gh - Debian Package Tracker

general

source: gh (main)
version: 2.46.0-4
maintainer: Debian Go Packaging Team (DMD)
uploaders: Otto Kekäläinen [DMD] – Loren M. Lang [DMD]
arch: any
std-ver: 4.6.2
VCS: Git (Browse, QA)

versions [more versions can be listed by madison] [old versions available from snapshot.debian.org]

[pool directory]

oldstable: 2.23.0+dfsg1-1
stable: 2.46.0-3
unstable: 2.46.0-4

versioned links

2.23.0+dfsg1-1: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
2.46.0-3: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]
2.46.0-4: [.dsc, use dget on this link to retrieve source package] [changelog] [copyright] [rules] [control]

binaries

gh (4 bugs: 2, 1, 1, 0)

action needed

Debci reports failed tests high

unstable: pass (log)
The tests ran in 0:01:41
Last run: 2026-05-25T07:07:08.000Z
Previous status: unknown

testing: fail (log)
The tests ran in 0:01:29
Last run: 2025-12-04T19:06:51.000Z
Previous status: unknown

stable: pass (log)
The tests ran in 0:02:13
Last run: 2026-08-14T03:00:31.000Z
Previous status: unknown

Created: 2025-11-05 Last update: 2026-08-24 03:30

A new upstream version is available: 2.97.0 high

A new upstream version 2.97.0 is available, you should consider packaging it.

Created: 2025-11-27 Last update: 2026-08-24 03:03

6 security issues in sid high

There are 6 open security issues in sid.

6 important issues:

CVE-2026-45803: `gh` is GitHub’s official command line tool. From 1.6.0 to before 2.92.0, a security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow terminal escape sequence injection when users view GitHub Actions workflow logs using gh run view --log or gh run view --log-failed. The vulnerability stems from the way GitHub CLI handles raw Actions log output. The gh run view --log and gh run view --log-failed commands stream workflow log lines to stdout or the configured pager without sanitizing terminal control sequences. An attacker who can influence GitHub Actions log content, for example via a PR triggered workflow, can embed escape sequences that are replayed in the user's terminal when they inspect the run. Depending on the victim's terminal emulator, injected sequences could change the window title, manipulate on screen content, or in some terminal emulators (such as screen) potentially execute arbitrary commands. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.92.0.
CVE-2026-59831: GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. From 2.10.0 through 2.95.0, connecting to a malicious Codespace with gh codespace jupyter can allow command execution because the command opens a JupyterLab URL supplied by a process inside the Codespace without validating that it is a loopback HTTP or HTTPS address, allowing a crafted vscode:// or vscode-insiders:// URL to be handed to VS Code. This issue is fixed in version 2.96.0.
CVE-2026-64652: GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub's official command line tool. Prior to version 2.97.0, gh auth status masked only the characters after the last underscore in certain fine-grained personal access tokens and GitHub App tokens. As a result, part of an affected token could appear in terminal or CI output that is captured or shared. Authenticated users are affected if they ran gh auth status (without the --show-token flag) with a token type whose format contains an underscore after the prefix. This includes fine-grained personal access tokens (github_pat_*) and GitHub App installation and user access tokens (ghs_*, ghu_*; for example, ghs_<APPID>_<JWT>), as well as the Actions GITHUB_TOKEN. Classic tokens such as gho_* and ghp_* have an underscore-free body and are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.
CVE-2026-64653: GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.97.0, some HTTP request URLs interpolate variable path components without percent encoding, allowing URL path metacharacters in attacker-controlled repository or resource values to make gh address a different API endpoint or resource than the user intended. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.
CVE-2026-64654: GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub's official command line tool. Prior to version 2.97.0, multiple GitHub CLI commands printed externally controlled gist, API, pull request, release, codespace, skill, or agent-task content without neutralizing terminal escape sequences. An attacker who can influence that content can embed escape sequences that are interpreted by the terminal of a user who runs an affected command, with impact ranging from cosmetic manipulation of the title or on-screen content to, on some terminal emulators, command execution. This extends the same class of issue as CVE-2026-45803—which addressed only gh run view --log—to the other affected command paths. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.
CVE-2026-64655: GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.97.0, gh attestation verify builds the certificate Subject Alternative Name matcher from the --signer-repo and --signer-workflow flag values without escaping regex metacharacters, so a user-supplied repository or workflow name is treated as a regular expression rather than a literal string. Because GitHub permits characters such as `.` in organization, repository, and workflow path names and `.` is a regex wildcard, an attacker can register a lookalike name (for example github/artifact.attestations-workflows) that satisfies a matcher intended for a different trusted signer (github/artifact-attestations-workflows), bypassing the intended Sigstore attestation verification. Exploitation requires the attacker to create a plausible lookalike repository and produce valid attestations from it, which could undermine supply chain verification for CI/CD pipelines or policy gates that pin trust to a specific signing workflow. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.

