There are 3 open security issues in bookworm.
1 important issue:
- CVE-2026-57062:
CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax) parsing in gpgsm in GnuPG through 2.5.20 mishandles the CMS format for AES-GCM because aes-ICVlen is supposed to be 12 bytes but 4 bytes is accepted. NOTE: this is related to CVE-2026-34182.
2 issues left for the package maintainer to handle:
- CVE-2025-30258:
(needs triaging)
In GnuPG before 2.5.5, if a user chooses to import a certificate with certain crafted subkey data that lacks a valid backsig or that has incorrect usage flags, the user loses the ability to verify signatures made from certain other signing keys, aka a "verification DoS."
- CVE-2025-68972:
(needs triaging)
In GnuPG through 2.4.8, if a signed message has \f at the end of a plaintext line, an adversary can construct a modified message that places additional text after the signed material, such that signature verification of the modified message succeeds (although an "invalid armor" message is printed during verification). This is related to use of \f as a marker to denote truncation of a long plaintext line.
You can find information about how to handle these issues in the security team's documentation.
![[bug history graph]](https://qa.debian.org/data/bts/graphs/g/gnupg2.png){kind=link}