of only learning a new address when expected, the new code allowed a new source address to be learned at all times. If a flood of RTP traffic was received, the strict RTP support would allow the new address to provide media, and (with symmetric RTP enabled) outgoing traffic would be sent to this new address, allowing the media to be hijacked. Provided the attacker continued to send traffic, they would continue to receive traffic as well.
CVE-2016-2316: chan_sip in Asterisk Open Source 1.8.x, 11.x before 11.21.1, 12.x, and 13.x before 13.7.1 and Certified Asterisk 1.8.28, 11.6 before 11.6-cert12, and 13.1 before 13.1-cert3, when the timert1 sip.conf configuration is set to a value greater than 1245, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (file descriptor consumption) via vectors related to large retransmit timeout values.
Please fix them.
testing migrations
This package will soon be part of the auto-srtp transition. You might want to ensure that your package is ready for it.
You can probably find supplementary information in the
debian-release
archives or in the corresponding
release.debian.org
bug.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/a/asterisk.png){kind=link}