Created: 2026-05-17 Last update: 2026-08-14 20:30

9 security issues in bookworm high

There are 9 open security issues in bookworm.

6 important issues:

CVE-2024-52308: The GitHub CLI version 2.6.1 and earlier are vulnerable to remote code execution through a malicious codespace SSH server when using `gh codespace ssh` or `gh codespace logs` commands. This has been patched in the cli v2.62.0. Developers connect to remote codespaces through an SSH server running within the devcontainer, which is generally provided through the [default devcontainer image]( https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-... https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration) . GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/inv... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244 ), such as remote username, which is used in [executing `ssh` commands]( https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L2... https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263 ) for `gh codespace ssh` or `gh codespace logs` commands. This exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects `ssh` arguments within the SSH connection details. `gh codespace ssh` and `gh codespace logs` commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like `-oProxyCommand="echo hacked" #`. The `-oProxyCommand` flag causes `ssh` to execute the provided command while `#` shell comment causes any other `ssh` arguments to be ignored. In `2.62.0`, the remote username information is being validated before being used.
CVE-2026-59831: GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. From 2.10.0 through 2.95.0, connecting to a malicious Codespace with gh codespace jupyter can allow command execution because the command opens a JupyterLab URL supplied by a process inside the Codespace without validating that it is a loopback HTTP or HTTPS address, allowing a crafted vscode:// or vscode-insiders:// URL to be handed to VS Code. This issue is fixed in version 2.96.0.
CVE-2026-64652: GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub's official command line tool. Prior to version 2.97.0, gh auth status masked only the characters after the last underscore in certain fine-grained personal access tokens and GitHub App tokens. As a result, part of an affected token could appear in terminal or CI output that is captured or shared. Authenticated users are affected if they ran gh auth status (without the --show-token flag) with a token type whose format contains an underscore after the prefix. This includes fine-grained personal access tokens (github_pat_*) and GitHub App installation and user access tokens (ghs_*, ghu_*; for example, ghs_<APPID>_<JWT>), as well as the Actions GITHUB_TOKEN. Classic tokens such as gho_* and ghp_* have an underscore-free body and are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.
CVE-2026-64653: GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.97.0, some HTTP request URLs interpolate variable path components without percent encoding, allowing URL path metacharacters in attacker-controlled repository or resource values to make gh address a different API endpoint or resource than the user intended. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.
CVE-2026-64654: GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub's official command line tool. Prior to version 2.97.0, multiple GitHub CLI commands printed externally controlled gist, API, pull request, release, codespace, skill, or agent-task content without neutralizing terminal escape sequences. An attacker who can influence that content can embed escape sequences that are interpreted by the terminal of a user who runs an affected command, with impact ranging from cosmetic manipulation of the title or on-screen content to, on some terminal emulators, command execution. This extends the same class of issue as CVE-2026-45803—which addressed only gh run view --log—to the other affected command paths. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.
CVE-2026-64655: GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.97.0, gh attestation verify builds the certificate Subject Alternative Name matcher from the --signer-repo and --signer-workflow flag values without escaping regex metacharacters, so a user-supplied repository or workflow name is treated as a regular expression rather than a literal string. Because GitHub permits characters such as `.` in organization, repository, and workflow path names and `.` is a regex wildcard, an attacker can register a lookalike name (for example github/artifact.attestations-workflows) that satisfies a matcher intended for a different trusted signer (github/artifact-attestations-workflows), bypassing the intended Sigstore attestation verification. Exploitation requires the attacker to create a plausible lookalike repository and produce valid attestations from it, which could undermine supply chain verification for CI/CD pipelines or policy gates that pin trust to a specific signing workflow. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.

3 issues postponed or untriaged:

CVE-2024-53858: (needs triaging) The gh cli is GitHub’s official command line tool. A security vulnerability has been identified in the GitHub CLI that could leak authentication tokens when cloning repositories containing `git` submodules hosted outside of GitHub.com and ghe.com. This vulnerability stems from several `gh` commands used to clone a repository with submodules from a non-GitHub host including `gh repo clone`, `gh repo fork`, and `gh pr checkout`. These GitHub CLI commands invoke git with instructions to retrieve authentication tokens using the `credential.helper` configuration variable for any host encountered. Prior to version `2.63.0`, hosts other than GitHub.com and ghe.com are treated as GitHub Enterprise Server hosts and have tokens sourced from the following environment variables before falling back to host-specific tokens stored within system-specific secured storage: 1. `GITHUB_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN`, 2. `GH_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN` and 3. `GITHUB_TOKEN` when the `CODESPACES` environment variable is set. The result being `git` sending authentication tokens when cloning submodules. In version `2.63.0`, these GitHub CLI commands will limit the hosts for which `gh` acts as a credential helper to source authentication tokens. Additionally, `GITHUB_TOKEN` will only be used for GitHub.com and ghe.com. Users are advised to upgrade. Additionally users are advised to revoke authentication tokens used with the GitHub CLI and to review their personal security log and any relevant audit logs for actions associated with their account or enterprise
CVE-2024-54132: (needs triaging) The GitHub CLI is GitHub’s official command line tool. A security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could create or overwrite files in unintended directories when users download a malicious GitHub Actions workflow artifact through gh run download. This vulnerability stems from a GitHub Actions workflow artifact named .. when downloaded using gh run download. The artifact name and --dir flag are used to determine the artifact’s download path. When the artifact is named .., the resulting files within the artifact are extracted exactly 1 directory higher than the specified --dir flag value. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.63.1.
CVE-2026-45803: (needs triaging) `gh` is GitHub’s official command line tool. From 1.6.0 to before 2.92.0, a security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow terminal escape sequence injection when users view GitHub Actions workflow logs using gh run view --log or gh run view --log-failed. The vulnerability stems from the way GitHub CLI handles raw Actions log output. The gh run view --log and gh run view --log-failed commands stream workflow log lines to stdout or the configured pager without sanitizing terminal control sequences. An attacker who can influence GitHub Actions log content, for example via a PR triggered workflow, can embed escape sequences that are replayed in the user's terminal when they inspect the run. Depending on the victim's terminal emulator, injected sequences could change the window title, manipulate on screen content, or in some terminal emulators (such as screen) potentially execute arbitrary commands. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.92.0.

Created: 2024-11-18 Last update: 2026-08-14 20:30

The package has not entered testing even though the delay is over normal

The package has not entered testing even though the 2-day delay is over. Check why.

Created: 2026-04-13 Last update: 2026-08-24 03:03

1 new commit since last upload, is it time to release? normal

vcswatch reports that this package seems to have new commits in its VCS but has not yet updated debian/changelog. You should consider updating the Debian changelog and uploading this new version into the archive.

Here are the relevant commit logs:

commit c0c67597a6840a0b00e0120d493c07fa657ff13b
Author: Otto Kekäläinen <otto@debian.org>
Date:   Sat Jan 3 22:25:22 2026 -0800

    Enable Salsa CI using default template

https://salsa.debian.org/api/v4/projects/go-team%2Fpackages%2Fgh API request failed: 401 Unauthorized at /srv/qa.debian.org/data/vcswatch/vcswatch line 410.

Created: 2026-01-04 Last update: 2026-08-23 21:21

6 low-priority security issues in trixie low

There are 6 open security issues in trixie.

6 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:

CVE-2026-45803: (needs triaging) `gh` is GitHub’s official command line tool. From 1.6.0 to before 2.92.0, a security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow terminal escape sequence injection when users view GitHub Actions workflow logs using gh run view --log or gh run view --log-failed. The vulnerability stems from the way GitHub CLI handles raw Actions log output. The gh run view --log and gh run view --log-failed commands stream workflow log lines to stdout or the configured pager without sanitizing terminal control sequences. An attacker who can influence GitHub Actions log content, for example via a PR triggered workflow, can embed escape sequences that are replayed in the user's terminal when they inspect the run. Depending on the victim's terminal emulator, injected sequences could change the window title, manipulate on screen content, or in some terminal emulators (such as screen) potentially execute arbitrary commands. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.92.0.
CVE-2026-59831: (needs triaging) GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. From 2.10.0 through 2.95.0, connecting to a malicious Codespace with gh codespace jupyter can allow command execution because the command opens a JupyterLab URL supplied by a process inside the Codespace without validating that it is a loopback HTTP or HTTPS address, allowing a crafted vscode:// or vscode-insiders:// URL to be handed to VS Code. This issue is fixed in version 2.96.0.
CVE-2026-64652: (needs triaging) GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub's official command line tool. Prior to version 2.97.0, gh auth status masked only the characters after the last underscore in certain fine-grained personal access tokens and GitHub App tokens. As a result, part of an affected token could appear in terminal or CI output that is captured or shared. Authenticated users are affected if they ran gh auth status (without the --show-token flag) with a token type whose format contains an underscore after the prefix. This includes fine-grained personal access tokens (github_pat_*) and GitHub App installation and user access tokens (ghs_*, ghu_*; for example, ghs_<APPID>_<JWT>), as well as the Actions GITHUB_TOKEN. Classic tokens such as gho_* and ghp_* have an underscore-free body and are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.
CVE-2026-64653: (needs triaging) GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.97.0, some HTTP request URLs interpolate variable path components without percent encoding, allowing URL path metacharacters in attacker-controlled repository or resource values to make gh address a different API endpoint or resource than the user intended. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.
CVE-2026-64654: (needs triaging) GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub's official command line tool. Prior to version 2.97.0, multiple GitHub CLI commands printed externally controlled gist, API, pull request, release, codespace, skill, or agent-task content without neutralizing terminal escape sequences. An attacker who can influence that content can embed escape sequences that are interpreted by the terminal of a user who runs an affected command, with impact ranging from cosmetic manipulation of the title or on-screen content to, on some terminal emulators, command execution. This extends the same class of issue as CVE-2026-45803—which addressed only gh run view --log—to the other affected command paths. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.
CVE-2026-64655: (needs triaging) GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.97.0, gh attestation verify builds the certificate Subject Alternative Name matcher from the --signer-repo and --signer-workflow flag values without escaping regex metacharacters, so a user-supplied repository or workflow name is treated as a regular expression rather than a literal string. Because GitHub permits characters such as `.` in organization, repository, and workflow path names and `.` is a regex wildcard, an attacker can register a lookalike name (for example github/artifact.attestations-workflows) that satisfies a matcher intended for a different trusted signer (github/artifact-attestations-workflows), bypassing the intended Sigstore attestation verification. Exploitation requires the attacker to create a plausible lookalike repository and produce valid attestations from it, which could undermine supply chain verification for CI/CD pipelines or policy gates that pin trust to a specific signing workflow. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.

You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.

Created: 2026-05-17 Last update: 2026-08-14 20:30

debian/patches: 1 patch to forward upstream low

Among the 7 debian patches available in version 2.46.0-4 of the package, we noticed the following issues:

1 patch where the metadata indicates that the patch has not yet been forwarded upstream. You should either forward the patch upstream or update the metadata to document its real status.

Created: 2024-02-29 Last update: 2025-12-14 08:30

Standards version of the package is outdated. wishlist

The package should be updated to follow the last version of Debian Policy (Standards-Version 4.7.4 instead of 4.6.2).

Created: 2024-04-07 Last update: 2026-03-31 15:01

testing migrations

excuses:
- Migration status for gh (- to 2.46.0-4): BLOCKED: Rejected/violates migration policy/introduces a regression
- Issues preventing migration:
- ∙ ∙ Updating gh would introduce bugs in testing: #1119130, #1142725
- Additional info (not blocking):
- ∙ ∙ Piuparts tested OK - https://piuparts.debian.org/sid/source/g/gh.html
- ∙ ∙ Autopkgtest for gh/2.46.0-4: amd64: Pass, arm64: Pass, armhf: Pass, i386: Pass, ppc64el: Pass, s390x: Pass
- ∙ ∙ Reproduced on amd64 - info
- ∙ ∙ Reproduced on arm64 - info
- ∙ ∙ Reproduced on armhf - info
- ∙ ∙ Reproduced on i386 - info
- ∙ ∙ Required age reduced by 3 days because of autopkgtest
- ∙ ∙ 253 days old (needed 2 days)
- Not considered

news

[rss feed]

[2025-12-13] Accepted gh 2.46.0-4 (source) into unstable (Simon Josefsson)
[2025-12-11] gh REMOVED from testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-01-15] gh 2.46.0-3 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2025-01-13] Accepted gh 2.46.0-3 (source) into unstable (Otto Kekäläinen)
[2025-01-02] gh 2.46.0-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-12-30] Accepted gh 2.46.0-2 (source) into unstable (Santiago Vila)
[2024-04-23] gh 2.46.0-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-03-27] Accepted gh 2.46.0-1 (source) into unstable (Anthony Fok)
[2024-03-05] Accepted gh 2.45.0-1 (source) into unstable (Anthony Fok)
[2024-03-05] gh 2.44.1-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-02-29] Accepted gh 2.44.1-2 (source) into unstable (Shengjing Zhu)
[2024-02-22] gh 2.44.1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-02-19] Accepted gh 2.44.1-1 (source) into unstable (Anthony Fok)
[2024-02-11] gh 2.43.1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-02-07] Accepted gh 2.43.1-1 (source) into unstable (Anthony Fok)
[2024-01-27] gh 2.42.1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-01-24] Accepted gh 2.42.1-1 (source) into unstable (Anthony Fok)
[2024-01-02] gh 2.40.1+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-01-02] gh 2.40.1+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2024-01-02] gh 2.40.1+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-12-27] Accepted gh 2.40.1+dfsg1-1 (source) into unstable (Anthony Fok)
[2023-12-07] gh 2.35.0-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-12-04] Accepted gh 2.35.0-1 (source) into unstable (Anthony Fok)
[2023-11-04] gh 2.30.0-2 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-10-30] Accepted gh 2.30.0-2 (source) into unstable (Nilesh Patra)
[2023-10-18] gh 2.30.0-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-10-15] Accepted gh 2.30.0-1 (source) into unstable (Anthony Fok)
[2023-07-07] gh 2.27.0+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-07-07] gh 2.27.0+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)
[2023-07-07] gh 2.27.0+dfsg1-1 MIGRATED to testing (Debian testing watch)

bugs [bug history graph]

all: 6
RC: 2
I&N: 3
M&W: 1
F&P: 0
patch: 0

links

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version: 2.46.0-4